

Japan-Asia Quarterly Review

ANPO

Vol 7.No.1

winter, 1975



in this issue

- 2 Miki: Front Man for the Right.....by Yamakawa Akio
- 8 Victory at Sea: Fishing Fleet Puts Japan's Nuclear Ship out of Actionby Kaji Etsuko
- 16 The Current Status of Nuclear Power Development in Japanby Uchiyama Takuro
- 20 Nuclear Reactors: Risking the Ultimate Pollution
- 24 *AMPO* Editor Testifies at U.N.
Japan-South Africa Uranium Deals Exposed
- 26 Protest Stalls Japan-ROK Nuclear Ambitions
- 28 *PROFILE*: Kodama Yoshio
Godfather of the Japanese Right
- 32 Poems by Kim Chi Ha
"The Crime of Touching the Ground..."
- 35 South Korea's Blue House: The KCIA in the Bedroom and A Ford in the Garageby Hasegawa Kazuto
- 40 Japan-Korea Mutual Corruption Sphere:
"Money Doesn't Fall from the Sky, You Know..."
.....by Nakazawa Osamu
- 48 Pollution Export: Cutting off the Retreat
.....by Hirayama Takasada
- 52 *CIA (Cultural Imperialism in Action)*
Imperial CHIC---The "Family State" as
Pop Culture
- 54 Thieu vs. the People: A Match He Cannot Win
.....by John Spragens, Jr.
- 62 Letter from the Thai Movement
- *Interview with Saeksan*
- 63 Thailand: The Golden Age of Students Comes to an End
- 65 Free Ishikawa! 400-Year Liberation Struggle of Outcaste Burakumin at New Height
.....by Koyano Takeshi
- 73 As Arbitrary in Exit as in Entrance:
Japanese Capital's Behavior in Thailand
.....by Tsurumi Yoshiyuki
- 79 Dishonorable "White": Japanese Capital Buys into Apartheid
.....by Kitazawa Yoko
- 88 Mass Arrests in Malaysia
- 92 Students and Labor Leaders Framed in Singapore
- 93 The Soh Brothers' Case: Tortured in Pak's Prisons
- 96 Nobel Peace Prize to Sato!?

Vol. 7, No. 1
Winter, 1975
(Series No.23)

Editorial & Management Office:
AMPO, P.O. Box 5250, Tokyo
International, Japan

* * * * *

EDITORIAL BOARD

Kaji Etsuko
Kitazawa Yoko
Matsuoka Nobuo
Murata Goro
Muro Kenji
Muto Ichiyo
Oda Makoto
O'Hara Kenneth
Shimizu Tomohisa
Sodei Rinjiro
Yamakawa Akio

DESIGN DIRECTORS

Ikeda Hiroo
Kohmoto Yoichi
Toi Jugatsu

COLLECTIVE MEMBERS

G. Winstanley
Diane Peterson
Lee Peterson
Natalie Scott
Ross Baker

* * * * *

In accordance with East-Asian practice, the surname is placed first in all Japanese names.

Cover photo: Scallop fisherpeople of Mutsu Bay, Aomori Prefecture, fly *tairyo-bata* (big-catch flags) including "sun-flags" in celebration of their largest catch ever -- Japan's first nuclear ship "Mutsu". See p. 8 ff.

to our readers

The editors intended this issue to be rather thin as the foregoing one (the special issue on the Conference of Asians) happened to be so fat. But we had to revise our plan as the period between the two issues turned out far more eventful than anybody expected. The Tanaka Cabinet fell in a spasm after Tanaka himself had completed half-way round-the-world tour and hosted U.S. President Ford. Yamakawa Akio, editor of New Asia News, details this development in this issue. As one facet of the corruption that led to the change of government, Nakazawa Osamu's outspoken expose centers on the Japan-Korea nexus. (A diagram showing this nexus in the foregoing issue should be re-examined in connection with his article in this issue).

The economic recession in the meantime has modified the course of overseas economic expansion of Japanese capital, but the point should not be missed that Japanese capital (or imperialism in general) does as much evil when it drastically retreats as it does when it advances. Both sides of the matter are analysed and discussed by Tsurumi Yoshiyuki in connection with Japan's corporations in Thailand and by Hirayama Takasada who analyses "pollution export."

A highlight of this issue is the coverage of a South Africa research tour by Kitazawa Yoko, a director of PARC and editor of AMPO. She made a thorough investigation of Japanese corporate support of apartheid, and exposed Japan's violation of U.N. sanctions as a witness at U.N. commissions. This issue carries some results of her investigation work. A press report in Japan said that the Japanese U.N. delegation "got utterly confused" and was "at a loss" when Kitazawa presented her irrefutable expose.

On the side of the people's struggle, Kaji Etsuko, an AMPO editor and NAN staff reporter, vividly depicts the victory of fishermen and fisherwomen in their year-long fight against the use of their sea by the nuclear ship Mutsu. Their struggle has proven in a striking manner that there are two dramatically opposed ways of development -- that for big corporations and that for the benefit of the people, carried out by the people themselves. For the first time in this issue, AMPO has dealt with Japan's nuclear energy problem -- a problem whose negative importance is growing as the world energy situation becomes more and more critical. The author of "The Current Status of Nuclear Power in Japan," Uchiyama Takuro, is an energy affairs journalist, actively engaged in the anti-pollution movement.

AMPO continues to cover events and situations in other parts of Asia. In this issue, the current Thai situation is touched upon in two articles from Thailand, while Saigon is covered by John Spragens and Korea by Hasegawa Kazuto. Police repression continues to be the most pressing matter of concern for movements of Asian people. This issue covers trumped-up riot charge against Tan Wah Piow in Singapore and mass arrests in Malaysia, and includes Korean poet Kim Chi Ha's new jail poems.

Finally, Koyano Takeshi gives a full account of the opposition to Ishikawa frame-up in AMPO's first coverage of the ceaseless struggle of Japan's Buraku people.

photo credit

Shinoyama Kishin: front cover; pp.8, 9 and 12
Asia Photo Press: pp.33, 34 and 35
Hasegawa Kazuto: pp. 36 and 38
John Spragens, Jr.: pp. 56 and 59
Institute for Buraku Liberation: pp. 66 and 71
Buraku Liberation League: pp. 68, 69 and 70
Tsurumi Yoshiyuki: p. 76

Miki-Front Man for the Right

by Yamakawa Akio

Last December Tanaka Kakuei, with a good half-year left before the end of his term, tumbled from the Prime Minister's seat only to be replaced by another LDP boss wearing a liberal mask, Miki Takeo. Miki's nomination to the party presidency (and hence the premiership) was preceded by a major crisis within the Liberal Democratic Party, a crisis so severe it threatened to rip the party right down the line dividing the two major groups of factions -- the one led by Tanaka's ally throughout his days in power, Ohira Masayoshi, and the other by the Number 1 rival of the Tanaka-Ohira team, Fukuda Takeo.

While the opposition parties objected to the mere handing over of power from one LDP faction to another, they were too disunited to take advantage of the disarray in the ruling party. The LDP thus squeezed out of the tightest jam it's been in to date. When the critical weeks were over, Nakasone Yasuhiro (former Minister of International Trade and Industry and now LDP Secretary General) had this to say: "We avoided the danger of Japan slipping into an Italian-type situation of chronic government crisis by a hair's breadth. We are now prepared to start a roll back." (Mainichi Shimbun, December 10, 1974). But what is the political meaning of the shift of power from Tanaka to Miki, and what is the nature of the Miki regime?

FORCES THAT TOPPLED TANAKA

The immediate blow that knocked Tanaka from the premiership was an exposé by a big monthly magazine Bungei Shunju. Two articles printed in the November issue of the 700,000-circulation magazine exposed the means by which Tanaka had built up his political and personal funds through irregular business practices. They also detailed scandals involving his love affairs. The issue was sold out in a few days, and soon was fetching ¥5,000 on the black market. Never had

a magazine article aroused such widespread repercussions as this Bungei Shunju exposé did.

But this paper bomb would never have exploded had it not been for the general anti-Tanaka sentiment already widespread among the people. At the time Tanaka stepped into power with the promise to establish peace with China, polls said he enjoyed the support of more than 60 per cent of the public. But his popularity, which climaxed with his visit to Peking and the subsequent normalization of diplomatic relationship with China in the fall of 1972, then began a steady decline, hitting a low of 10 per cent in October, just before the revealing articles appeared.

A major point of discontent was the 40.6 per cent rise in the national consumer price index since Tanaka assumed the premiership. Inflation here, as elsewhere, has hit the family budget hard, and toward the end of 1973 housewives were standing in long queues to buy daily necessities because big corporations were hoarding goods in hopes of profiting from consumers' anxieties over the "oil crisis". The recession set in, causing a number of enterprises to go bankrupt with subsequent unemployment of workers. The current atmosphere in Japan is indicated by the many books on the decaying Japanese economy which fill Tokyo's bookstores.

It was against this background that the labor movement was able to turn out an unprecedented number of workers, 6.5 million, for this year's spring wage struggle. Then in July the Upper House elections. Under Tanaka's direction the LDP spent fabulous sums to buy support and went all out to mobilize corporations to get out the LDP vote. And yet when the results were in, the LDP margin in the Upper House had slipped to a bare seven seats. Business leaders were extremely alarmed, fearing the emergence

in the Diet of a united opposition outnumbering the LDP in the not-too-distant future.

Then Environment Agency Director Miki and Finance Minister Fukuda resigned in a show of defiance of Tanaka's politics, which everyone in the party claimed was responsible for the election debacle. They declared that only a "thorough reform" within the LDP would save the party. Their gesture reflected an awareness that the period of the LDP's monopoly rule was drawing to an end.

Faced by this party crisis, Tanaka chose to remain silent. Hoping to compensate for his failure in domestic policy, he made two overseas tours, to Mexico, the U.S., Canada and Brazil in September, and to Australia, New Zealand and Burma in November. The much-publicized highlight of his visit to the U.S. was an invitation to President Ford to come to Japan at the end of November. He calculated that these diplomatic successes, particularly carrying off the first visit of a U.S. president to Japan, would help him remain in power.

But the "image-up" trips and the Ford visit failed to do a thing for the premier's sagging popularity. On November 26, the day Ford left Tokyo, Tanaka called his close aides to his home to tell them that he would resign.

TANAKA FORCED OUT BY RIGHTWING

But it is important to note that the Tanaka cabinet did not fall of its own, nor was it brought down by the left. What caused the collapse of the Tanaka cabinet was the judgement of the rightwing in the LDP that the Japanese political scene would slip into uncontrollable chaos should Tanaka be allowed to stay on. As Fukuda Takeo said, "Every day Tanaka remains in office brings the sinking of the Nippon Maru one day closer."

The Bungei Shunju exposé itself was a bomb set by these intra-LDP rightists. The magazine is well-known for its right-wing tendency. For example, in the issue following the one which broke the Tanaka scandal, the magazine called for an end to the myth of a non-nuclear Japan.

So it is no accident that the article, while drawing a quite elaborate picture of Tanaka's money-making connections, a-

voided reference to money channels involving Fukuda, Nakasone, and other LDP bosses. The report also said nothing about the Korean connections which constituted one of Tanaka's main money sources (see "Japan-Korea Mutual Corruption Sphere" elsewhere in this issue). An informed source said that Fukuda provided 60 million yen for this Bungei Shunju article and let his influence be used to facilitate data collection from the Finance Ministry and National Tax Agency.

Overthrow of the Tanaka-Ohira axis, a call first put up by Seirankai, a new group of LDP ultrarightists, became the unified slogan of the right inside and outside the LDP. The pressure from the right on the Tanaka-Ohira alliance rapidly mounted in connection with the conclusion in April of the Japan-China aviation agreement which led to the suspension of Japan-Taiwan passenger service. To these Taiwan and Korea Lobbyists, Tanaka and Ohira were pro-Communists, and it was they who created the down-with-Tanaka mood within the party. It is interesting to note that at the Foreign Correspondents' Club interview with Tanaka on October 22 that spotlighted the Bungei Shunju article, it was the South Korean correspondents who quietly but effectively oriented the questioning against Tanaka.

Toward the end of November, when everyone knew that Tanaka's political days were numbered, rightwing LDP dietmembers, starting with Fukuda's sponsor Kishi Nobusuke, were following one another off on visits to Korea and Taiwan. No fewer than 73 LDP Dietmembers were on hand for Chiang Kai-shek's 88th birthday celebration. They reportedly promised Park Chung Hee and Chiang Kai-shek that they would create a new government that would reverse Tanaka's foreign policy.

What the Tanaka-removal campaign, channeled through the expose in Bungei Shunju, comes down to is a peculiar sort of right-wing coup - a type of coup possible only in a mass media-ized society. It represented a tactical victory of the right in that, by concentrating their attacks on the scandal, they were able to mobilize even the left wing for their purposes.

LDP Vice-president Shiina Etsusaburo, the man who manipulated behind the scenes to place Miki in the premiership, is him-

self a rightwinger. Before the Pacific War he was a high ranking official and drafted Japan's Manchuria Five Year Settlement Plan. When Japan was defeated he was Vice-minister of Military Procurement. In a book he wrote after the war he had this to say: "If you call Japan's rule of Manchuria an imperialist action I must say it was a glorious imperialism."

After he picked Miki Takeo as LDP president he said in an article in Mainichi Shimbun (Dec. 10) that the choice of a new party president had to be made in such a way as to wipe out "the sense of relaxation of international tensions, vaguely and widely permeating Japanese society." He is on record as being prepared to fight against this sense of relaxation in domestic affairs as well as in foreign affairs: "It would be dangerous for us to forget that an essential difference exists between the right and left. We shouldn't be tempted to think that somehow the right and left can coexist and co-prosper. Cooperation between the two is permissible only on the basis of a clear recognition of the essential difference."

THE NATURE OF THE MIKI CABINET

Everyone admits the objective possibility of Japan going left in the present turbulent international and domestic situation. It is exactly this apprehension that made the main current of the ruling class decide that the core of the political leadership should be shifted to the right wing groups. This is what the emergence of the Miki cabinet means.

The crisis of the LDP as symbolized by the crisis of Tanaka has its root in the context of the present world situation. True, Tanaka obtained overwhelming popularity by tackling the tasks of creating a new relationship with China when the anti-China cold war policy that had flourished for a quarter of a century came to its logical end. But although Tanaka thus succeeded in adapting Japan to the new Kissinger political setup, his success came just when the postwar world economic structure supported by the Breton Woods system was beginning to collapse shaking the very ground upon which the LDP had been operating for years. One of Tanaka's big mistakes was in supposing that the political situation he faced was of the sort that could be overcome by scattering money among the electorate -- the tactic that had proved effective in overcoming the previous recession in 1965. But the situation in 1972 turned out to be far more serious than Tanaka imagined. The upsurge of nationalism in the Arab world and in the Third World in general over the question of resources has presented unprecedented difficulties to expansion-oriented Japanese imperialism. This same situation served to aggravate domestic contradictions to the point that the postwar constitutional system itself could be called into question. For the postwar system has been built with rapid economic growth as its unquestioned premise. In this sense the political turmoil in Japanese politics in the latter half of 1974 bespeaks the beginning of a historical turning point in Japanese economy and politics.

An interesting factor in this situation is that the ruling groups failed to meet this historical turning point in a unified manner.

The forces represented by Fukuda favored a course of first strengthening and purifying themselves as a clear-cut rightwing force. They proposed that only



Toi Jugatsu

on this basis should control of the economy coupled with a deflationary policy be taken, and deemed it urgent to confront the left wing in an authoritarian manner.

In the meantime the party liberals, represented by Miki, emphasized labor-management collaboration and the creation of a national consensus through promoting dialogue between opposing forces, so that the Liberal Democrats could metamorphose into a party prepared to form a coalition government with a part of the progressive forces.

These two groupings have slightly different policies on the question of whether or not closer collaboration with Asian dictatorial regimes should be the guideline of Japanese diplomacy. But in the particular context that appeared in the autumn of 1974 both agreed to cooperate for the purpose of ending the Tanaka era. They aligned while fighting each other, so to speak, and what made this strange coalition possible was the common awareness that the Tanaka cabinet had to be ended and that preparatory steps taken to divide the left.

Which of these two courses of the conservatives would win out was in fact crucial, but the left had no power to take advantage of this infighting. Rather they made themselves look almost ridiculous by objectively cooperating in the rightwing-led anti-Tanaka campaign by concentrating on the scandal question rather than presenting any viable program of how the Japanese people might deal with the situation of world turmoil.

Three main facts emerge from an analysis of the LDP crisis: (1) the era of Tanaka-Ohira hegemony is over; (2) a new system of rule under the control of Party Vice President Shiina in which the rightist factions have a greater say than before has been established; and (3) the selling of this right-oriented system to the public is under way under the label of a liberal Miki regime. Should Miki strike out a bit on his own and score a few successes, all to the good as far as the main-stream rightists are concerned: how better to sap the opposition parties of whatever militancy they may still retain? The split which would result would enable the conservatives to bury the "united opposition" talked up so much of late and organize a left-right coalition government under their own leadership.

WHO'S WHO IN THE MIKI CABINET

Miki, who after all commands only a small faction in the LDP, had no choice but to acquiesce in the handing over of cabinet and party posts to his former political rivals: Fukuda became Vice Premier, Nakasone Yasuhiro party secretary, Nadao Hirokichi Chairman of the party Executive Council and Matsuno Raizo Chairman of the party Policy Research Board.

Nakasone came from a Home Ministry background (supervising the secret police guard of the emperor) before the war. Nadao is a notorious Taiwan lobbyist who served as president of the Japan-Taiwan Parliamentarians' Association. Matsuno is a confidant of Sato and Fukuda. Once a director of the Defense Agency, he is known as a staunch protagonist of a Japanese nuclear army. So the composition of the cabinet fails to conceal the victory of the rightwing.

THE POLICIES OF THE MIKI CABINET

Miki, 67, has been in the Diet continuously for 37 years, and has the longest parliamentary career of all Dietmembers. He is known for his relatively "liberal" politics, having refused to cooperate with the wartime Tojo cabinet, after the war as president of the small National Cooperatives Party, and joining the only Socialist-led cabinet after the war as Postal Minister. He is forever eulogizing "revised" capitalism, citing Robert Owen, and is one of the early politicians to advocate the normalization of diplomatic relationship with China. He is surrounded by Liberal Democratic Dietmembers who distinguish themselves from the cold war politicians.

His career is not lily-white, however. Toward the end of the war, he served as an adviser to the Ministry of Procurement of War Materials. Interestingly, Shiina Etsusaburo who nominated Miki as party president happened to be a vice-minister in the ministry when Miki was there. Though his own faction was small, Miki has held various ministries and was nominated party secretary general after his party merged with the Liberal Demo-

cratic Party. He is very good at maneuvering in a tight spot, hence his reputation as a "Balkan type" politician. He is not above political intrigue, and has on more than one occasion resorted, chameleon-like, to protective coloration switches to save his own skin. Miki is related by marriage to Anzai Hiroshi, president of Tokyo Gas Co., Anzai Masao, president of Showa Denko Co. and other leading businessmen as well as to former premier Sato Eisaku. He is even a relative of the Crown Princess. Backing him politically and financially are such leading businessmen as Hotta Shozo, president of Sumitomo Banks; Kikawada Kazutaka, representative director of the Committee of Economic Development (Doyukai); Iwasa Yoshizane, president of Fuji Bank; Kobayashi Hiroji, president of Nippon Electric Corp.; Inayama Yoshihiro, chairman of Nippon Steel Corp.; and Idemitsu Keisuke, chairman of Idemitsu Kosan.

The new premier, however liberal he may try to look, is finally another LDP boss representing the interests of big business. His stressing the importance of dialogue with people and proposing talks with labor movement leaders are typical Miki tactics for coopting the opposition. Specifically he has his sights set on keeping the 1975 spring wage hike down to 15 per cent or less.

In economic matters, it is certain that Finance Minister Fukuda will be the pace-setter as Miki is not as proficient at practical economic matters as at speech making. Fukuda, with his Finance Ministry background, is an able technocrat. The Miki Cabinet will thus steer an economic course toward more bureaucratic control and a cutback in national consumption.

In foreign policy, Miki promised he would do his best to conclude peace treaties with China and the Soviet Union at an early date. But the development which led to the fall of the Tanaka Cabinet makes the outlook for Miki's pro-China policy quite precarious. Moreover he faces the delicate question of balancing his respective policies toward Soviet Union. A well known "Korea-Taiwan" lobbyist asked to comment on Miki's foreign policy, said, "Taiwan is concerned about saving face, and the change of premier will give Taiwan an excuse to resume its relationship with Japan." It is not that Taiwan lobbyists

want to see the tide reversed and the relationship now established with China cut, he said. Rather, these rightwingers consider Miki a convenient facade behind which to turn down the "exorbitant demands" often made by Seoul and Taipei.

As for the new foreign minister, Miyazawa, he can be expected to utilize fully his excellent foreign language ability and close ties with the Kennedy group in the U.S. in implementing the pro-American policy of the new cabinet. Miyazawa will try to develop multilateral diplomacy with the Soviet Union and China on the basis of a solid alliance with the U.S.

It is important to note in this connection that the Ford-Tanaka talks in Tokyo produced a new Japan-U.S. joint communique which, it said, would be the basis for the future relationship between the two countries. One of the Miki cabinet's first actions was to send a special telegram to the White House pledging to honor the provisions of the communique.

The new Tokyo communique, a diplomatic expert in Tokyo points out, can be regarded as a preface to what soon may come to be called the Ford Doctrine. He characterized it as an offprint made specifically for Japan from the grandiose New Atlantic Charter. One of the items in the communique clarified Japan's responsibility for the formation of a "new order in Asia." This involves a greater Japanese military role, particularly in Korea. It is not fortuitous that Ford's visit to Japan was linked with his trip to Seoul. Already in October, Japan dispatched a powerful military delegation to Washington including the Defense Agency Director, the Joint Chief of Staff of the Self-Defense Forces and the Secretary General of the National Defense Council, to work out a formula for Japan's military collaboration along the lines later laid down in the communique. Japan promised to provide the Korean army with military technology as well as funds in preparation for the dissolution of the "U.N. forces" stationed there. The agreement reached in Washington in October was supposedly spelled out in greater detail in later talks between Kissinger and then Minister of International Trade and Industry Nakasone.

Another point in the communique -- about "effective and rational utilization and distribution of resources" and co-operation among resource consumer countries -- will raise even more knotty questions for Japan under Miki. Miki himself visited the Middle East in autumn, 1973 as a Japanese government minister, raising Arab leaders' expectations for "cooperative" Japanese Middle East diplomacy under his premiership. The United States, however, interprets the wording of the communique as committing Japan to full support for the Kissinger five-point oil dollar recycling program announced at the University of Chicago on November 14. Miki will thus have a dilemma in the area of oil diplomacy for he will have to operate, under pressure from both the oil-producing countries and the United States.

It is too early to forecast how long the Miki cabinet can hold out under the tremendous pressure from all sides. If the world situation intensifies in the first half of this year (many are predicting another war in the Middle East, for instance), Miki may be eased out of his post at the LDP convention scheduled for July. On the other hand, he may succeed in advancing conditions favorable for the formation of a conservative-progressive alliance (this would entail, as mentioned above, effecting a progressive front). The future of the Miki Cabinet will be decided by a number of factors at work simultaneously -- the tempo and degree of development of cracks in the class basis of the current type of rule and the tempo of maturing of leftwing forces. But at the time of this writing the pattern that produced the Miki Cabinet out of the crisis of the Tanaka rule remains: -- (1) intensifying of objective contradictions, (2) continued ability to adapt to the new situation on the part of the LDP, and (3) the absence of any viable united front of the working people to take advantage of the objective contradictions. The establishment left parties are divided by in-fighting, and the Socialist Party is reeling not only from factional feuding but also from a recent exposé that some of its candidates accepted graft from local business corporations. The Communist Party made a gesture of supporting Miki after Tanaka's resignation in line with its typical parliamentary political style. The party assumes a chauvinistic attitude on the Korea question, completely ignoring the basic fact of Japan's recolonization of

south Korea. With the postwar constitutional system on the verge of collapse and people generally deeply distrustful of the parliament, the CP spreads the illusion that everything will be okay and prosperity restored if only the party wins more seats in the Diet.

It is fundamental change that is really at stake in Japan. But Japan can change only by discarding the pattern of prosperity built on exploitation of the Third World, and rebuilding its life on an entirely different principle -- a principle that will enable Japanese people to live together within the Third World and in a manner worthy of human life, not in terms of material prosperity but in terms of a new social order and structure. Entirely apart from the established left, various movements in Japan -- movements of workers', peasants' and citizens' -- are beginning to realize that it is they who must shoulder this task. ● ●



VICTORY AT SEA


FISHING FLEET PUTS JAPAN'S NUCLEAR SHIP

"Don't kill the sea!" "Protect scallops in Mutsu Bay!" The cry of fishermen in northern Japan against the nuclear powered ship Mutsu resounded throughout the country during the summer of 1974. Their fight brought the fishermen's struggle in this country to a new stage. And the Japanese government's nuclear energy policy, aimed at making this the fourth country in the world to have nuclear ships after the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and West Germany, suffered a heavy setback from the people's strong resistance. The fishermen were asking ultimately, "Is nuclear energy really necessary to human life?"

Construction of the 8,214-ton vessel was begun in 1963, one year after the U.S. launched its first nuclear-powered vessel, the Savannah. The Japan Nuclear Ship Development Agency (JNSDA), controlled by the Science and Technology Agency, was set up to take responsibility for the national project. The ship was built by Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries (I.H.I.), while its nuclear reactor was designed and constructed by Mitsubishi Atomic Power Industry (MAPI).


The Mutsu is the first and only nuclear ship in Japan. Its reactor was the first completed without any help from the U.S.A.; from the basic design to final construction, the ship is an wholly domestic product. That is why both the government and industry expected much of the success of the ship. Yet it was nearly two years after its completion in 1972 before the nuclear reactor's power generation tests on the Mutsu could be conducted. Fishermen living on Mutsu Bay in Aomori Prefecture, where the ship is homeported, mounted powerful opposition to the test claiming that it would contaminate the sea with radioactive wastes. They prevented the Mutsu from starting testing for almost two years.

Then, impatient with the delay, the government decided at a cabinet meeting that the Mutsu should leave port for testing on the high seas during the summer of 1974. It emphasized that "the age of nuclear ships" was approaching because of the energy crisis, and



OUT OF ACTION

by Kaji Etsuko



"we have to hurry up development in order to safeguard our national interest as a ship building country." The JNSDA set August 25 as the date for sailing.

But the Mutsu did not depart according to schedule, for the fishermen's anger had exploded. About 300 fishing boats, manned by angry fishermen, converged on the Mutsu early Sunday morning to block the departure of the \$50 million nuclear-powered ship set for 9 a.m. Scores of boats pressed against the bow of the Mutsu around 7 a.m. When a fisherman managed to hook his mooring rope into a ring of the Mutsu's anchor chain, the fishing boats, bound by ropes, closed in to deploy an effective picket. Over 200 boats formed outer picket rings.

Some 600 fishermen on boats, wearing headbands and flying protest banners from their boats, demanded that the government cancel the cruise of the nuclear-powered ship. When the 14 coastguard vessels dispatched by the Maritime Safety Agency appeared and clashed with the fishing boats, there ensued a virtual sea battle. But their attempt to force the swarm of fishing boats to disperse was completely futile. And although one fisherman was arrested, he was released at once as fishermen on boats attacked coastguard vessels declaring they would take a p.o.w. in retaliation. The homeport area, incidentally, is not under the control of the Maritime Safety Agency.

At 7 p.m. the coastguard vessels had almost given up hope when the calm bay turned choppy. Swells and strong winds forced the fishermen to evacuate the area. But the fishermen did not give up. When a tugboat turned up, the fishermen returned again. A tow line was fired onto the Mutsu from the tug, but one of the fishermen cut it off with a hatchet.

By 10 p.m. the fishing boats, all tiny wooden affairs of the 2- to 6-ton range, had been forced by the weather to disperse, clearing the way for the Mutsu's crew to get ready for weighing anchor. The vessel left its home port in pouring rain at 12:45 a.m., manned by a crew of 58, technicians, officials of the Aomori Prefectural government and the Science and Technology Agency.

Moriyama Kinji, head of the Science and Technology Agency, refused to change

schedule in spite of the protest and told reporters, "I am an expert in the L.D.P. at handling labor problems. I will never yield to the pressure of demonstrations and red flags. I consider them 'congratulations' on our departure." He also declared that only a "very few" people were opposed to the nuclear-powered Mutsu.

But those fishermen who surrounded the Mutsu like shoals of small fish around a huge whale were not the only people who stood up to prevent the Mutsu from leaving port. On the day prior to the Mutsu's departure, more than 2,000 trade unionists and citizens organized a protest rally and staged a sitdown in front of the Mutsu Municipal Office.

On August 25th, the long banks along the harbor were filled with women gathered to support their husbands' and brothers' fight on the sea. They held high banners reading "We don't want the nuclear ship" and shouted with all their strength. Altogether more than 20,000 people were gathered to watch the sea battle, while 600 policemen, including riot squads, were mobilized to deal with the protest on shore.

The fishermen realized that their seemingly unsuccessful initial battle with the Mutsu was not all-important and they were not discouraged at all to see the Mutsu put out to sea thanks to the typhoon and darkness. For they had learned what amazing strength they, together with the fishermen who did not participate in the sea battle, could muster. They said convincingly "the Mutsu will never be able to return to Mutsu Bay."

Having managed to break through the blockade of fishing boats, the Mutsu made its way across the Tsugaru Strait between Honshu and Hokkaido for its testing area, 800 kilometers out in the Pacific east of the Shimokita Peninsula. The government soon heard that the criticality test was successful and the Mutsu crew celebrated with three "Banzai" cheers. But the government's jubilation was short-lived; within only four days, the Mutsu, leaking radiation, was powerless and adrift at the mercy of the Pacific tides. The reactor had reached only two per cent of its capacity when the warning system reported a leak: strong fast neutron beams were escaping at a rate higher



than the permissible level for 100 per cent capacity operation!

According to the government, the Mutsu's pressurized reactor is protected by an extra-thick shield. Trying to calm the fishermen's fear of radioactive pollution of the sea, both government and JNSDA had given repeated assurances that the Mutsu was perfectly safe. The JNSDA had distributed widely a booklet titled "Safety of Nuclear Powered Ship" which claimed, "Since it is Japan's first nuclear-powered ship, enormous cost went into the Mutsu to ensure that no accident will ever occur."

But the news from the reporters aboard the Mutsu contradicted all that. Leakage of radioactivity was discovered when an area monitor, a radiation level indicator, rang an alarm bell. The monitor had been installed above a hatch on an upper deck over the reactor chamber of the vessel. Leakage of 0.1 milliroentgens of neutrons was detected.

Since the ship was nearly 500 miles from port, engineers aboard this ultra-technological project were forced to the farcical expedient of boiling up 75 pounds of rice, mixing in boron, and pasting it over the leak in hopes that it would work as an absorbent.

Although this makeshift measure reduced the amount of neutrons leaking at the section from about 100 counts per second to 30 counts, technicians were unable to find the origin and cause of the leak.

A group of experts on the shielding of nuclear reactors was then dispatched, who, in turn, made do in the absence of adequate instruments: more than 100 pairs of old socks were collected which the experts filled with polyethylene, a substance which absorbs neutrons. They finally concluded that the radioactivity leakage had resulted from a basic technical error, faulty designing of the lead and plastic shields which cover the nuclear reactor. The experts also admitted that there had been an error in calculation, a three figure miscalculation, of radioactivity levels employed to determine the size and volume of the shields. (The abnormal leakage of radiation was caused by the fact that the shielding ring on the very top of the primary shielding surrounding the pressure vessel containing the reactor was made of steel, a material which cannot prevent neutrons from escaping.)

It was later learned that Westinghouse of the U.S., which checked the design of the entire reactor beforehand, had indicated that the shielding ring in question was "in danger of leaking radioactivity." This ring is part of the upper shield and is supposed to prevent radioactivity, which leaks upward from the pressure vessel, from leaking outside. It is about two meters in diameter and is fitted on the very top of the pressure vessel. In the original design, this ring was to have been made from ordinary concrete 30 centimeters thick. Westinghouse which was paid ¥80 million to check the design, informed Mitsubishi, "This thickness is inadequate, and it is necessary to add another 30-centimeter concrete ring. This second ring should preferably be made of limonite concrete." Mitsubishi, however, thought that a steel ring would be more effective than a concrete one in preventing gamma rays from escaping and switched to a steel ring. But the steel ring, while it prevents gamma rays from escaping, is practically useless in preventing neutrons from escaping.

After the news of the leakage was out the JNSDA emphasized that it was too small to be dangerous to the human body, but the fishermen were understandably not convinced and determined to oppose the expected return of the controversial ship to its home port. On September 5th more than 4,000 local fishermen held a large rally in which they pledged to fight to prevent the return of the Mutsu.

When the government tried to win their consent to the Mutsu's entering port on the grounds that the crew were exhausted and food and fuel were running out, the fishermen vowed that they would block its entry "by every means -- even through use of force." They decided to put a wall of 30,000 sandbags into the sea to halt the functioning of the home port and, in fact, made more than 4,000 sandbags in a single night. Finally the Mutsu drifted in the Pacific for fifty days and had no port to return to. Everyone started referring to it as the Flying Dutchman.


The Japanese government was cornered and could do nothing but accept most of local fishermen's demands. These included: 1. removing the home port to another place within six months, 2. freezing the ship's nuclear reactor until it is taken to a new port and a guarantee that extraction of nuclear fuel rods not be conducted in the meantime, 3. re-evaluation of the government's nuclear energy policy itself. Furthermore, the government

offered ¥1,952 million for development of the fishery industry in Mutsu Bay.

Thus the Mutsu, which was to have demonstrated the power and glory of Japanese nuclear potentiality, is moored again and now covered with snow. The cherry-colored ship looks more like a "phantom ship" than a "ship of the great future." Of course a new port has not been found yet.

In the struggle against the Mutsu the fishermen who proved to be the strongest were the "rank and file." Mutsu Bay fishermen have organized fishery cooperatives in this major scallop cultivating center, which are the actual functioning center of the fishermen's economic life in each village or district. In the past, however, the heads of the cooperatives were more local bosses than representatives of the fishermen. But this tradition has been drastically transformed in the process of the struggle against the nuclear powered ship. For example, among the 29 fishing cooperatives, the four which determined to fight to the end all replaced their bosses with representatives from among the working fishermen.

A striking feature of last summer's fighting was that decisions made by upper levels, in other words the executives, of the fishery associations were frequently reversed at general meetings of the "rank and file." The sea "picket" of August 25 was actually like a wild cat strike. The government believed



that it would be able to win the consent of local fishermen for the test through negotiations with the bosses. One staff member of the Science and Technology Agency advocated, "Only if you understand well the situation of the local people you can be sure there won't be violent actions such as blockades."

Nevertheless, the opportunism of the bosses was completely overthrown by the "rank and file" who demanded a share in decision-making on an issue so vital to their lives. They would not allow their bosses to be coopted by the government with its cries of "the national interest," and "public welfare," and its attempts to buy off the fishermen with various "compensations." "No matter what the experts or scholars say, no one knows what to do if an accident occurs. We have no choice but to continue opposing the nuclear-powered Mutsu to the end." "I don't understand how they can say it is for 'peaceful purpose' when it's threatening our very lives."

One weekly magazine characterized the ideology of the fishermen of Mutsu Bay in creating this unique struggle as "primitive democracy." But however you define the energy and power of the fishermen, it was clearly their strong confidence in themselves -- "We fishermen can survive as long as we have our sea" -- that generated this power. Where did this confidence come from?

Mutsu Bay enclosed by Shimokita Peninsula is very calm sea and, rare today for Japan, has not yet been contaminated by industrial pollution. Fishermen on the Bay live by cultivating scallops, and this year produced 60,000-tons. Sales of scallops recently soared to an annual total of ¥10 billion, second after apples for Aomori Prefecture.

But just a few years ago, there was no sign of the lively activity one sees today on Mutsu Bay. In those days, all the villages in the area were typical deserted places where, the family bread winners having gone to urban areas to work as seasonal laborers, only the elderly were left. Scallop cultivation techniques had not yet been discovered and other sea resources were disappearing because of overfishing and poaching. By the late 1950's, fishermen had to leave their villages

to earn a living. The women who were left with the aged supported themselves either by growing a small amount of rice or by working as day laborers in the area.

In the mid-1960's, through the efforts of both the Fisheries Experiment Bureau of the Prefectural government and the fishermen themselves, scallop cultivation was finally realized on the bay. After that fishermen began to return to their home villages. As the new technique gradually spread throughout the area, the scallop crop increased dramatically from 6,000 tons in 1961 to 12,000 tons in 1971, and in 1973 it reached 34,000 tons accounting for more than half of the national market.

The example of Noheji village is a typical one. Before scallop cultivation started, there were 17 fishing boats in the village moored year round. Fishermen began to come to the village in 1967 and started cultivating scallops. The number of boats increased to 130 in 1971 and by 1973 there were 170. The village was again filled with the voices of young people. The village baseball team was completely rejuvenated. The people had regained their own lives: this was what gave them the strength to oppose the nuclear ship.

Scallop cultivation is very similar to rice cultivation. The day-to-day work is a far cry from the usual fishing image and is more aptly described as agriculture on the sea. It takes almost two years to produce scallops for marketing. Fishermen go out to the sea at three or four o'clock every morning and in most cases, a husband and wife work together on a 2- to 6-ton boat. The husband usually operates the boat while the wife does the chores connected with the actual cultivation: transferring the grown scallops to other baskets, weeding out harmful starfish or other shellfish, sorting the scallops according to size, and so on.

Scallop cultivation could not be done without women. Even though they have to do household work as well performing the hardest tasks on the

sea, they feel much happier now than in the days when their husbands were gone more than 9 months out of the year. That is why women on Mutsu Bay were the first to rise up against the nuclear powered ship and why they attacked the Mutsu so strongly. They know better than anyone what they have to lose if they are forced to give up scallop cultivation. "The government doesn't care about us. They always want to treat us like silent, docile people," they say.

Why did the government decide to build the home port in Mutsu City where people's opposition is so intense? Mutsu Bay was chosen in 1967, and in those days scallop cultivation had not yet started and there were only a few fishermen supporting themselves by fishing. The government was in a hurry to find a port, having been turned down by Yokohama City in Kanagawa Prefecture, and it happened that the then Mayor of Mutsu City, a member of the ruling LDP, was eager to accept the proposal of the government justifying it as "industrial development of the city."

But when the ship was finished and the JNSDA announced it would conduct the nuclear reactor's power generation test in port in 1972, local fishermen's voices against the test grew louder. This was in spite of the fact that the JNSDA had promised the Aomori Prefectural government at the time Mutsu port was chosen that the nuclear reactor would not be operated while the ship was in port, that a spare engine would be used for sailing out to sea. People were shocked that the JNSDA completely ignored this promise, and were more determined than ever not to allow the test in port. Then the JNSDA announced in June 1973 that the test would be conducted offshore in the Japan Sea, despite the fact that it had insisted that the test must be carried out in port because the rolling and pitching of the vessel at sea would pose a serious problem in gathering data on the power reactor and engine. But the revised plan was also severely attacked, this time by an even broader group of fishermen including people living on the Japan Sea side of Aomori Prefecture, Akita Prefecture and even Hokkaido.

The JNSDA changed the plan once again, this time proposing an area in the Pacific Ocean 1,000 kilometers from Aomori Prefecture, but this too was rejected by a great number of people. Thus there was no place for the Mutsu to carry out testing or, for that matter, even take its maiden voyage.

Then in September 1973, the government went on the initiative to persuade the local fishermen of Mutsu Bay. At that stage, the four strong fishery cooperatives decided, 1. to stop the test if the government conducted it forcibly without the consent of the people, and 2. to demand that the home port be transferred elsewhere. Thus, their stand developed from opposition to testing in port to a demand for the removal of the home port itself. Even the Governor of Aomori Prefecture, who had dealt with the fishermen as a spokesman for the government, was compelled to change his attitude and promise that he would ask the government to transfer the home port after the test was concluded.

Along with the fishermen's opposition movement, a citizen's movement against the nuclear ship grew. In September 1973, the present mayor of Mutsu City, Kikuchi Kanji, was elected after campaigning on the statement, "the test should not be conducted as long as fishermen around the home port and residents in the city are not convinced of its safety. Since the people never agreed to it, the 'home port' should be sent back to the government." During the summer he sent a series of questions directly to the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), including questions about how the used nuclear fuel will be transferred from the city, where this waste would be ultimately discharged, what the capacity of the disposal plant was, and what were the counter-measures prepared against a disaster caused by a nuclear reactor accident. To all of these questions, the AEC did/could not respond with any clear answers. Finally, the Mayor requested that the government re-check the safety of the ship, as it had not been used for almost two years, but this was also ignored.

When the JNSDA, acting under the government's instruction, signed a set

of agreements with the Aomori Prefectural government on the Mutsu's departure for the tests, representatives of Mutsu City boycotted the signing ceremony. As for the relationship between the Mayor, the citizen's movement and the fishermen, though the groups meet often and maintain friendly relations, the fishermen claim, "we have to fight our own struggle. The Mayor has his own way to fight."

The Mutsu is not the only issue around which people in Shimokita Peninsula are fighting state power and capital. For, in fact, a process that could bring the total destruction of the area is in motion throughout the Peninsula under the name of "development". Noheji Bay, for example, which is opposite Ominato Bay where the home port of the Mutsu was built, is already marked on map as a sea berth where 500,000-ton oil tanker could be anchored. This is part of the "Mutsu-Ogawara Development Plan," the main part of "Shinzenso." (The nation-wide development plan adopted in 1969. See AMPO No.11, 1971) If the plan, which would bring in this amount of crude oil every 2 or 3 days were realized, Mutsu Bay would be polluted overnight. The fishermen of Noheji village are now fighting the construction of an oil station here as strongly as they opposed the Mutsu. As many fishermen in the area have seen Tokyo Bay as seasonal workers, they understand well what a polluted bay would mean to their lives.

Furthermore, on the Pacific coast, nuclear power plants are being built by both Tokyo and Tohoku Electric Power Companies which will generate 20 million watts of power. It is also reported that MITI, in cooperation with either Nippon Steel Corp. or the Mitsui group, is going to construct a huge nuclear power station with a nuclear power iron manufacturing plant somewhere on Shimokita Peninsula. There is a growing movement against these plans of people living in this area.

The chief of Noheji Fishery Cooperative, Mikuni-san, complains, "I don't understand why the government brings everything to our place." But he is not overwhelmed by the powerful enemy against which the people have

to fight because "we know now that the Vietnamese kicked out the Americans." Japanese in many places are now learning that "development" comes only when capitalists can gain advantage from it. ● ●

NEW ASIA NEWS

A WEEKLY FEATURE NEWS SERVICE BY
PACIFIC-ASIA RESOURCES CENTER (PARC)
PROVIDING IN-DEPTH REPORTING ON
JAPAN AND ASIA.

Some recent feature articles:

- *Cutthroat Competition
in Japan's Ruling Party
- *Frame-up in Singapore
- *South Vietnam's Prisons:
The Limits of Human Endurance
- *The Ford Doctrine Takes Shape
- *U. S. Nuclear Weapons in Japan
- *Thieu's Net Unravelling
- *Japan's Food Worries
- *South Korea: Keeping Labor in Line
- *Letter from the Philippines
- *Nobel Peace Prize to--Sato!?
- *Japanese Capital in South Africa
- *Campaign to Free India's
Political Prisoners
- *Japan-China Relations:
A Happy Anniversary
- *Marines Busted for Letter
to U.S. Congress
- *Thailand: Another Muslim Rebellion?
- *Marcos and Sugar:
The Profits are Sweet
- *Abortion in Japan: On Whose Demand?
- *Trials in Seoul:
Korean Opposition Under Fire
- *Minorities in Bangladesh:
Self-determination for Whom?

Subscription Rates: (Airmail only)

- *US\$100 per year or US\$10 per month
for publications seeking full
reproduction rights.
- *US\$25 per year for other individuals
and organizations (no reproduction
rights).
- *Special rates available on request
for Asian individuals and groups.

Make your check payable to NEW ASIA
NEWS and mail to:

New Asia News
P.O. Box 5250
Tokyo International
JAPAN

The Current Status of Nuclear Power Development in Japan

by Uchiyama Takuro

LESSON FROM THE NUCLEAR SHIP "MUTSU"

After two years' delay caused by the opposition of local fishermen, Japan's first nuclear ship, "Mutsu" finally carried out its first sea trials last August and September. Weighing 8,214 tons, with an atomic reactor capacity of 36,000 kw and with a speed of 17 knots the ship has been homeported at Mutsu City on the head of Mutsu Bay in Aomori Prefecture since September 1972, despite residents' fears of atomic pollution.

Fishermen have an especially high stake in opposing the ship's presence, as radioactive leakage into the bay would immediately wipe out the valuable scallop industry. (Mutsu Bay's scallop beds now produce an annual harvest worth ¥5 billion (16.6 million), a figure expected to double in the near future.) In addition to the fishermen, local branches of the progressive parties and trade union groups also opposed the ship's operations in and out of their city. The use of government force (coastguard boats) and the providential intervention of a typhoon, which forced fishing boats blockading the ship to take shelter, finally broke the deadlock which had developed over last summer's plans to take the ship out of port for tests on the open sea.

Events justified the fishermen's fears, for the ship developed a leak in its radiation shield during a criticality test which used only 500 kw of its 36,000 kw capacity. Further testing had to be suspended, and the outlook for the development of a Japanese nuclear fleet turned gloomy.

Of particular concern, the accident aboard the "Mutsu" revealed an astoundingly slipshod procedure for determining the safety of the nuclear reactor and caused a widespread loss of confidence in the Government's Atomic Energy Commission. The AEC's safety review committee had OK'd the radiation shield after merely examining the blueprints, and the release of this information called into serious question the government's sense of

responsibility in carrying out "safety review". Criticism accordingly spread from the handling of the ship to the AEC's entire approach to nuclear energy, including nuclear power plants. Concerned that this incident will undermine plans for the rapid development of nuclear energy, the government and business are searching for a way to allay popular suspicion by consulting with scholars and specialists and have even considered reorganizing the AEC, which is modelled after the U.S. AEC.

JAPAN FLOATS ON OIL

The expression "our age floats on oil" is frequently heard these days, and this is especially true of Japan's economy, which has been little more than a rowboat in a sea of oil since the January 1971 Teheran agreement between the *Organization of Arab Petroleum Countries* and the major oil companies. In particular, the oil shock following the October 1973 Mideast War revealed the vulnerability of Japan's primary energy structure. (Primary energy includes oil, coal, natural gas, hydroelectric power and nuclear power. Electricity generated with coal or oil as fuel and LP gas are secondary energy.)

Calculated in kiloliters of oil, Japan's energy consumption increased at an annual rate of 12 percent a year, from 84 million kl in 1960 to 300 million kl in 1971. The sources of primary energy were as follows: Oil 73.5 percent, coal 17.9 percent, hydroelectricity 6.7 percent, natural gas 1.3 percent, and atomic energy 0.6 percent. With 99.7 percent of its oil imported--and 81 percent of that from the Mideast, Japan's high degree of dependence on oil is striking.

By way of contrast, an "Energy Message" issued by U.S. President Nixon's administration in April 1973 stressed the low degree of American self-sufficiency and warned of a coming crisis due to dependence on foreign sources for a mere

10 percent of the country's primary energy in 1970.

But Japan's high economic growth rate, which had so fascinated the rest of the world, was premised on the availability of cheap imported energy. Moreover, long-term economic planning was based on ever-increasing dependence on foreign oil: under the cabinet of Tanaka Kakuei Japanese policy was to increase oil imports from the 1972 level of 257 million kl to 700-800 million kl by 1985.

THE NEED FOR MORE NUCLEAR ENERGY

The high prices and competition for oil supplies which resulted from the energy crisis made realization of the 700-800 million kl import figure in 1985 highly unlikely, and the Japanese government has begun to reconsider its primary energy strategy. According to the July 1974 "Estimates of Possible Primary Energy Supplies" (see chart), the import of crude oil will be limited to 500-- or at most 600--million kl, but even that figure is about double 1972's 270 million kl import.

To replace oil, the government projects a sharp increase in utilization of nuclear power. At present Japan has seven nuclear power plants in operation with a capacity of 3.07 million kw (July 1974), and 16 more (13.51 million kw capacity) under construction, including projects where local opposition has so far kept construction from beginning. This gives a current total potential of 23 plants with 16.58 million kw capacity, while the projections for 1985 call for a nuclear power capacity of 60 million kw, a figure unchanged since the 1970 publication of "Longterm Prospects for Energy Needs (Supply and Demand)."

Assuming a nuclear power capacity of 60 million kw, the government issued the following minimum and maximum estimates of 1985 energy requirements: (1) At a minimum, Japan's primary energy needs would be the equivalent of 727 million kl of oil of which 10.3 percent (50 million kw, equal to 75 million kl of oil) would be provided by nuclear energy. (2) At a maximum, Japan would require the equivalent of 919 million kl of oil in primary energy, of which 11.4 percent (70 million kw, equal to 105 million kl of oil) would be nuclear power. Strangely, nuclear power has been hailed

as "domestic energy" as the Japanese began to repudiate overdependence on foreign oil in the wake of the 1973 energy crisis. In fact, however, nuclear power can in no way be considered "Japanese-produced energy", because: (1) All nuclear fuel (Natural and enriched uranium) must be imported: (2) The technology for nuclear reactors and power plants now in use (light water type reactor: General Electric's boiler water type reactor and Westinghouse's pressured water type reactor) is American; and (3) The equipment and technology for disposing of atomic wastes comes from the U.S. and Europe.

Indeed, the development of nuclear power will further strengthen U.S. dominance of Japan's primary energy supply. In the area of oil U.S. oil majors dominate the Japanese market, holding 50-51 percent of the stock in foreign companies (and thus controlling management) and dominating domestic companies by loans and control of their oil sources (domestic companies buy their oil from the U.S. majors). Beginning with Gulf, which early saw nuclear energy as a competitor to oil, the majors have already begun to extend their reach to uranium resources. Their aim is "to control the world's primary energy," and Japan's nuclear development will play right into their hands. Rather than making Japan independent from overseas sources of primary energy, nuclear power will only soften the blows of higher oil prices and decreased supplies.


CAN WE PRODUCE 60 MILLION KW BY 1985?

In March 1974, Japan had a total electric power capacity of 84.17 million kw crowded into its small land area. Of this: (1) 21.52 million kw hydroelectric (25.6 percent of the total); (2) 60.37 million kw were thermal (power from burning) (71.7 percent); and (3) 2.28 million kw were nuclear (2.7 percent). The proposal to generate 60 million kw of nuclear power by 1985 involves creating a nuclear capacity close to our total present capacity in the next ten years. Is this staggering goal possible?

The proposal has not been formulated in concrete terms which take into consideration present limitations on development of nuclear energy, and it might be more accurately called a hopeful projection of "expectations" than a working plan.

In fact, it would be quite a challenge to reach the 50 million kw set as the minimum goal for 1985, and this target could well be considered a maximum. Severe restrictions surround the development of nuclear power, and we will look at some of these in detail.

First, the nuclear fuel supply. This involves both natural and enriched uranium, and the technology for enrichment; the nuclear development plan visualized reliance on imports for natural uranium and on American technology for enrichment. The *light water* reactors called for in the 1985 plan would require annual imports of 12,000 short tons of natural uranium and a total accumulated stock of about 100,000 short tons, and it is doubtful whether such large supplies can be obtained.



Fukushima-Daiichi Plant No. 6

The power companies are trying to ensure their supply by longterm contracts with such uranium producing countries as Canada, Australia and South Africa, but the buyers' market of 1972 has disappeared since the 1973 Mideast War. Instead of competing among themselves to supply Japan's rapidly increasing uranium requirements, the uranium producers are now developing policies to protect their resources, and in the new supply and demand situation uranium prices are moving upwards. Meanwhile, existing arrangements will satisfy Japan until 1982 or 1985, depending on whether natural or enriched uranium is the primary fuel used. However, there are, as yet, no provisions for needs developing after 1985. At the same time, rapid nuclear development in the U.S. and Europe raises the prospect that the world's limited enrichment capacity may soon be taxed to the limit, with

countries like Japan which do not have their own enrichment technology being forced into the role of poor cousin. At the earliest, Japan will not be able to construct its own uranium enriching plants until after 1985.

Second, disposal of nuclear waste. The atomic fuel used in nuclear reactors is replaced at the rate of about one-third a year, and the waste which is removed must be disposed of by reprocessing, burial or destruction, so that the "nuclear cycle" will not be complete until waste processing plants are established. Such waste processing plants pose a worse radioactive pollution danger than nuclear power plants, and their construction must include extremely careful attention to environmental and safety considerations.

Now under construction, the Tokai No.1 spent fuel reprocessing plant will be able to handle 210 tons a year, at most adequate for the nuclear capacity planned for 1976-77, but a location has not yet been selected for an urgently needed second plant. Indeed, although the government is building the No.1 plant, it has declared that the second should be built privately (i.e. by the power companies), and plans for it remain extremely vague. Both government and power companies have been counting on being able to send nuclear waste abroad (mostly to Europe) for processing, but this optimistic illusion will soon be shattered as the limits of existing waste processing capacities are reached.

While high-level radioactive waste must be reprocessed, the disposal of low-level radioactive waste is actually more of a problem. At present, the power companies store it on power plant grounds in special drums, but obviously they will run out of space. They would like to dump it in the ocean, but since this requires an international agreement, it will not be easy to carry out.

By far the most important obstacle to the realization of the nuclear power is the opposition of local residents. With the experience of two atomic bomb attacks in their history, the Japanese in general are very concerned with the dangers of nuclear plants. In an effort to belittle this feeling, the government and the power companies have dubbed it the "nuclear allergy," but this has

not prevented the emergence of opposition movements in almost every area where construction of a nuclear power plant has been planned. While everyone is afraid of radioactive pollution, fishermen are particularly concerned that the waste water discharged by the plants will destroy the ecological setting for the fish, shellfish and seaweed on which their livelihood depends, and they have spearheaded resistance. In some places where power companies have already bought land, local residents have been able to keep them from making any moves to start construction for as long as five years.

This opposition from local people makes the acquisition of sites for power plants extremely difficult. Although the AEC's committee of nuclear safety experts must approve the plans for every new nuclear power plant, it refuses to publish the contents of its investigations or detailed data, and residents have little confidence in its conclusions that proposals are safe. It is thus

likely that the people will continue in their determined resistance to nuclear power plants.

JAPAN'S ECONOMIC TROUBLES

In spite of such obstacles to its plans, the Japanese government and business circles believe that "nuclear energy is the only thing which can correct the weakness of our primary energy structure and rescue us from the energy crisis." Without grappling with these problems, they take every opportunity to call for the construction of nuclear power plants, expecting to produce a new source of cheap energy which will support a renewed high growth rate. They have not yet confronted the reality that the end of the "age of cheap oil" means the end of "Japanese-style" prosperity.

While the government dreams, local movements are spreading throughout Japan, standing opposed to the grim dangers that

PRELIMINARY CALCULATION OF JAPAN'S PRIMARY ENERGY SUPPLY POTENTIAL

Government Calculation July 1974

		1972		1980				1985			
				Lower limit		Upper limit		Lower limit		Upper limit	
		Quantity	Percent of total	Quantity	Percent of total	Quantity	Percent of total	Quantity	Percent of total	Quantity	Percent of total
Domestic	Hydroelectricity 1,000kw	19,900 (20)	6.3	27,000 (23)	4.2	29,000 (25)	4.0	29,000 (25)	3.4	33,000 (29)	3.2
	Geothermal power 1,000kw	- (0.06)	0.0	400 (0.7)	0.1	1,000 (1.7)	0.3	1,000 (1.7)	0.3	6,000 (10)	1.1
	Domestic oil & natural gas 1,000kl	3,700 (3.5)	1.0	5,500 (5.3)	1.0	11,000 (10.8)	1.7	13,000 (12.8)	1.8	30,000 (28.6)	3.1
	Domestic coal 1,000t	28,000 (18)	5.3	20,000 (14)	2.5	20,000 (14)	2.2	20,000 (14)	1.9	20,000 (14)	1.5
	Domestic Total	(45)	12.9	(43)	7.8	(52)	8.3	(54)	7.4	(82)	8.9
Nuclear power generation 1,000kw		1,800 (2.3)	0.7	20,000 (30)	5.4	25,000 (38)	6.1	50,000 (75)	10.3	70,000 (105)	11.4
Subtotal		(47)	13.6	(73)	13.2	(90)	14.4	(129)	17.7	(187)	20.3
Import	L.N.G. 1,000t	1,000 (1.3)	0.4	24,000 (32)	5.8	29,000 (39)	6.3	36,000 (48)	6.6	62,000 (82)	8.9
	Coal 1,000t	50,000 (39)	11.3	94,000 (69)	12.6	104,000 (75)	12.0	111,000 (80)	11.0	121,000 (86)	9.4
	Oil 1,000kl	270,000 (257)	74.7	400,000 (376)	68.4	450,000 (420)	67.3	500,000 (470)	64.6	600,000 (564)	61.4
	Import Total	(297)	86.4	(477)	86.8	(534)	85.6	(598)	82.3	(732)	79.7
Primary Energy Total		(344)	100.0	(550)	100.0	(624)	100.0	(727)	100.0	(919)	100.0

Notes: [1] Numbers in () in "Quantity" column represent 10^3 kcal.

[2] Quantities for 1972 are existing capacities.

[3] 1972 figures for hydroelectricity (in kcal) include generation by pumped water, while those for 1980 and 1985 exclude purely pumped water. In cases of compound generation, the part generated by natural water flow is included.

accompany nuclear development.

Wherever construction of nuclear power plants has begun, local residents have gone to court in efforts to stop it, in many cases successfully. Without land as a "container" for nuclear power plants, the plan for development can go nowhere. Yet in spite of declarations that "the Key to our nuclear development policy is to achieve a national consensus," the government has committed nothing but rhetoric to meeting the urgent demands for guarantees against radioactive pollution. Until more effective and open safety measures are enforced, there will be no solution to the problem of finding land for nuclear power plants, but the plan for rapid nuclear development takes no account of this reality.

In addition to cheap oil and the electricity it made possible, Japan's economic growth was based on cheap labor and the long coastline which provided many sites for petrochemical industrial complexes. Lured by the government into the age of the throwaway and made to think that "the good life" was a matter of material possessions, the Japanese allowed their whole country to be trans-

formed into the site of a huge highly consumptive petrochemical complex. As a result, pollution has destroyed the environment and has made Japan fit to be called the "contaminated islands."

Today Japan is panting for breath in the midst of a severe recession. Its cause? The oil shock which shattered the illusions of the "age of cheap oil." With the end of the age of cheap primary energy, the myth that cheap oil and cheap resources will return can only deepen the economic crisis. And yet, capitalists who want to continue on the road of growth pin their hopes on the dream of nuclear energy, taking no account of the fact that the Japanese people are no longer willing to accept the environmental consequences that accompany uncontrolled growth. Fed up with petrochemical pollution and justifiably skeptical of the safety of proposed nuclear power plants, the Japanese people can only conclude that these capitalists are steering the Japanese economy deeper and deeper into a quagmire. ● ●

Nuclear Reactors : Risking the Ultimate Pollution

Look at the map on page (21) By 1985, Japan's coastal areas are to be covered by numerous proposed nuclear citadels (represented by dots). Keep in mind that Japan is not only an insular country but a mountainous country with a wide mountain ridge running through the main island, leaving only one third of the territory -- coastal regions -- available to the population. The Pacific coasts have already been transformed into a single "Pacific industrial belt," packed with factories, refineries, ports, shipyards and jammed with traffic -- all sources of intolerable pollution. But business magnates do not plan to stop there. They plan to build nuclear power stations both in the already pollution-infested areas and in fresh areas where giant industrial complexes are to be set up at the sacrifice of the livelihood of local farmers and fishermen.

As Uchiyama Takuro shows in his article, the 60 million kw nuclear power generation program is unrealistic in many ways, especially now that the rapid economic growth-oriented pattern of the Japanese economy is no longer tenable. But this doesn't mean that the government has changed its policy in favor of a more healthy pattern of development. With irrational persistence, the government and big business are dashing ahead on their objectively defunct program of "development" simply because they cannot think in other terms. Because there is no "people" in their vocabulary, their violation of the people's interests becomes harsher and more heinous as their economic crisis deepens. This is true not only in Japan, but throughout the third world.

The following points illustrate the pernicious nature of the Japanese nuclear power programs.

The Japan Atomic Energy Commission has its reactor safety examination council, and utilities use the council's almighty approval in trying to persuade local people to agree with them on the siting of their nuclear plants. But what about the Mutsu reactor mentioned in Uchiyama's article? Why was there a major failure in a reactor that had safely passed the council review? In a typical example of the council's malfunction, the Mutsu reactor passed the examination without being inspected in its final stages; in fact, only the basic design had been examined by the council. Prof. Uchida Hideo, chairman of the Safety Examination Council, when asked about this case, had this to say, "We examined only the basic design. It is none of our business to know whether the reactor was going to be built to the design. We assume no responsibility for what is outside the scope of our duties." (*Mainichi Shimbun*, Nov. 9, 1974) Fishermen in Mutsu were told many a time that the reactor was safe because the council had okayed it, and those who voiced their doubts were accused of lacking scientific

knowledge. In actuality, leakage did occur. Fast neutron beams, thousands of times stronger than anyone had expected, escaped from the reactor's top. Why? The basic design itself was defective. *Atoms in Japan*, the organ magazine of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum, in its September issue admitted that the radiation leak on the Mutsu was due to the faulty design of the primary shield. But no one, let alone the council, accepted responsibility for this failure.

True, the safety examination council met 39 times to examine the Mutsu reactor's basic design. But no minutes of the discussions exist, not even brief summaries. Asked why this is so, Prof. Uchida told the parliament in a matter-of-fact way: "If we take memos of our discussion, it might make our members hesitate to speak freely."

Japan is well known for its earthquakes, but this factor is unbelievably belittled when a safety review is made. In the case of a nuclear power plant planned at Ikata in Shikoku Island, AEC deliberately avoided referring to the fact that the site rests upon one of the world's largest fault lines, known among geologists as "Fossa Magna," along which

LOCATIONS OF NUCLEAR PLANTS IN JAPAN

● in operation
⊙ under construction
○ in planning

Hamamatsu t. Hokkaido.
Tomari v. Hokkaido.
Shimaneaki v. Hokkaido.
Aitahiyama t. Hokkaido.
Matsushima t. Hokkaido.
Ichihara v. Aomori.
Asauchi, Noshiro c. Akita.
Tsuruoka c. Yamagata.
Naki t. Niigata.
Kashiwazaki c. & Karisu v. Niigata.
Uchiura v. Ishikawa.
Togi t. Ishikawa.
Shiga t. Ishikawa.
Tsuruga c. Fukui.
Mihama t. Fukui.
Oit t. Fukui.
Takahama t. Fukui.
Kasumi t. Hyogo.
Hamaoka t. Hyogo.
Kashima t. Shimane.
Hinas t. Okayama.
Kurotsu, Gotsu c. Shiga.
Mugata c. Chikama.
Tsuwaga t. Yamaguchi.
Nagato c. Yamaguchi.
Toyokita t. Yamaguchi.
Genkai t. Fukuoka.
Shima v. Fukuoka.
Genkai t. Saga.
Urae t. Oita.
Amekusa t. Kumamoto.
Sendai c. Aomori.
Sadohara t. Miyazaki.
Uchinoura t. Kagoshima.
Higashidori v. Aomori.
Rokkasho v. Aomori.
Machihama, Kuji c. I.
Tanohata v. Iwate.
Onagawa t. Miyagi.
Nami t. Fukushima.
Futaba & Okuma ts. Fukushima.
Tomioaka & Naruna ts. Fukushima.
Tokai v. Ibaragi.
Hamaoka c. Shizuoka.
Nanto & Kisei ts. Mie.
Kumano c. Mie.
Katsuura t. Wakayama.
Kozu t. Wakayama.
Hidaka t. Wakayama.
Hiwasa t. Tokushima.
Kainan t. Tokushima.
Naga t. Kochi.
Ikata t. Ehime.

Name of Power Plant	Generating capacity (Thousands of KW)	Time started
Tokai	166	July 1966
Tsuruga	357	March 1970
Fukushima No.1	460	March 1971
Fukushima No.2	784	July 1974
Mihama No.1	340	November 1970
Mihama No.2	500	July 1970
Shimane	460	March 1974
Total	3,067	
<hr/>		
=== under construction ===		Time to start
Onagawa	524	1978
Fukushima No.3	784	1974
Fukushima No.4	784	1976
Fukushima No.5	784	1975
Fukushima No.6	1,100	1977
Hamaoka No.1	540	1974
Hamaoka No.2	840	1978
Takahama No.1	826	1974
Takahama No.2	826	1975
Mihama No.3	826	1976
Oi No.1	1,175	1977
Oi No.2	1,175	1977
Ikata'	566	1977
Genkai	559	1975
Tokai the 2nd	1,100	1977
Fukushima the 2nd	1,100	1979
Total	13,509	

A. East Hokkaido	g. Mikawa-bay & Tokoname
B. Tomakomai	h. Chunansei
C. Mutsu-Ogawara	i. Naruto-minami
d. Akita-bay	j. Suho-nada
e. Sendai-bay	k. Hyuga-nada
f. Enshu-nada	l. Shibushi-bay

the incidence of earthquake is considered fearfully high. The council also deliberately avoided mentioning that the site, being such a strategic earthquake spot, coincides with one of the nine seismic observation spots in Japan. Shikoku Electric Power Company's "aseismic design" was approved when presented as being capable of withstanding an acceleration of 200 - 300 gals. However, geologists know that an earthquake of a magnitude of 6 often causes an acceleration of 400 gals. A local group opposing the siting points out an interesting fact: On other occasions Prof. Matsuda, responsible for aseismic design review on the AEC, brings to the public's attention the danger of big earthquakes. Writing for an academic magazine, he once stated that along "Fossa Magna is where the most serious earthquakes of a magnitude of 8.5 are likely to occur."

Are these council members really concerned with the safety of the people? Or are they merely rubber stamping decisions made by big power interests?

MAJOR ACCIDENT COUNTERMEASURE

The U.S. AEC announced in May, 1971, that the Emergency Core-Cooling System (ECCS) mounted on light water type reactors (LWR -- the type of reactors used in the largest number in Japan) is ineffective. This finding came as a shock to Japanese power utilities and the AEC, for if the equipment does not work when the primary coolant pipe is broken, the result will be a lethal nuclear explosion and widely scattered radioactive fallout. However, during the four years that have passed since that alarming announcement, nothing has been done to improve the ECCS.

What has been "improved" is not the faulty ECCS itself, but a computer program for analyzing the functioning of the equipment. The AEC in Japan called the U.S. AEC's statements into question on the grounds that their experiment was done only with a model and not with a real reactor. The Japan AEC, on the other hand, concluded on the basis of computer programming that the U.S. results applied only in part to the actual reactor, and that the "LWR would be safe even if ECCS should fail to work." No effort has been made, nor are any planned, to determine whether or not the ECCS would work in the event of a coolant-loss accident.

HUSH-HUSH

But accidents do occur, and frequently. Take, for example, the U.S.-made LWR (JPDR) of the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute at Tokai village. This reactor was introduced as Japan's first power reactor and went critical in 1963. Despite uncritical trust placed by Japanese experts in this "proven type" power reactor, the reactor developed one failure after another. Six months after being commissioned, water leaks from the joints of control rods and the pressure vessel halted the reactor for eight and a half months. In 1966, cracks were found in the pressure vessel. In August 1972 water was found leaking from the primary piping, and the reactor has been shut down ever since. More than 10 other accidents occurred in the reactor, each requiring a halt for about one week.

The 1972 accident was the gravest, and could have led to a major explosion. The way the accident was handled was unbelievable. The water leak was found in the evening of August 17, but it was not until the next day that the report reached 100 staffers working on the second floor of the building. (The rest of the workers were kept ignorant of the situation.) These 100 were told that they should not speak about it. Two days later the accident was made public, and while a JAERI spokesman said that it had been discovered during a usual patrolling, the fact was that it had been detected only by chance. To bury accidents, or if that is impossible, to minimize them -- this seems to be the policy of the JAERI as well as of the power utilities. They are afraid of the people's response to their incompetency, but are not concerned with the people's interests.

FISHERMEN

LWR's thermal efficiency (the ratio of electric power obtained to total generated energy) is as low as 30 per cent when the steam temperature is only 280°C. This means that an LWR power plant dissipates 70 per cent of the generated energy into the outside environment. The waste heat is discharged into sea water. A nuclear power plant with an electric output power of 1,000,000 kw thus discharges 70 tons of coolant water per second at

a temperature 10°C higher than that of the sea water.

The Tsuruga plant (357,000 kilowatts) discharges 22 tons of hot water per second into Urasoko Bay, causing the temperature of the water in the bay in a range of 2.5 kilometers to rise 0.5 - 1.0 degree centigrade above the normal level. Already, local fishermen complain that the octopus population in the bay (an important edible marine product in Japan) has decreased and that other fish catches have also been affected. When the waste water discharge is at its peak during the July - October months, local fishermen find unusually large quantities of small fish roe and young fish there, and the distribution of plankton changes visibly.

In 1985, electric power stations in Japan (including thermal and nuclear) will be discharging annually 187,000 million tons of hot water into the sea; by 1990, this figure will increase to 266,000 million tons, equal to the total annual amount of water carried into the sea by all of the rivers in Japan.

RADIOACTIVE WASTES AND SPENT FUEL REPROCESSING

Japan will soon commission its first spent fuel reprocessing plant to produce plutonium from LWR wastes. Spent fuel reprocessing is a dangerous process in many ways. First, it produces horribly toxic plutonium, a fraction of 1 gram of which can cause lung cancer in a population of one million people. Secondly, it discharges into the environment at least 50 times more radioactive matter than a nuclear power plant, including Krypton 85, Iodine 131, Xenon 133 and Tritium in their gaseous states. With waste water, Tritium, Strontium, Cesium and Zirconium are discharged into the sea. One estimate points out that a person who stands two kilometers from a reprocessing plant for one year would be showered with 32 mili-rem of radiation. This is more than six times the maximum permissible irradiation dose, set by the U.S. Government at 5 mili-rem per year. Thirdly, the reprocessing plant produces the most handy material for atomic weapons. By operating the first plant in Japan for one year, enough fission material will be produced to make possible the production of Hiroshima-type bombs.

As Uchiyama points out, the first reprocessing plant can deal with 210 tons of spent fuel annually. In 10 years, however, the annual yield of spent fuel is expected to reach 1,500 tons, and huge amounts of radioactive wastes will have to be stored in drums. The building of more reprocessing plants, as Uchiyama says, is extremely difficult, and, in its four years of operation, the Tsuruga power plant of Japan Atomic Power Co., has already piled up more than 6,000 drums filled with dangerous nuclear matter. Ultimate disposal of them in the deep sea is considered, but none of the technical problems involved in this plan have been solved.

These are only some of the features which characterize Japanese atomic power development. But these alone show that the government and power utilities are forging ahead with their 60 million kw program without caring about its fatal defects and incongruities. The brunt of their carelessness is carried by the Japanese people who work and live wherever a plant is built.

Powerful movements against the siting of nuclear power plants have now been organized in several places. In retaliation, the power companies are doing all they can to bribe, threaten and deceive those who actively challenge them. The above-cited JALF report claims that the opposition movement is based on "terror tactics," and led by "outside elements" who come into the area only to arouse unwarranted fear among the people. It says that, "In fact, terror tactics worked to the point where the vote was affected in some plant site areas."

Statements of this sort do not take into consideration the fact that the people's fear is well-grounded. At Ikata, where a 566,000 kw plant is being built, the utility tried to bribe and threaten the land owners by offering a "higher price," which the company said would not be paid if the land was compulsorily requisitioned. Land tracts were thus purchased without the owners being told of the purpose for which they were bought. Suddenly, after under the table plotting with the Liberal Democratic local assemblymen, a resolution welcoming the plant was presented and railroaded through the local government. At Fukushima, the Tohoku Electric Power Co. went so far as to stop supply of electric power to

families opposing its nuclear plant, in an attempt to "make them keenly feel the necessity of electric power."

But people are seeing more clearly through the unscrupulous designs of the power utilities than they have ever seen before. They are resisting by forming groups to study the scientific details of the plants, by organizing mass actions,

and by filing lawsuits. And they have been successful: Mitsubishi Atomic Power Co.'s plan to site a plant at Omiya, a suburban town near Tokyo, was utterly defeated, and the opposition from the people near projected sites has allowed no new plant projects to be heard by the Electric Power Source Development Council for the past two years. ● ●

AMPO Editor Testifies at U.N.

Japan-South Africa Uranium Deals Exposed

After a month of investigations in South Africa last summer, AMPO Editorial Board member, Kitazawa Yoko, discovered deals on uranium purchase by Japan's electric power companies from South Africa and Namibia.

In New York last autumn, she made separate testimonies on this nuclear issue to the fourth Committee of the UN General Assembly and Council for Namibia. The following text is one of the testimonies which she gave to the UN Council for Namibia on November 6, 1974.



Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the United Nations Council.

It is an honour for me to be given the opportunity to speak here to the United Nations Council for Namibia.

I have been asked by the World Council of Churches, the National Council of Churches (USA) and the National Christian Council of Japan, to speak before interested Committees in the United Nations on the results of my research on Japanese economic involvement in Southern Africa.


Today, I would like to draw your attention specially to the case of the Japanese purchase of uranium from the Rössing Uranium mine in Namibia.

As you know, Japan has recently begun to shift her dependency on energy resource from oil to nuclear power. In June 1973, Japan's Atomic Energy Commission published a "Long-Term Nuclear Development and Uti-

lization Programme." According to the programme, by 1985 Japan's nuclear electric power goal is 60 million kwh, 24-26 per cent of Japan's total supply. At present, nuclear power contributes only 2 per cent of all needed electrical power in the country. Thus the purchase of uranium ore from overseas is vital to reach this goal.

Generally, purchase of uranium ore from overseas is based on a long-term contract. In this case nine Japanese electric power companies, all of which are private businesses, began to look for long-term contracts for the purchase of uranium ore in the early '70s.

As of December 1973, they had completed nearly 80 per cent of the needed 92,000 s. tons of uranium purchase contracts for a 10-year period starting in 1975. Of this, South Africa including Namibia will provide 38,000 s. tons (43 per cent of total needs), Canada 33,600 (42 per cent),



France 8,800 (8 per cent) and Australia 3,200 (3 per cent). (Johannesburg Star June 25, 1974).

Comprehensive figures for Japan's 1975-1985 uranium ore purchase contracts are found in an article written by an official of the Resource & Energy Agency under Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry. (Kozan December 1973).

He stated that in 1970, Japan's total needs for uranium ore were 300 s. tons a year. By 1985 it will be increased to 14,300 s. tons a year, and by the same year, total needs for the period 1975-1985 will amount to 106,200 s. tons, of which Japan has to purchase 90,200 s. tons from overseas. Details of their contracts are the following:

from	Denison Co. of Canada	28,000 s.tons
	Rio Algom (RTZ) of Canada	5,600
	NUFCOR of S. Africa	12,500
	Rio Tinto Zinc of S. A.	17,500
	Rössing Uranium of Namibia	8,200
	CEA-URANEX of France	8,800
	Queensland Mines of	3,200
	Australia	
	<hr/>	
	Total	83,000 s.tons
		(80% of total)

Rio Tinto Zinc Co., a U.K.-based multinational corporation is the single largest corporate supplier of uranium to Japan. The Rössing mine in Namibia is an open-cast mine, the operations of which have been developed by Rio Tinto Zinc of the U.K.

The mine is situated 56 km. east of Swakopmund, Namibia, and is the biggest uranium mine in Southern Africa. Loans

for its development had been provided by South Africa's state-owned International Development Corporation (IDC) and is jointly funded by R.T.Z. Among the overseas portion R.T.Z. has a major stake, and General Mining of South Africa and Deutsche Urangesellschaft of West Germany have minor stakes. When partnership and sales agreement was concluded in 1973 between R.T.Z. and French Total Compagnie Minière et Nucleaire, a wholly owned subsidiary of state-owned Cie. Française de Pétroles, it gave Total a 10 per cent holding in Rössing.

Estimates of total investment needed for developing the mine vary between \$225 million and \$300 million, making it one of Southern Africa's major ventures. It is impossible to verify IDC's amount of ownership in Rössing Uranium mine, due to the 1948 South Africa Atomic Energy Act which prohibits the disclosure of any fact relating to uranium, but IDC is thought to control a substantial share, has a number of Board members and has a veto over important management decisions. It is clear the South African government has not left these important decisions up to foreign interests. The mine is much too important for that.

Production at Rössing will start on schedule in mid-1976, and is estimated to provide uranium oxide for the new South African enrichment plant currently planned at Valindaba 128 km. west of Pretoria and worth R550 million.

Japan's long-term purchase contract from Rössing mine in Namibia represents a gross violation of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions on Namibia. Since IDC is a partner in financing and running the mine, Japan's purchases are made directly from the illegal occupying power.

This purchase of uranium ore from South Africa (including Namibia) is solely handled by the Sumitomo Shoji branch office in Johannesburg. This particular act clearly legitimized South Africa's presence in Namibia. Moreover it provides profits from Namibia for South Africa, increases South Africa's vested interest in staying in Namibia and increases South Africa's nuclear power. It is also robbing Namibia's natural resources without the participation of the African people or consultation with them. Finally purchases such as

these are in direct opposition to the October 7, 1974 decree on the Namibia and Security Council Resolutions.

Let us look at these points and the implications for Namibia carefully.

Rössing is a very strategic, important and profitable mine for South Africa. The involvement of the IDC is testimony to this. Any purchase of products from Rössing encourages South Africa and indicates that nations of the world are willing to do "business as usual" with the South African occupying power. In short to buy from Rössing, a mine with government sponsorship, is to give a clear message to South Africa--that profits come before people and the illegal occupation of Namibia is not serious enough to interfere in commerce. The message must be reversed.

Freedom for Namibia must come first. All commercial links with companies which are actually robbing Namibia of its riches should be stopped.

To help insure the success of Rössing by contracting for purchase, Japan insures that South Africa will try even harder to maintain its illegal occupation of Namibia thus continuing its profits and its source of strategic material.

Most important, the African majority of Namibia has not been consulted as their mineral wealth and their patrimony are virtually stolen from them with all profits going to their oppressor. The voice of the people of Namibia is clear! South Africa must leave and let them make their

own decisions about their commerce and business. Namibian property is not for sale from South Africa.

In light of this analysis I respectfully urge the following.

1. That the Council for Namibia encourage the Japanese government to stop the purchase of any Namibian ore by Japanese companies. The Japanese government should publicly announce that they have taken this step thus setting an example for other nations in the world.

2. All interested participants in Rössing eg. RTZ should be asked to immediately withdraw from any investment in Rössing.

3. The Council should hold hearings on the question of Foreign Economic Investment in Namibia and invite some of the major traders and investors to testify. At the very least all traders and investors should receive a public letter from the Council clearly outlining their position.

4. Concerned groups in nations like Japan, the USA, Britain etc., should be publicly asked by the Council to approach these traders and investors, and add their support to the Council's position.

Mr. Chairman, I respectfully make these recommendations. I welcome any comments or questions.

Thank you. ● ●

Protest Stalls Japan-ROK Nuclear Ambitions

A protest from the Liaison Council for Japan-Korea Solidarity (Nikkan Renren) has forced two Japanese giant firms to abandon their planned participation in the construction of Canadian nuclear reactors in South Korea. The move threw a wrench into efforts of the Pak Chung Hee regime to acquire the potential for development of nuclear weapons.

The two firms, Marubeni Corp. and Hitachi Ltd. were to be the contractors

for two CANDU type heavy water reactors that Pak has ordered from Canada. The reactors are the same kind which produced the plutonium 239 for India's nuclear explosion earlier last year. The South Korean government-run Korea Electric Co. (KECO) announced its plan to buy the reactors immediately following the Indian blast.

Using natural (instead of enriched) uranium, the reactors can annually pro-

duce 280 kilograms of plutonium 239, the most handy fission material for use in nuclear weapons. Two such reactors would give Pak the capacity to fabricate 50 Hiroshima type bombs a year.

In addition to causing an immediate escalation of the tensions between the two Koreas, the solidarity group warned that Japan could use Korea's nuclear capability as an excuse to develop her own. A Japanese military expert, Osanai Hiroshi, echoed their concern: "South Korea is acting as Japan's dummy in obtaining nuclear weapons," he said. Japan has already promised to cooperate with the ROK nuclear development plan. Moriyama Kinji, director of the Japanese government's Science and Technology Agency, conveyed this promise to Seoul in May 1974, and in return was decorated by the Korean government in special ceremonies.

Nikkan Renren also revealed that the Japanese government is providing a loan of \$250 million to the Pak government to meet part of the \$1,200 million cost of the reactor construction project. Westinghouse is building South Korea's first nuclear power station (595 megawatt) near Pusan, scheduled for completion in 1975. The 600-megawatt CANDU reactors are the second and most crucial stage in South

Korea's plan to have nine nuclear power plants by 1986.

Nikkan Renren charged that the projected nuclear energy from the CANDU reactors is planned to supply power to the Masan Export Free Zone, where Japanese enterprise has entrenched itself to exploit low cost Korean labor. The project thus will contribute to the further subjugation of the Korean economy to Japan, and gives the Japanese government further incentive to cooperate with Pak.

The South Korean government insists that it has speeded up its nuclear plan "purely for peaceful purposes" because of the high cost of oil. But no one is convinced. Koreans fear that Pak will use nuclear weapons to shore up his eroded power base after U.S. troops withdraw from the south.


But Pak's plans may well be foiled. The recent victory of the Solidarity group joins with an ongoing Canadian effort to oppose the sale of the reactors. Continued efforts by these and other groups may well keep Korea and Japan off the road to nuclear proliferations. ● ●

Back Issues



Vol. 6 Nos. 3-4
Summer-Autumn, 1974


CONFERENCE OF ASIANS:
The Blood of Malayan Political Prisoners
SINGAPORE: The Price of Progress
Chung Kyung Mo: We Koreans are not Alone
Snan Vongsuthee: On the Thai Labor Movement
Foreign Capital Invasion and Thailand's
Textile Workers
SAVE ALL KOREAN POLITICAL PRISONERS



Vol. 6 No. 2
Spring, 1974

The U.S. Military in Asia
NISSAN MOTOR: Hell's Battlefield
Okinawa Citizen's Struggle against
Mitsubishi and the CTS
Anti-Prostitution Movements in Japan
Foreign Workers in Japan
Warin Wonghanchao: Negotiation with
the Japanese are Useless

BOUND VOLUME '70-72



Bound Volume of
AMPO's Now Rare
Only 50 copies left.

Nos. 7-15
2,700yen-\$15.00

GODFATHER OF THE JAPANESE RIGHT, KODAMA YOSHIO



Kodama Yoshio never fails to be there whenever and wherever major events occur in Japanese politics. He is the ring leader of the Japanese ultra-right, and his biography offers a window into the history of Japanese imperialism -- past and present.

The rightwing movement in Japan is now divided into many factions, splitting over ideological as well as organizational matters, but its power should not be minimized. An estimate puts the number of rightwing organizations at 500, embracing 120,000 fascists. Kodama is the king of these groups.

To be a "bigshot" in the ultra-rightist camp requires three capacities -- the ability to exercise violence; hidden, powerful connections with political and business leaders operating on the surface; and money power, either a personal fortune, or the ability to conjure up banknotes as necessity demands.

Kodama unquestionably has all of these capacities. He has under his patronage more than 30 "action groups," including the Flag-of-the-Rising Sun Youth Brigade, the Showa Renovation League and the Patriotic Youth Party. These Kodama-sponsored groups merge into Seishikai (the Youth Thought Study Association). Most of these organizations have as their common slogan, "Action before words;" in short, they are groups of fanatics who favor violence. Machii Hisayuki, a leader of Seishikai, is a naturalized citizen of Korean origin, commanding a "killer troupe" by the name of To Sei Kai, operating mainly in the Kanto area. (The comparable Kansai killer group is Yanagawa Gumi.)

While it is true that To Sei Kai has been formally dissolved, it continues to function under the name of TSK CCC (To Sei Kai abbreviated?). The new version is a company which keeps luxurious bars, clubs and restaurants in downtown Tokyo, where Machii still reigns over the night. He is the virtual owner of Kampu Ferry Co., operating ferryboat shuttle services between Shimonoseki and South Korea's Pusan. In addition, he owns seven real estate firms, and the latest news is that he has discovered a big oil deposit in Colorado. Utilizing his dual nationality, Machii is of course closely tied with Korean business and political circles.

In fact, the South Korean Embassy in Tokyo is built on a site he provided.

Kodama became friends with Machii around 1960. Through Machii, Kodama cultivated friendships with President Park Chung Hee and Premier Kim Jong Pil of South Korea. In doing so, he established his grip on the Japan-Korea channels of money flow, and came to carry great weight in Japanese political and economic circles.

In 1960, when mass struggle against the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty came to a height, Kodama began to act openly as a rightwing leader and as a behind-the-scenes sponsor of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party. At that time, Kishi Nobusuke (a wartime minister under Tojo and war criminal) was the prime minister of Japan. In 1960, Kishi especially wanted to pull together various violent elements, ranging from ultrarightists to religious fanatics to hoodlums, in order to prepare for the scheduled arrival of President Eisenhower (U.S.A.) on June 19th. His aim was to use them to suppress the tens of thousands of workers and students expected to pour into the streets to protest the President's visit. In response to his request, Kodama successfully organized these diverse elements into a unified force of 10,000 men. (He missed his chance to see them in full action when protests successfully caused the cancellation of Eisenhower's visit.) It is from this organization that Kodama concocted the Seishikai in 1961.

Thus, Kodama now has under his command Seishikai as his para-military action troop -- the Kodama division. As a façade covering this fighting group he organized Kofu Club, embracing bosses of various rightwing trends. As a separate endeavor, he runs the Japan Youth Lecture Course, his private school to train young cadres.

In his lecture to a meeting of the Seishikai cadres, Kodama stated,

"In future fights, we shall go to jail if we win and get killed if we lose. But we prefer jail to death as the more honorable outcome. We must fight against an enemy ten times and sometimes fifty times stronger than our own force. But when we die we won't die alone. We will die after each one of us kills fifty or one hundred of the enemy. Let's live and let's fight until we meet in jail."

Kodama claims that 60 per cent of the rightwing forces in Japan are under his command. Seishikai alone is believed capable of mobilizing 3,000-5,000 armed men.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A FASCIST

Kodama joined the ultrarightist movement in 1920, at the age of 18. Born into a family of an indigent former warrior, he experienced near-slave labor at a spinning factory as a primary school boy. Later he went to Korea and worked with a poor farming family. In his youth he lived a typical lumpen proletarian life of vagrancy. The years of his youth saw a worldwide depression, and Japan, too, was rocked by labor and peasant struggles. The Emperor's government cracked down on these movements and came down particularly hard on the Communist Party of Japan.

It was in this period that Kodama fast approached the rightwing movement. When a cold spell hit the poor rural areas of the Tohoku district and starvation was widespread, Kodama decided to take his first independent action "on behalf of the suffering peasants." One day, he dashed toward a wagon carrying the Emperor to present a petition calling for steps to save the peasantry. He was arrested and imprisoned for six months. Following this action, Kodama began to be influenced by such well known ultranationalists as Kita Ikki, Okawa Shumei and Uchida Ryohei. He joined the Radical Patriotic Party, and became a comrade of young ultrarightists who later attempted several fascist coups and terrorist actions, known as the Ketsu-meidan (Blood Bonded League) case, the May 15 and February 26 incidents.

According to Kodama's autobiography "Inside and Outside the Jail", he once sent a dagger to Finance Minister Inoue recommending suicide, and was arrested and sentenced to five months in prison on charges of blackmail. He once designed a coup d'etat format called the "Tokyo Blackout Plan" -- a scheme calling for occupation of all power stations by Kodama troops for the purpose of cutting Tokyo's electric power supply. During the blackout period, assassins would be sent to kill government leaders.

Later he became more and more deeply involved in the Japanese army's invasion

of the Asian continent. In 1941 he set up the so-called Kodama Organ in Shanghai, which served as the Imperial Navy's secret device to procure necessary war materials. In the meantime he cultivated friendships with Ishiwara Kanji, the leader of Toa Renmei (East Asia League) and drafter of the Master Plan for the creation of the puppet state of Manchukuo, and with Army staff Col. Tsuji Masanobu, the man who designed the Japanese army's China invasion strategy and other top level military plans. The Kodama Organ plundered copper, bauxite and other precious minerals and metals for the Japanese military, and though the exact value of these materials is not known, one estimate puts it at more than ¥1,000 million at the time of Japan's defeat.

Kodama formally entered Japanese politics when a provisional government, with Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko as its leader, was formed to handle the immediate post-surrender situation. Kodama was appointed adviser to the cabinet, and worked hard to protect the emperor system from the Occupation's pressure to dissolve it.

Kodama's most influential action in the early postwar period was the provision of political funds to Hatoyama Ichiro (premier after 1955) on the condition that Hatoyama do his best to protect the emperor system. (The fund came from the Kodama Organ, Kodama having embezzled the remaining assets of the organization.) Hatoyama founded the Japan Liberal Party -- the predecessor of the Liberal Democratic Party -- on the basis of this fund; without Kodama, the postwar conservative party could not have gotten off the ground.

Soon after, Kodama was arrested and placed in Sugamo prison as a Class A war criminal. This term in prison proved valuable to his later career, for it was there that he made alliances with Kishi Nobusuke and Sasagawa Ryoichi, two central pillars of the postwar Japanese right.

THE JAPAN LINES CASE AND THE KOREAN CONNECTION

Kodama's current underhanded dealings in the business and political world are hard to discover, for everything is carefully obscured. We can ascertain, however, that he draws great benefit from his participation in the "arbitration" of

major corporate disputes; he also continues to be a major financial patron of the Liberal Democratic Party.

One of the recent disputes he arbitrated was the Japan Line case, in which Sanko Steamship planned to take over the Japan Line. Japan Line is one of the six major shipping companies in Japan, extending its business multilaterally in recent years. It entered the oil business, for example, by contracting to buy crude directly from Abu Dhabi. The dispute started when Sanko Steamship, also a giant shipping firm, began to buy Japan Line's shares secretly after the oil deal was concluded, apparently hoping to buy control over Japan Line.

Japan Line's main financial bank is the Industrial Bank of Japan; the bank's leader, Nakayama Sohei (a close business friend of former prime minister Tanaka Kakuei), played an important role in Japan Line's oil deal.

The other side, Sanko Steamship, is headed by president Komoto Toshio, behind whom stood Sasagawa Ryoichi, another big boss of the Japanese right.

Japan Line tried to protect itself by asking Kodama to come to its rescue through Nomura Securities' chairman Segawa Minoru. The negotiations presented an interesting scene: the matter was discussed between two rightist leaders, Kodama representing Japan Line and Sasagawa representing Sanko Steamship. The resulting compromise was that Japan Line would buy back most of the shares earlier bought by Sanko Steamship; through this sale, Sanko Steamship won an easy profit of ¥14,000 million (\$4.7 million).

This dispute was further complicated by Japan Line's scheme to set up huge oil refineries in the Yosu and Kanyang districts in South Korea. Tenders were going to be closed on the Korean project at the end of July, 1973, and three Japan-Korea business groups were vying for participation in it. The first group consisted of Teijin, C. Itoh & Co., and the San-kyung business group in Korea. The second was a united force of Japan's Arabia Oil Co., Fuji Oil and the Choyang group, while the third was composed of Japan's Daikyo Oil, France Oil and the Hangyang business group. With the competition among the three groups already sharp enough, Japan Line declared that it would

join it, tying up with the Hyundai group (Korea) and Toa Sogo Kigyo, which is Kodama Yoshio's business organ. The Japan Line group planned to set up oil refineries with a processing capacity of 150,000 barrels per day. Japan Line would supply Abu Dhabi crude to this refinery, and a big shipyard would be constructed on Koje Island where 250,000 dwt class VLCCs are to be built to handle the oil. The entire project would require an investment of \$3.2 billion.

With this grand plan still in the making, Sanko Steamship's Komoto and Sasagawa moved in. Since Japanese business projects in South Korea are assured at least several per cent of the investment as commission, the outcome of this competition naturally became the concern of business-political circles in both Korea and Japan.

Japan Line, operating through Kodama and Machii, took the tactic of hitting straight at the Blue House. Machii utilized his connections with Park Chong Gyu, then chief bodyguard of President Park. The scenario called for the Park government to issue a license for the project in August, following which the Japan-Korea ministerial conference, then scheduled for September, would make a final decision in favor of the Japan Line group.

But the mystery begins here. On August 8, with the intra-group feud heightening behind the scenes, Kim Dae Jung was abducted. The ministerial conference was postponed. And in this hurley-burley, C. Itoh & Co. joined the Japan Line-Hyundai group and Teijin withdrew from the competition. Kodama himself had pushed for this move, the result being that the new Japan Line-C. Itoh-Hyundai group was chosen as a group qualified to undertake the project.

The rumor is that, when Kodama visited Seoul early in 1973, Park Chung Gyu asked him if the Japanese rightwing was so powerless that they could not "dispose of" Kim Dae Jung. Those who trust the reliability of this report point out that the terrorist organization led by Kodama and Machii, cooperating with Yanagawa Gumi, collaborated with the Korean CIA in kidnapping Kim, probably in an attempt to improve Japan Line's position in the competition over the refinery project. However, the truth is still to be told.

In any case, circumstantial evidence is ample. The Kim Dae Jung case cropped up just when competition was at its height, and under the momentum of the incident, Japan Line, the last entry and generally considered to be in the weakest position, came to the fore. Good timing? Sources well informed on political affairs point to the cutthroat fight over the Korea money then going on between the main-current of the LDP (Tanaka and Ohira) and the anti-maincurrent (Kishi and Fukuda factions) in the background of this business in-fighting. In this turmoil, Kodama is believed to have acted as the arbitrator between the two political alliances, using his power to get the lion's share of the Korea business divided properly among them.

KODAMA'S FINGERS IN JAPAN'S FUTURE

Kodama is thus emerging more and more visibly from his mafia's den. Alarmed over the declining power of the Liberal Democratic Party under the impact of the Tanaka scandal, Kodama is designing a new political structure for crisis-ridden Japan. He proposes that a new conservative party be organized by anti-maincurrenters in the LDP, and that a new conservative coalition government be organized, composed of the new LDP, Democratic Socialist Party, the Komei Party and rightwing factions of the Socialist Party. The Kodama-designed coalition government is intended to counter the trend in favor of a Socialist-Communist coalition.

Kodama's scheme before the fall of the Tanaka cabinet was to separate Miki and Nakasone from the coalition of the four maincurrent factions (Tanaka, Ohira, Miki and Nakasone) and to bring Miki and Nakasone together with Fukuda. When we look at the composition of the new Miki cabinet, we can see clearly that Kodama's plan has been materialized.

The Democratic Socialist Party now is greatly attracted to the Kodama plan, and is secretly maneuvering to build an anti-Communist joint front with the Komei Party and the rightwing of the Socialist Party. Kodama is quietly pulling the strings as political preparations are made for the period beyond the Miki cabinet, working ceaselessly to extend his control and power over the future of Japanese society. (M.E.) ● ●

"The Crime of Touching the Ground..."

Poems by KIM CHI HA

EDITOR'S NOTE: In the last issue of *AMPO* we printed the poem attributed to Kim Chi Ha, "*The Cry of the People*." This important work is now available in book form, *The Cry of the People and Other Poems* edited by Nicola Geiger. In this issue we present selections from his most recent poems, written in prison, where he is serving a life sentence for

... the crime of touching the ground with his two feet, ... the crime of attempting to stand up despite his poverty-stricken status, the crime of wasting time in thinking, the crime of looking up at the sky without a feeling of shame, the crime of inhaling the air and expanding his thorax...

and all the other human acts outlawed by the south Korean dictatorship, as listed in his poem "*Groundless Rumors*."

Translations are by David McCann.

(Kim Chi Ha, *The Cry of the People and Other Poems*, Nicola Geiger, ed., is published by Autumn Press, 2113 Isshiki Hayama, Kanagawa-ken, Japan. The price is \$2.95 plus postage.)

TOMORROW'S BRIDE

Cry out
 when you feel alone.
When troubled, no tears--
 yell out!

Tomorrow's bride
returning from the factory
through the night, the tears, the long sighs
let your voice sound!
Sing out your songs!

You, eighteen-year-old
with large hands,
thick-waisted, coarse-mouthed,
tomorrow's bride.

MOON FALLING AND RISING

I arose and
set out to be the boundless
flowing cloud the moon falls and
rises through.
Suddenly at dawn
awake, white fog rising,
hollyhocks unfolding I set out

to be the boundless, dazzling
distant cloud in the skies
at dawn

But I am shut up in a dark room.
Double and triple bonds bind my hands
and I live, tied to living,
to money, to wife and children,
in a dark crack amidst rocks
below a flowing stream.

Clouds, 0 clouds;
Clouds in the night sky!



YOUR BLOOD

*Let us meet.
Your red blood,
the hot breath, resonant voice, the burning glance, all
scattered and gone, worn down to bone,
nothing left now, but we shall meet.
There, on Puyong Mountain.
There, in a hole in the red earth.
There, where arrowroot screamed at the skies.*

*Sorrow, heart-piercing;
the gunshot, the pounding at the door,
the heavy sound of steps following, heart-piercing.
We shall meet as well under the clubs,
your blood, bright red and pine fragrant.*

*Ah, you were in the sleeping child's smile,
in the song fading away, in the breath, and in each night
after long night;
you were there
and so your blood lives,
even now within me leaping up.*

*We meet, and though the handful of earth
that absorbed your bones
be scattered in the wind, on Puyong Mountain,
there on the red, red earth, on the dazzling
scalloped ridge,*

*there we meet
and again it flows,
your blood, bright red and pine fragrant*

*in my life
in the earth
in the clear eyes of children
who fall sleep in rags
and there, in the light of the sun.*



P'IRI

END

This life, with nothing left over
but waiting.
Endless endings.
Bottomless, boundless, formless
slough mires my feet deep, oh skies,
oh skies.
The end of this voice, after its long cry.
The end of using this awkward body,
not as a lotus to bloom again.
I will step before dying
on some untrustworthy stone.
Before dying
I will leave on your dreamless, pale skin
one ominous dream.
Windless, voiceless, lightless life,
with nothing left but waiting
death rises from death.
Endings, with no end
but waiting for the knife edge of a shout;
all endings, endings like sleep.
I will leave before death
one line written down
in paring

P'iri voice rising
falling
window glaring ceaselessly
with afternoon sun.
Root of a forehead burning
bearing droplets of sweat:
into the palm, the fever's roots
driven deep into the city's palm.

Death's
hips
gesture
ceaselessly.
To death, the chill
winds shock
of consumption,
consumption, consumption.

Root of evil,
roots of endless ruin.

Though they rest me,
though they rest me,
to put out the small candle light
of unease at waking,
between mad flesh
rubbing on flesh
a sea of sweat rises,
blue sea.
P'iri voice falling,
window glaring ceaselessly
with afternoon sun.

Kim Chi Ha
Fall 1974

South Korea's Blue House The KCIA in the Bedroom And a Ford in the Garage

by Hasegawa Kazuto

In the Winter 1974 AMPO, south Korean opposition leader Kim Dae Jung predicted a serious collision between the ROK government and democratic south Koreans during 1974. The year actually saw a series of collisions -- with dictator Pak Chung Hee coming out on top of each one. How did he do it? Hasegawa Kazuto (pen name for a journalist specializing in Korean affairs) wrote in last year's article that Pak would need "more than genius" to survive. Here he discusses what the "more" was in 1974.

Harvard Professor Edwin Reischauer called it "an awful blunder." Americans in Japan called it "a cruel blow to the life and death struggle of the Korean people for freedom, justice and democracy." Mothers of Korean political prisoners said it would mean "continued unhappiness, despair and insecurity for the people of Korea." And the Korea Newsletter said it was "the wrong visit to the wrong dictator at the wrong time."

Nevertheless Gerald Ford went to Seoul November 22-23 to bestow his personal blessing on the Pak Chung Hee dictatorship. Most Koreans and a good number of Americans wish it had been just that: a personal blessing by an either misguided or misinformed American individual. But Ford went as President of the U.S. and as the mouthpiece for the increasingly one-man U.S. State Department, Henry Kissinger, who accompanied him. Together they ignored all requests not to go to Korea, and they ignored all requests to publicly defend political and human rights while in Korea.

Since the trip was sponsored by the same people who brought us -- and continue to bring us -- the Vietnam War, the logic of a new U.S. President including Seoul on his first world trip is inescapable. Ford's 100-day


presidential honeymoon was appropriately over when he got to Seoul, and his presidency now has a commemorative stamp: one million copies of Pak and Ford, cheek-to-cheek and grinning like bears, being used for ROK postage today and for U.S. history tomorrow.

Within the U.S. State Department, Korea diplomats were not all that excited about Ford and Kissinger going to the land where three things reign supreme: Pak, the KCIA and fear. Since Pak's January and April Emergency Decrees, even some men at the Korea Desk of the State Department were getting disillusioned with their newest and possibly brightest dictator in Asia.

Nevertheless they followed their leader, Henry the K, in rationalizing the Seoul visit: "If Ford doesn't go to Korea," they said, "it will give the wrong sign to others, particularly in Asia." Though the officials did not elaborate, the "others" included U.N. delegates (who would vote two weeks later to maintain 38,000 U.S. troops in the south under U.N. auspices) and particularly close U.S. "allies" in Asia like Presidents Thieu and Marcos (who wanted assurances that the U.S. Asian policy will remain consistent no matter who's using the White House linen).

On the surface, November 22 was a delightful day for U.S.-ROK relations. Pak arranged one of the biggest welcomings Ford may get in his whole term in office -- hundreds of thousands of cheering, U.S.-flag waving Koreans. Ford responded by going out of his way to praise the "progress and economic development" of South Korea, implying that he now better understood the rationale for Pak's utterly repressive rule.

But below the surface, the Ford visit caused ripples of cynicism among



The two sides of south Korea -- Christians marching for a restoration of democracy in October, and riot police showing their ability to contain protest.

Korea's intellectuals which forbodes a strong wave of anti-American sentiment. Students in particular are expressing deep bitterness over Ford's unnecessary display of enthusiasm for Pak. They see it as a signal that U.S. policymakers care little or nothing about internal freedoms in south Korea so long as the country remains a source of cheap labor and remains divided from the north.

THE 'COMMUNIST THREAT'

Ford's visit was only frosting on the cake of repression that President Pak baked and the KCIA force-fed the Korean people in 1974. The package mix was prepared well in advance of each carefully timed serving during the year. The cake was served on a glittering platter of deceit, and its candles were dynamite sticks.

Ford ate from the platter and apparently saw all the glitter and none of the deceit. Otherwise he might have had second thoughts about returning

to Washington and promptly requesting between \$400 and \$500 million in new U.S. military aid for the Pak regime.

The deception all involves the so-called "aggressive military threat" posed by north Korea. During February and March, 1974, the ROK government daily put screaming banner headlines in the controlled media announcing an imminent, vicious and all-out communist attack from the north. The fears of people in the south were whetted by a February 15 government announcement that DPRK gunboats had fired on and sank ROK fishing vessels in the West (Yellow) Sea.

Such incidents came to a head in late March when, with peoples' fears at a fever pitch, the government began moving in and arresting "communists and communist dupes" throughout the south. On April 3 the Blue House issued Emergency Measures 3 and 4 outlawing the "National Federation of Democratic Youth and Students" which, according to the government, was planning a "Pyongyang-led violent overthrow of the Pak govern-

ment and the establishment of a proletarian regime."

In fact, the "federation" was nothing more than several hundred students and young Christians who had been thinking of staging an anti-government rally in Seoul's City Hall Plaza April 3. If there was any organization to the group at all, it was very loose -- because the KCIA had broken up any meeting of more than three persons and had cut off all forms of communication between campuses.

Still, the incredible emergency decrees went into effect, and more than 700 persons were arrested in the first ten days of April. By mid-December 183 of them were still in prison, including a score with life sentences and nine sentenced to death. Pak's skill with the weapon of the "pre-emptive strike" had worked, leaving opposition to Pak virtually leaderless for six months.

Even the U.S. State Department confesses that at the base of Pak's over-kill was an incredible hoax: "We have no reason to believe that North Korea fired on south Korean vessels on February 15 or any other date this year," says a department spokesman -- off the record, of course. "In fact we have no reason to believe that the north is particularly belligerent at this point."

Nevertheless, Pak's tactic worked so well that he decided to try again immediately preceding Ford's visit. On November 15, the government announced it had just discovered a 1200-meter-long north Korean tunnel in the southern half of the DMZ. Again there were frightful banner headlines, but this time the ROK government was more interested in using the tunnel to bolster security commitments from the United States and the United Nations. And it succeeded -- Ford's military aid request and the UN vote represented tremendous victories for the Pak regime.

The November 15 tunnel was actually discovered by two South Korean soldiers in June. At that time President Pak didn't have any particular need to exploit the news, so he put it under wraps. When Ford announced in September that he would visit Seoul, Pak knew that the time was coming to unwrap the

gift to himself and the "free world." Ford and Kissinger ate it up.

TWO VULNERABLE POINTS

Armed with a club in one hand a pack of lies in the other, Pak Chung Hee not only survived 1974 but survived most of it with flying red, white and blue colors. There were only two points during the year when his vulnerability was exposed, and those occasions are instructive -- both in terms of any opposition strategy to get rid of Pak, and in terms of how Pak dealt with the threats.

The first threat began building on Christmas Day, 1973, and came to a head two weeks later with Emergency Measures 1 and 2: more than 400,000 south Koreans signed petitions to revise the dictatorial Yushin Constitution. The utterly peaceful and democratic tactic was ingenious and it soon drove the government into nervous fits. The emergency decrees on January 8, however, quickly smashed the petition campaign by promising 15 years in jail for persons who in any way criticized the Constitution.

Pak's other vulnerable point was at the opposite end of the spectrum: an August 15 attempt on his life by Mun Se Kwang, a Korean born and raised in Japan. Although Pak left Seoul's National Theater unscathed, his wife was shot to death in the exchange of gunfire, and Pak's own vulnerability was exposed.

Following the basic ROK government script, the assassin was charged with acting on instructions from Pyongyang, although no proof of such charges has ever been presented. After making this ritual accusation, the ROK government turned its venom from the north to the east and demanded that Tokyo assume responsibility for an assassination plot hatched on its soil.

Seoul's strategy was to get two Japanese birds with one Korean stone: using Mun as a pawn, the ROK government sought first to bargain with the Japanese government, which is still red-faced over the KCIA's Tokyo kidnapping of Korean opposition leader Kim Dae Jung in August, 1973 (See AMPO no.

18, Autumn 1973). Secondly, the ROK government wanted Japanese police to crack down on the 600,000 Koreans in Japan, few of whom have any great love for Pak Chung Hee.

In order to show the seriousness of its demands, the Pak regime mobilized a series of anti-Japanese demonstrations in Seoul, and even went so far as to pay men to publicly chop off their fingers and send them to Prime Minister Tanaka. Because of Japan's heavy economic and political investment in south Korea, there was great concern over the protests in Tokyo. But the basic Japanese strategy was not to lose more face on top of Kim Dae Jung, so they have waited for the anti-Japanese fervor to die out. Meanwhile Pak did accomplish one thing: he allowed thousands of Koreans to let off steam directed at the enemy without, instead of the enemy within; Japan, and not the Blue House, apparently is responsible for the crises that plague south Korea.

Like most of Pak's connivings and manipulations during the year, the beauty of this argument is that it's fundamentally true -- as far as it goes. It totally ignores the corruption, graft and exploitation that goes on in the high reaches of the south Korean business and government world -- most of which is intimately tied to the

Japanese power structure. In this sense, Pak was biting the hand that feeds him -- but at the same time he was holding out his hand for a closer integration of the Japanese-south Korean economic, political and police structures.

The Japanese have yet to firmly shake that hand and agree to any further integration at this point, partly because of hurt feelings but also because of the current weakness of the Japanese capital investment market. There are signs, however, that the Miki Cabinet and the new Japanese Ambassador to Seoul Nishiyama Akira, will try to firm up Japan-south Korea ties in the near future. This is partly due to continued U.S. pressure on Japan for assuming a larger economic and political role in the region. Also, a U.S. Congressional report in early August noted the "inevitability" of Japan assuming a larger military role in Asia, a likelihood that makes the U.S. military presence in the south nearly tolerable for even the most anti-American Korean.

Korean Catholic priests lead the way toward the Seoul's streets in an October 9 demonstration. Blockaded by riot police shortly after this photo was taken, none of the demonstrators got to the street until three hours later -- and then were tear-gassed.



AN OPPOSITION SPLIT?

With the mass arrests last spring, the more youthful, more dynamic and more militant opposition leadership was dealt a serious blow. Therefore it was no surprise that, when new leadership emerged this past fall, it was mostly older liberals tied to large institutions -- the Catholic Church and the opposition New Democratic Party (NDP) being the two main forces. The Catholics were late-comers to the opposition movement, joining in full force following the July arrest and 15-year sentencing of Tji Hak Soun, Bishop of the Wonju Diocese. They held regular demonstrations, some as large as 4,000 persons, during the fall. The NDP got reorganized under a new party chairman, Kim Young Sam, and showed sporadic signs of seriously challenging the government on the matter of Constitutional revision. The party was especially outspoken in the six weeks preceding Ford's visit, being well aware that Pak was loathe to crack their heads before the President arrived.

At the time of this writing (December 15), there are indications that this older liberal leadership is being forced by rising popular political/economic discontent to either put up or shut up. Kim Young Sam illustrates the problem when, throughout the fall, he referred to "taking to the streets" while insisting on using "peaceful, legal means to restore democracy."

Many Korean people -- including Kim himself -- are coming to realize that he can't have it both ways. Since the November 27 founding of the broad National Council for the Restoration of Democracy, Kim is tending toward a more activist position. The tendency, however, is leading to a split within the older liberal opposition in general and within the NDP in particular: many of these liberals still want to try to effect change "through the proper channels"; their chances of success are probably one in a thousand, and that "one" depends largely on Pak somehow miraculously dying in office.

If a more militant opposition emerges, the chances of forcing a

fundamental democratic change in the government are more like one in twenty -- till slim, but definitely more hopeful. The success of a more militant opposition will depend directly on the new opposition leaders' ability to draw upon the increasing frustrations of workers and peasants, whose real wages declined steadily throughout 1974 due to nearly 50 per cent inflation. Unlike one year ago, when I wrote that "workers had been relatively quiet and the peasants seemed dead" (during 1973), both groups are now beginning to show their anger. An unheard of revolt of south Korea's 650,000 organized workers erupted during the October meeting of the Federation of Korean Trade Unions. The unions demanded not only better pay but an end to government manipulation of the FKTU and suppression of labor rights. Along the same lines, there are reports from the countryside that farmers have about had their fill of being the most heavily exploited group in Pak's grand urban-centered industrialization plan.

The growth of a more militant opposition will also be facilitated by the possible release of political prisoners in coming weeks or months. Of the handful of prisoners released through November, most of them quickly returned to opposition struggles with renewed fervor and dedication. Yet there is some possibility that Pak may try to improve his image domestically and internationally by releasing some if not all prisoners by spring. If he does, there will probably be strict parole provisions: those who continue their protest will be put back in the clink and the keys thrown away.

Nobody is holding their breath for the near-term overthrow of Pak's police state. But neither is anybody -- including Pak himself -- underestimating the Korean resistance. They are still capable of someday marshalling a united front, even in the face of pervasive KCIA tactics to divide and conquer. ● ●

JAPAN-KOREA MUTUAL CORRUPTION SPHERE

"Money doesn't fall from the sky, you know..."

by Nakazawa Osamu

"According to rumors in Tokyo, Premier Tanaka and businessmen allied with him, and former prime ministers Sato and Kishi and others, have very close economic ties to the Park regime in south Korea. It is said that these political leaders have amassed enormous wealth from rebates on aid to the ROK. There are powerful forces in Japan, because of these complex mutual interests, which favor close relations with the present administration in south Korea. Japanese politics is more corrupt than American."

These provocative comments by Harvard Professor Jerome Cohen turned the spotlight on dubious aspects of political and economic relations between Japan and the Republic of Korea. Then Prime Minister Tanaka and former premier Kishi Nobusuke ignored Cohen's charges but former premier Sato Eisaku denied the allegations angrily on TV and in the newspapers. Despite the silence and the denial, to most people Cohen's remarks sounded quite plausible.

"Politicians have to spend lots of money. Whether it's Japan or some other country, they have connections with banks and corporations. Politicians do favors for them, so businessmen bring the money around. In the old days rich people went into politics and used up their entire fortunes pursuing a political career. They were called 'well and fence' men because that was all that was left of the home and funds they started with. They went from riches to rags. Nowadays people start out in rags, become politicians, and end up with luxurious houses and villas. Where do they get this money? It doesn't fall from the sky, you know ..."

So spoke Sasakawa Ryoichi, leading his lucrative Motor Boat Racing Association, in a recent interview with Edith Hanson in the Shukan Bunshun, Oct. 28, 1974. Sasakawa, called the "Godfather" of the Sato regime by Time magazine, had some other interesting comments about money and politics.

Hanson: Do you use your boat racing profits in elections?

Sasakawa: Yes, I do. But nobody knows who I give it to or how much I spend. I don't tell anybody. The press reports are all lies.

Hanson: But some of them must come close to the truth?

Sasakawa: Not a one. They just make it up and write anything. They don't have any hard information. I only give the money to the candidate himself and never in the presence of anyone else. A contribution that others know about is a wasted investment. Cohen talks about rebates in the business and government dealings between Japan and south Korea. If the politicians keep saying, "There aren't any rebates, there aren't any rebates", someone will start an investigation. Then there might be trouble. They should be more careful.

Hanson: Are you implying that Prof. Cohen was correct?

Sasakawa: He's not too far off. Nobody can be in politics without money. But politicians don't get it directly because that raises legal problems. The trading companies and businessmen make political donations. That's not illegal.

Sasakawa should know, since he is one of the major operators behind the scenes in the political world. Then the sensational article about premier Tanaka appeared in the Nov. issue of Bungei Shunju, "A Study of Tanaka Kakuei -- His Money and His Men". It revealed the devious ways in which political funds are obtained -- tax evasion, dummy companies, non-existent corporations, congratulatory gifts, so on and so forth. After the article appeared, Tanaka was criticized by other members of the Liberal Democratic Party, but actually his conservative colleagues are all birds of a feather. They all use the same techniques to get money.

If a company makes a profit, it is expected to make political donations. The Kokumin Kyokai (LDP's official fund-raising organ) and registered offices of LDP factions exist for this purpose. With political donations, only the amount listed on the receipt is tax exempt. On the other hand, if the two parties "understand each other" well enough, they can beat the tax collector. The politician accepts a ¥5 million donation and gives a receipt for ¥10 million. Then both the corporation and the politician have ¥5 million to use any way they want. It does not have to be called a "rebate" or a "political donation". It is not even considered corruption. "You scratch my back and I'll scratch yours" is the common sense reality of conservative politics in Japan.

Thus the defiant assertion by political leaders that "there are no rebates" is no refutation of Prof. Cohen's allegations since it still leaves the whole question of the source of conservative political funds shrouded in mystery.

STRUCTURAL COLLUSION

These financial dealings constitute the everyday relationship between conservative business and political elite and are not considered by them to be "corruption". Beneath the surface, however, there is another level of dealings that are indisputably and criminally corrupt. The history of the LDP is a history of corruption.

Most such cases, of course, as with the Korea connection, never come

fully to light. As Sasakawa stated, money moves invisibly. In addition, all inquiries and probes run into the wall of political power, including the public prosecutors who do not press for convictions. In a considerable number of cases the investigators have died violent deaths. The Bungei Shunju article described how a secretary of the premier fell to his death from the scaffolding of a water tank in the Kuzuryu-gawa dam scandal. Kurachi Takeo, a journalist investigating the "accident", wrote an article about it but his galley proofs "disappeared." Shortly thereafter Kurachi was stabbed to death by his eldest son who was later declared "insane".

The deepest secrets of Japanese politics have seldom been reported by the media. The general public has gotten some understanding from fictionalized accounts and novels such as Matsumoto Seicho's Black Mist of Japan and Deep Current (which described the U.S. occupation era) or Saga Sen's Beyond Special Investigation about the 1961 Bushu Railroad scandal.

However, there have been a few books that deal directly with political corruption. Murobushi Tetsuro's Exhortation Toward Corruption (1968) is one important work. The author writes in the preface: "This happened when I was involved in the establishment of a golf course. I spotted the names of several public officials among the applicants. Their membership fees, which were very expensive, were paid by a business firm. Shortly thereafter a certain well-known politician began to visit the golf course with the president of a certain company. About the time one of the bureaucrats suddenly retired and joined the top management of the company that had paid his membership fees, that well-known politician became premier. It centered on the suspicion that the premier and a cabinet minister had favored one company in the multi-billion yen reparations' payments to a certain country. It turned out that the company that had paid the premier's golfing fees got 90 per cent of the reparations' orders. It was pointed out that the premier, who reported an annual income of barely ¥2 million, had at some point built a ¥10 million villa, and the cabinet minister was using an automobile provided by that same company."

Murobushi explained later in the book that the premier was former prime minister Kishi, the minister was Nagano Mamoru, the Minister of Transportation, and the company president was Kinoshita Shigeru of the Kinoshita Trading Company. Kishi and Kinoshita had developed a close relationship when the former was vice-minister of Commerce and Industry and the latter was director of the Iron and Steel Control Committee during the war. The incident involved indemnities to Indonesia. Kishi had built a lavish villa in Atami, a hot spring resort, on a large plot of land. People wondered where the money came from.

I recount this rather old story to show that corruption in foreign aid, as with the mendacious collusion between Japan and south Korea, has a long history. Moreover, I think this is the original model for Prof. Cohen's "rebates."

Yu Tae-Ha, the ROK ambassador to Japan during the Syngman Rhee regime, was recalled to Seoul after the 1961 coup and courtmartialed for fiscal malfeasance. He defended himself by saying, "Although I am charged with wasting money, I used official funds to make donations to Japanese politicians, thus promoting Japan-south Korea negotiations." He submitted a list of names

of recipients, causing a political stir at the time. The opposition accused Park Chung Hee during the 1963 presidential election of "financing the election campaign with money from Japan." The 1965 Japan-ROK Normalization Treaty included provisions for various kinds of assistance to south Korea: \$300 million in grants, ¥200 million in government loans, and ¥300 million in private loans. The negotiations on claims payments were handled by Ohno Bamboku, vice-president of the LDP, and Kim Jong Pil, then chief, KCIA. There were rumors that several hundred million yen changed hands during the talks. The frantic scramble by the Korea Lobby in Japan to get a piece of the claims involved hoodlums and organized crime.

Financial and political collusion in Japan-Korea relations has long been a problem. The Park regime has been in power for thirteen years and the Japan-south Korea treaty was concluded ten years ago. During that period illicit funding and corruption has become a structural element of Japanese political life. Part of the LDP would collapse without the prop of south Korean money.

We can see how that trickle of funds became a surging river of corruption over the years by looking at the growth of the economic exchange between



Toi Jugatsu

the two countries. Between 1962 and 1973 the bilateral trade had expanded more than twenty-two times to \$2,962 million; Japanese exports were \$1,723 million and ROK exports were \$1,239 billion. Japanese loans to south Korea from 1959 to June 1974 amounted to \$1.03 billion (government loans, \$383 million; commercial loans, \$647 million). Japanese investments in south Korea vastly exceed American, with 695 cases valued at \$467 million compared to 111 cases worth \$174 million. In addition, Japan has provided \$236 million in grant aid. The total amount of "economic cooperation" -- grants, loans, and investment -- is \$1,732 million. There are 610 Japanese companies in south Korea. In 1973 their production and services were valued at \$600 million, which is 8.6 per cent of south Korea's GNP. These statistics illustrate the subordination and integration of the south Korean economy into Japan, Inc. Seoul has become a subcontractor for Tokyo. And needless to say, the opportunities for illicit profits and corruption have kept pace with the deepened and expanded economic ties.

THE ACCUMULATION OF ILLICIT WEALTH

I cannot discuss the ROK economy or the Japan-south Korean economic relationship at length here. It must be noted, however, that the south Korean economy is so distorted and rife with corruption because it was initially under American military rule, later inundated with Japanese capital, and has been controlled by a comprador regime and political businessmen who accept a neo-colonial subordination to Japan.

The economic indicators paint an impressive picture of the "miracle on the Han." The ROK GNP grew at a nominal annual average rate of 9.6 per cent between 1962 and 1973. Per capita income increased from \$285 to \$377. Exports rose from a mere \$55 million to \$3.22 billion in 1973.

These figures are misleading, however. They must be adjusted for the ROK's high rate of inflation. Inflation has actually been stimulated by the government as a fiscal device to increase the exchange rate for south Korean currency vis-a-vis the dollar. In 1948 the exchange rate was 45 hwan to the dollar; by February 1962 the rate had

gone up thirty times to 1,300 hwan to the dollar. When the currency was changed in 1962, 1,300 hwan were made to equal 130 won. The rate rose since then, until it reached 350 won to the dollar in 1974, and was further devaluated to 424 in December. Thus, won statistics should be divided by 2.7 or 3.3 to correspond with real values in 1962.

With this correction made, it is obvious from even official statistics that the south Korean economy is still far from real independence. Rather, the trends are in exactly the opposite direction: the self-sufficiency rate (including food) is decreasing. At the same time, loan indebtedness has increased at an abnormal rate: \$3 million in 1961; \$400 million in 1965; \$3 billion in 1970 and \$6.8 billion (estimated) in 1974. If Japan had a similar proportion of foreign loan debts to GNP, we would owe \$237 billion! But perhaps these foreign loans might best be thought of as the heroin fix an addict must have. The victim stays alive, barely, and remains dependent on the drug. Likewise, the ROK economy has been skewered, the industrial structure is unbalanced, and there are extraordinary inequities in the distribution of wealth. A new class structure is emerging. The dissident poet Kim Chi Ha has called the new ruling elite the Five Bandits; the tycoons, national assemblymen, government officials, generals, and cabinet ministers. They have enriched themselves through private plunder in the midst of state insolvency to foreign creditors and vast public poverty. At the other end of the class structure are the poor and destitute masses. Twenty-four per cent of the population (400,000 households) have monthly incomes between 15,000 and 20,000 won.

South Korean business leaders got their start with the transfer of former Japanese assets from the colonial period. They flourished by sucking the profits from U.S. and Japanese "aid." A financial elite so conceived and so nourished owes its existence and prosperity to an alliance with the political leadership. Good contacts meant profits and monopoly rights; no political influence spelled ruin. Support in high places was the secret of "business success."

The outrageous wealth of the "Five Bandits" is shown in an official survey

(August 1972) of private lending in south Korea (as distinct from bank loans, etc.). The reported total amount of private loans was 550 billion won, equivalent to 90 per cent of the currency in circulation. The assets of four key figures in the Park regime alone were equal to 50 per cent of the total money in circulation. Former KCIA chief Lee Hu Rak's personal fortune was assessed at 30 billion won.

How do the "bandits" rob the public till? Here are some of the tricks of their trade.


1. Control and manipulation of foreign "aid." Which project or company will get the foreign money? The approval of fund allocations involves bribes and inspires secret and corrupt relationships between the government on the one hand and business leaders and political party leaders on the other. Foreign money is not the only valuable item up for grabs. Imported materials may be diverted. Chang Song, chief, Army Security Command, was dismissed from his position in May 1973 on the charge of selling 1,600 drums of military gasoline to private businesses.

The approval process for "aid" varies depending upon the nature of the project. There are five principal categories: (1) capital goods; (2) materials; (3) capital goods financed by official loans; (4) commercial (foreign) loans; and (5) direct investment. These all vary slightly but space permits only a description of types 3 and 4 which are explained in Chart 1.

Political finesse is necessary at each check-point in the approval maze.

Chart 1

PROCEDURES FOR PURCHASED CAPITAL GOODS FINANCED BY REPAYABLE GOVERNMENT LOANS




It is standard procedure to set aside 3 or 4 per cent of the total project cost for payoffs to the following: chief, presidential secretariat; chief, KCIA; chairman, finance committee, Democratic Republican party; director, Economic Planning Board; Minister of Finance, etc. Another 3 or 4 per cent of total project cost goes for rebates to influential bankers and industrialists.

2. Using "aid" money to take advantage of the difference in interest rates between south Korea and the donor country. The Export-Import Bank of Japan and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund charge an annual interest rate of 6 to 7 per cent. In south Korea the standard interest rate is about 20 per cent. Thus if a businessman can just get funds or material from the "aid" program, he can make an enormous profit by diverting the "aid" grant to usury. When Lee Hu Rak fell from power in December 1973, close-follower Lee Yong Jun was arrested. Lee Yong Jun had allegedly set up a fictitious company and financed it for three years with grant "aid" funds to the tune of ¥7.4 billion.

In south Korea business financing is overwhelmingly by private loans. Only 14 per cent of corporate financing is by banks and official credit channels; 86 per cent is by loans from an individual to the business (see the report on private loans cited above). What a money lender's heaven!

3. Illicit profits from foreign contracts. This is a very common practice. Kim Dae Jung pointed out that an automobile selling for ¥1.7 million in Japan costs about ¥3 million when exported to south Korea (Sekai, July 1973). There

PROCEDURES FOR COMMERCIAL LOANS



was a scandal about the construction of the fifth Ulsan fertilizer factory in September 1965. The actual cost of the cement purchased from Mitsui & Co. was \$35 million but the ROK government "paid" \$49 million. Moreover, it was later discovered that some of the bags contained OTSA (raw material for saccharine) which was being smuggled into south Korea as cement. A similar price rigging incident occurred in 1966. Freight cars exported by Hitachi Ltd. and Kisha Seizo (Rolling Stock Mfg.) cost \$10 million more in south Korea than in Japan. There have been many instances of outdated industrial plants exported to south Korea which really should have been scrapped. This profiteering on Japanese exports to south Korea and ROK imports from Japan is just within the borderline of normal commercial activity and is very common.

4. Intentional bankruptcy of companies financed by foreign loans. This is a more drastic method than the above. Some examples are the Shinhan Insulator company, financed by a Nissho-Iwai loan of \$3.45 million and the Korean Aluminum Co. which received a \$13,480,000 loan from Tomen and Showa Denko. The Foreign Ministry sent a Survey Group on the Republic of Korea's Third Five-Year Plan to Seoul in 1972. According to the group's report, of the 147 firms financed by foreign loans, one-third (45) went bankrupt. Japanese financing alone for these defunct companies exceeded \$150 million. The causes of the

bankruptcies included defective and obsolescent plant and equipment sold by Japan and other countries and excessive capacity due to poor planning in approving the ventures. In the case of Korea Aluminum, \$5.92 million of the foreign loan literally disappeared; there was a strong suspicion that the enterprise was never a legitimate company but merely a front for quick illegal profits. Curiously, bankruptcy did not result in ruin or heavy losses for either the Japanese or the Korean businessmen involved. On the Japanese side, the loans came from the Export-Import Bank, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, etc. It was all government money. Similarly in the ROK, the government had to assume all bad debt payments.

A report by the Northeast Asia Section, Foreign Ministry, entitled "Bankrupt Corporations in the Republic of Korea" states that "there is a greater possibility of loan funds being embezzled in the capital induction phase or in the financing process than in the phase of normal business activities." The report noted that one of the "diversionary methods" is "rebates."

5. Direct contribution of political funds. For example, the first stage of the construction of the Pohang iron and steel mill project, agreed upon by Japan and south Korea in August, 1969, required \$123 million in aid. That amount included \$73 million in Japanese government funds. Many observers believe

Technical school at Kumi built with Japanese money. The family refuses to evacuate.



that part of this money was used to finance Park's reelection in 1971.

The 5th Japan-ROK Ministerial Conference in 1971 agreed to cooperate on the construction of a subway system. As part of the agreement, 186 subway cars were sold to south Korea for \$61 million. It was later discovered that the same cars cost only \$35 million in Japan! Rumors have it that the extra money from this deal also was used in the 1971 election. If these figures are correct, the bill was padded by more than ¥4.8 billion.

These are the Five Bandits' most popular ways of enriching themselves. In addition, there are other very important "men and money" connections. For example, Park Chong-gyu, then chief of Presidential Bodyguard, made the final decision on applications to operate in the Masan Free Trade Zone. And Lee Hu-Rak was closely associated with the Samsung group, the largest zaibatsu in south Korea. President Park Chung Hee is a major shareholder in Honam Oil, Maxwell and Hyundai Shipbuilding. The economic threads are interwoven with political authority to form a tight pattern of pay-offs, collusion, and "money politics."

*SOUTH KOREA:
"THE NEW FRONTIER" OF WESTERN JAPAN*

What happens on this side of the Tsushima Straits? A glance at the Japanese "connection" shows an identical pattern of quick money, shady political influence, and corruption. The reasons are not hard to find and include the following:

1. High interest rates and profits are guaranteed for "aid" and investments in south Korea because illegal rebates, much higher than normal profit rates, are always paid.
2. Loans and investments have strings attached: the expansion of the export market for Japanese goods. Moreover, business is assured of higher prices because the transactions are financed by the Japanese government and the Export-Import Bank.
3. Inferior and obsolescent equipment and materials can be sold for a good profit in south Korea.

4. Japanese industries find it increasingly difficult to expand their facilities at home because of pollution. Operating in south Korea provides them with plant sites in the area closest to Japan and with abundant cheap labor. The workers' monthly salary is only 15,000 won, they have no right to strike, and they can be required to work sixty hours a week: What capitalist wouldn't want to move into the ROK?

Or consider the attractions of the Masan Free Trade Zone: land rental is only ¥504 per tsubo and the ROK government provides and maintains buildings, utilities, etc.; no public protest allowed against pollution; five years' exemption for customs duties, income and property taxes; 50 per cent tax reduction for an additional three years.

The conditions are so attractive that business leaders regard south Korea as part of the "economic sphere of Western Japan." The integration is obvious in the Japanese participation in what are normally south Korea's development plans. For example, Japan sent a survey group to Seoul in February 1972 to participate in the discussion and planning of the ROK's Third Five-Year Plan, which was announced later in the year. Another group of technicians and industrialists visited south Korea in May 1973 to participate in the plan for heavy and chemical industries. In fact, Japan isn't so much "participating" as drafting these plans! Individual corporations have competed furiously, including the use of political influence, to get part of the plan business.

For example, the Mitsubishi Corp. and C. Itoh & Co. were fighting for a \$100 million contract to build a copper plant in south Korea. During the public uproar over the Kim Dae Jung abduction in 1973, Premier Kim Jong Pil asked Foreign Minister Ohira, "which should get the deal?" Ohira recommended C. Itoh. Wouldn't it be strange indeed if the lucky company didn't feel grateful for this "little" favor. This may also explain Ohira's ambivalence toward the Kim Dae Jung matter.

These economic relations have produced the Korea Lobby, organizations like the Japan-ROK Cooperation Committee, and commercial and political alliances.

Space limitations do not permit a detailed analysis of the complex connections. However, I want to note the close relationship between President Park and the Mitsubishi Group. Fujino Chujiro, president, Mitsubishi Corp., operates on his close personal ties with President Park. When Fujino calls to the occupant of the Blue House from Tokyo or meets with him informally, he addresses the president as "Park-kun." That familiar term is usually reserved for intimates or inferiors.

Another set of close relationships bears special watching. They are the ties between former prime minister Kishi and President Park via Mitsubishi, Nihon Sekiyu (Caltex) and Honam Oil (Caltex). Kishi visited south Korea at the climax of the "political settlement" of the Kim Dae Jung incident. His detailed and serious discussions were not about political abductions, however, but on the development of offshore oil areas between Japan and the ROK.

A third powerful combination is the Mitsui group tie-in with Samsung and Lee Hu Rak. Many Mitsui companies have set up operations in the Masan Free Trade Zone. Nevertheless, it is true that Mitsui has reduced its involvement in south Korea since relations between the two countries soured in 1973.

THE "INCONVENIENCE" OF SOUTH KOREA'S POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE

To unravel the Japan-south Korea "connection" is to start pulling at the very fabric of Japanese politics. There is about as much chance of combining the totally corrupt LDP politics with the Park military dictatorship and getting a "clean" Japan-south Korea relationship as there is of two and two making ten. Premier Tanaka has fallen because of his wealth and how he acquired it, but there is no reason to believe that his LDP critics are any "cleaner," particularly in their deals with south Korea.

Seoul regards Japanese capital as a hostage guaranteeing Japan's commitment to south Korea's security. The Park regime believes that a steady flow of secret money and secret political deals gives it an advantage over Japan.

Tokyo probably has a strategic notion that goes beyond particular corporate interests: there can be no revived Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere without south Korea. The new imperialism still needs a bridge to the continent.

Several years ago south Korea requested assistance from the Japan Iron and Steel Federation. Nagano Shigeo, president, Nippon Steel Corp., replied that three factors would determine the future direction of Japanese industry: (1) India's 500-million population, (2) Indonesia's mineral resources, and (3) the prosperity of south Korea, a bulwark for "Free Asia" against communism (*Nihon Keizai*, September 6, 1969). This is not just an expression of benign support. Even if south Korea has to be given \$300 million a year in "aid," that is still less than the Japanese central government's 1973 subsidies to Hokkaido. And look what Tokyo gets for its money in the ROK: markets, cheap labor and a 600,000-man military force. What could be a better bargain to cost-conscious, profit-minded capitalists?

Superficially it appears that Japan has recently been knuckling under to outrageous south Korean actions and demands. But the incidents, the anti-Japan demonstrations, the cries for apologies and so forth only obscure a deeper, much more significant transformation. Vice-Foreign Minister Togo Fumihiko's unguarded remark about the arrest of two Japanese, Tachikawa and Hayakawa, in Seoul in April, 1974 on charges of anti-government political activity pointed to the essence of the problem. Togo said, "When we regard south Korea as a foreign country, a solution to this case becomes very difficult." He meant that it is because south Korea is nominally an independent country, that complications like international law and national honor arise. It was an understandable slip because in the economic sphere the situation is quite different. A single "Korea-Japan" is emerging on the Korean peninsula as Tokyo expands its power and influence over the southern half.

Corporations are linked. Corporate budgets and accounts are coordinated and merged. The very idea of a "rebate" is probably on its way out. How can you give a rebate to yourself? ● ●

Pollution Export: Cutting off the Retreat

by Hirayama Takasada

Japanese industry, hoping to beat the problem of popular resistance to its polluting of the environment here, is exporting its filth to countries it considers more tolerant. AMPO readers are well-aware of the fact that overseas too, there have been many cases of militant opposition. As Japanese we can not sit back, however, and wait for an opportunity to cheer such opposition if and when it does materialize. Not only because we realize that it is usually in countries with repressive regimes that Japanese industry expects to get away with pollution, but also because we cannot consider our own anti-pollution movements successful as long as this "solution" exists for shamelessly aggressive Japanese capital.

The following report is the experiences of the Executive Committee to Stop the Toyama Chemical Industry from Exporting Pollution.

It all started with a headline in the Toyo Keizai Nippo of February 15th, 1974, "Exporting the Plant to South Korea?" The piece of business news that followed was enough to raise our suspicions: Has Toyama Chemical really suspended production of mercurochrome? The furor over mercury poisoning which reached a peak in 1973 with discovering of yet another Minamata disease area, the Ariake Sea area of Kyushu, forced the Toyama Chemical Industry Co. to stop production of this local antiseptic and germicide commonly referred to as akachin. It seemed, however, that Mr. Koe, a Korean resident in Japan and president of the Sanwa Chemical Co., was to buy the plant and move it to a factory of his company in Incheon City, south Korea, there to begin again production of akachin destined for the Japanese market. The factory itself had been completed at the end of 1973 and in February of 1974 Mr. Koe applied to the South Korean government for

permission to set up the plant in question with a view to starting production by the end of April.

Alerted by the newspaper article, we started researching Toyama Chemical, one of Japan's biggest manufacturers and marketers of medical supplies, and industrial and agricultural chemicals, and found, among other things, that it has been producing mercurochrome (and presumably discharging mercury) since 1943. It shared the market with three other manufacturers until 1971, when the growing popularity of items such as band-aids caused the other three to cease production. Toyama thus came to monopolize the market with its product "Merbormin." In explaining the reasons why it stopped production in September 1973, the company nowhere so much as alluded to the obvious fact that it was its own polluting practices, finally sufficiently exposed, that had forced the cessation. To learn the real reason we went to Toyama where the factory is located and talked with members of "The Citizens' Federation for Prosecuting Pollution" and the "Toyama Defense Committee." The sequence of events these people laid before us showed clearly that it had been public pressure and fear about its public image that had forced the company to stop production and put us on the alert to the deviousness of the company, something which we were to encounter ourselves in our own movement.

On May 23, 1973, responding to the discovery of Minamata disease victims in the Ariake Sea area announced the previous day, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry decided to investigate factories throughout Japan which use mercury, and the Environmental Pollution Department of the Toyama Prefectural Government set out to investigate, the same department began entering the six factories to investigate, and on that

day too the Toyama Chemical Industry Co. declared that they would stop the production of mercurochrome by September. On September 30th the company stopped the production of akachin.

Having learned from the Toyama people something of what to expect from Toyama Chemical Co., we returned to Tokyo and set about finding allies among groups opposing pollution as well as Japan's economic invasion of Asia. Though we held various viewpoints we were united in our determination not to ignore Japanese polluting in Korea and we joined to form the "Executive Committee to stop the Toyama Chemical Industry Co. from exporting pollution." We planned a rally and march to the head office of Toyama Chemical in Tokyo for April 27th. On that day our Toyama friends leafletted at the factory and stations around Toyama. Many persons concerned with Japan-Korea relations and pollution problems spoke at the Tokyo rally and one of them, a member of the Japan YWCA, informed us that on February 18th Korean people, many of them from the Incheon YWCA had protested the planned opening of the plant in Incheon to the Mayor of that City and to the Sanwa Chemical Co. This was very encouraging news for us. When our march reached its destination, we found the head office of Toyama closed up tighter than a drum. But our shouts of "Stop Exporting Pollution" drew support from passers-by in that district lined with banks and other buildings.

On the evening of April 27th the national broadcasting corporation NHK aired a most interesting program which began with the news that Toyama Chemical Co. had, that very morning, abandoned its plan to move the mercurochrome producing plant to Incheon City. A Toyama Prefecture official interviewed on the program laid the blame for pollution of Toyama waters solely at the door of Toyama Chemical Co. and said further that the mercurochrome-producing plant was still in the factory. An Incheon YWCA member interviewed strongly protested the transfer of a plant to Korea which had had to stop its operations in Japan due to pollution. Mr. Koe of the Sanwa Chemical Co. told NHK that the environmental pollution control standards of the Korean government were too severe to permit bringing the akachin plant into his factory. A Korean official stated that the Korean government had no

intention of permitting the introduction of such a dangerous plant into Korea.

On the following day three members of our committee succeeded in obtaining an interview with one of Toyama Chemical's executives at the Tokyo head office. He wanted to stress that the company never had any intention of exporting the akachin plant. However when later we asked him when the company had abandoned the plan to transfer the plant he answered guilelessly, "At an executive meeting in April." So much for dialogues with industry.



Nippon Chemical closes its gate as protesters arrive

Well, we had won a victory, but none of us doubted that it was only a limited one. As mercurochrome production represented only a small percentage of Toyama Chemical's total production we could not flatter ourselves that we had dealt a vital blow to the company. Further we realized that the Korean government's seeming opposition to Japan's pollution export policy was strictly opportunistic. Fundamentally the Park regime has given Japanese capitalists free rein to pollute Korea to their heart's content. When their interests demanded it they put on a show of sympathetic response to the protest of the Incheon citizens: later we received word that the Incheon sisters were being persecuted by Korean authorities.

Nevertheless, through this first struggle we had gained valuable experience and many young people began to join the committee determined to concretize their solidarity with Korean people by cutting off this pollution channel by

which Tanaka and Park would link our two countries. We started publishing a monthly newspaper Cut Off the Path of Retreat for Pollution, and it wasn't long before our next target presented itself.

Again, as in the case of Toyama Chemical, it was an item in a business paper that tipped us off. The article in the June 3, 1974 Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun was titled, "New direction: Setting Up Bases of Production for Pollution-producing Industries through International Division of Labor."

The article said that Nippon Chemical Industry Co., Ltd., the top manufacturer of inorganic chemicals, was planning to establish a joint corporation at Ulsan, Korea to produce sodium bichromate and sodium sulphate. By then we had been educated enough to read between the lines and understand what "new direction" meant.

It took us two months of research and visits to the areas where Nippon Chemical Industries is located to find out what had led up to the decision to move into Korea. We learned sodium bichromate, which the company plans to produce there, accounts for 24 per cent of its gross sales, which in 1973 amounted to ¥ 10.2 billion.


Nippon Chemical controls 63.6 per cent of the sodium bichromate market. This chemical, potassium chromate, is widely used in paints, dyestuffs, gilding, plating, coating and leather processing and is virulently poisonous, being regulated by law. It is known that the chemical can cause an ulcer on skin and mucous membrane (especially nose and mouth), and a cancer on lungs and other respiratory organs. In extreme cases, it can cause the symptoms of convulsions and loss of consciousness. Hexavalent chromium, in particular, is so dangerous that if it gets into the human body it can cause peripheral blood vessels to expand, causing nephritis or uremia. Chrome, containing hexavalent chromium, is found in large amounts in the dross discharged in the process of potassium bichromate production.

Sodium bichromate is being produced at two plants of Nippon Chemical: Komatsugawa in Tokyo and Tokuyama in Yamaguchi Prefecture. Chrome pollution first became a public issue at the

Komatsugawa plant when, in 1970, chrome slag discharged from the plant was used in nearby Ichikawa City for reclaiming land for a housing area while Ichikawa people didn't know what was used. Following up residents' complaints about the unusual yellow material in the area Dr. Asami Teruo of Tokyo University "investigated." By his survey, it was found that the sample from the soil of the reclaimed land contained a large amounts of chrome (54,600 ppm) and also Tokyo-Bay was already polluted by the chemical which came from the land. In response to residents' pressure, the mayor of Ichikawa City protested to Nippon Chemical and requested it to stop discharging chrome slag. By this time at least 15 or 16 thousand tons of chrome had been dumped in Ichikawa City. (Figures for the total amount of chrome slag discharged from the factory since it started production in 1915 are not available. When we queried the president of Nippon Chemical about the discharge around the plant itself - a visit to the factory showed us it was literally soaked in chrome - he sloughed off responsibility with the argument that there had been no legal restrictions for almost half a century and that it was inevitable that some chrome would be drained away by rain.)

Thus Nippon Chemical had no choice but to transfer the main part of its sodium bichromate production out of the Tokyo area, and in February 1972 full production started up in its other plant in Tokuyama City, Yamaguchi Prefecture. In spite of the fact that the company had signed pollution prevention agreements both with the city and prefectural governments, it was not long before, thanks to an accident at sea, it was discovered that between July and September 5 thousand tons of waste had been dumped offshore. The Tokuyama City Council unanimously passed a resolution to ask the company to suspend operations, which it did beginning September 22, 1972. When it was further revealed later the same month that the company had illegally discharged 4,300 tons of chrome slag within the factory site, the Yamaguchi Prefectural government not only ordered the company to clean up the dross, but also withdrew application of its "tax holiday" exemptions to Nippon Chemical (40% the first year, 30% the second, 10% the third).

Where to go next ? In the logic of industries like Nippon Chemical - Korea, naturally. (Japanese capitalists take readily to the ideas of people like Yatsugi Kazuo, who envisions a "cooperative economic sphere" uniting the western part of Japan and the southern part of Korea.) When in June of 1974 it announced its reasons for the decision to go into Korea, the company noted that, "It's no farther from Tokuyama to Ulsan (Korea) than from Tokyo to Tokuyama. It is very convenient in terms of transportation."



Protesters against Toyama Chemical's pollution export march in Tokyo

Nippon Chemical's Korean partner is Hwang Hak-Koo, representative director of Kun Sul Chemical Industry Co. Ltd., (connected with Japan's Kansai Paint). The new 50-50 joint enterprise Ulsan Inorganic Chemical Co., already has the go-ahead from the Park regime and is scheduled to start operations from early next year. According to its planning, the estimated production of potassium bichromate per year is 12 million tons, three-fourths of which is exported to Japan.

The hazards of sodium bichromate production have already raised the fears of some Koreans. An article about Japanese pollution export in the Korean monthly details results of a study of 58 factories dealing with sodium bichromate where, out of 160 workers, two showed one of typical symptoms of the chronic poisoning in which nose cartilages were corroded by chrome, and 96 suffered from similar symptoms of poisoning. It was first appearance in Korea.

We cannot let Nippon Chemical, which has already threatened the lives and health of workers and citizens in Japan,

go into the already polluted Ulsan Industrial area, forcing the Korean people to accept yet another type of poisonous filth. Though our movement is still small, we are not going to underestimate what is possible. Word of our fight against Nippon Chemical has already reached the Korean people through an article in the Chung Chong Ilbo. We know that Nippon Chemical is only the top of a huge iceberg of Japanese enterprises arbitrarily polluting Southeast Asia.

Another deciphered phrase is "worsening of the investment environment": it means the development of anti-Japanese movements in Asia. As for the "theories" fabricated to promote pollution export, this one by Yoshiwara Kunio of the South East Asian Research Center of Kyoto University is typical:

"In Japan, 'the big pollution power, one cannot talk about the export of pollution-producing industries without fear of being severely attacked. But clearly pollution is caused only where many plants are concentrated in one area and too much waste is discharged to be cleaned within nature's ecological cycle. Therefore, as long as it is done with deliberate planning, these industries should take advantage of the wider space in Southeast Asian countries... etc., etc., etc.'" ● ●

Social Scientist

Monthly Journal of the Indian School of Social Sciences

Editor: Dr. Jacob Eapen
Associated Editor: Dr. Mohan Thampi

Subscription rates (in US dollars)

Air Mail : Annual \$17
Sea Mail : Annual \$11

Contact

Manager, Social Scientist,
Indian School of Social Sciences,
TRIVANDRUM - 1, INDIA

IMPERIAL CHIC

The "Family State" Myth as Pop Culture

It is a delicate public relations problem. How does one create a "democratic image" for an Emperor? How does one make popular figures put out an Imperial family without undermining their vital ideological function? In particular, how does one make full use of the fact that Princess Michiko is a magazine idol without placing her on the level of a pop singer or a movie star?

This dilemma is the constant headache of the Administration Section of the Imperial Household Agency. The Administration Section, whose chief responsibility used to be the organization of the weeding of the palace grounds by elderly volunteers from around the country, has in recent years come to be in charge of Imperial Family public relations. Its task has been to prop up the Emperor System by changing its pre-war authoritarian image ("the father of the people") to one at least superficially consistent with democracy ("the people's beloved friend").

In 1959 the opportunity came. The Crown Prince, a wooden youth who seems most at ease when standing at attention, managed to initiate a romance with a "commoner," a tight-lipped young lady named Shohda Michiko, wealthy daughter of a flour merchant. The mass media exploded with ecstatic headlines: "The Cinderella of our Time," "The Rainbow Bridge which Links Us to the Imperial Family," etc. The Michiko boom was on.

The entertainment magazines, and especially the women's magazines, found they had a gold mine. Michiko's name on the cover of an issue was an absolute guarantee of its sales. Journalists crowded to her door, begging for a photograph which the public had not yet seen or a quote they had not yet heard.

The Administration Section, through which all such requests are channeled, suddenly found itself in a remarkable

position. Since journalists and photographers are not allowed to enter the Imperial Palace, private photographs of the Imperial Family are periodically presented to the press. The date of release of these photographs is a matter of tremendous importance in the intensely competitive weekly magazine market, ensuring profits for some publications and losses for those whose deadlines have passed.

It is the Administration Section that has the power to choose the date of release of photographs, which means that it virtually controls the income of the publishing companies. Naturally it knows the deadline of each magazine; naturally it reads them carefully. Its power over the tone and content of all articles about the Imperial Family is simply unchallengeable.

In one sense the publicity has been a great success: the Imperial Family's daily life has become the nation's favorite soap opera. It is almost impossible to open a women's magazine without encountering some awkwardly posed family portrait, Michiko with her highly controlled, rather chilly smile and the Crown Prince unsure about where to put his hands. As one editor put it, Michiko is a "clothes-changing doll." Indeed, the expression on her face remains fixed year after year, and only her clothes change to fit the seasons. The "fashions" she models represent neither Imperial splendor nor bourgeois wealth, but are schoolteacherish and severe. In fact they seem to be designed with the same purpose as schoolteachers' clothing: to make the body beneath them unimaginable. Looking at Michiko, one can only suppose that her three children were brought by the stork.

Her husband, on the other hand, presents the awkward spectacle of a Harold Lloyd figure at whom one is not permitted to laugh. Hardly an imposing prince, he was apparently invisible to visiting U.S.

President Ford, who during the presentation ceremonies marched right past him and had to be called back. Recently he has started to turn grey; it seems that it will be his misfortune to pass directly from boyhood to old age.


The immense popularity of this unattractive couple is both a triumph of public relations and evidence that the authoritarian character of the emperor system is far from dead. But it is precisely here that the Administration Section encounters its dilemma. On the one hand they are delighted with Michiko's popularity; on the other hand they find it intolerable that she is "placed on the same level" as, for example, Misora Hibari, the self-styled "queen of popular song" who in all respects cuts an infinitely more "regal" figure than does the Princess. As one senior official put it,

I fear to think what the world will be like when Prince Hiro (Michiko's first son) is his father's age. When we visit provincial areas we are sometimes shocked to find that they calmly put a picture of Her Highness next to one of Misora Hibari. Her Highness' position is completely different from that of a star singer. Her Highness' position is clearly defined in Chapter One of the Constitution of Japan, and it is unfortunate that Japanese citizens no longer recognize this. Schools also fail to teach this nowadays. This is a very regrettable trend.

As a result of these fears, the Administration Section has begun to alter its popularization policy, and has intensified its control over reportage. Magazine editors who wish to put out special editions on the Imperial Family must pay a courtesy call on the Imperial Household Agency and submit articles to a strict word-by-word inspection.

For example, the word "sweat" is no longer permissible. It was once possible to use this word, for example in connection with a photograph of Michiko playing tennis. But since 1970 the Administration Section has declared the word "undesirable because it is connected with something bodily."

One wishes this policy were merely ridiculous. Unfortunately the notion of a disembodied, superhuman Imperial Family is part of this country's most dangerous tradition. The Emperor system was the ideological keystone in the structure of Japanese fascism, and it remains a vital element in present-day nationalism. While the ideology of the "family state" is no longer official doctrine, it remains as something like an unconscious assumption, without which this country's jealously exclusive immigration policy, and its intense "racism" towards people of the same race (Koreans and Chinese) would be insupportable.



The Administration Section is quite correct in saying that the popularity of the Imperial Family is not of the same nature as the popularity of movie stars. It was under the sweatless, bloodless, disembodied image of the same family that vast armies of sweaty bodies marched off to bloody war. The deliberate re-mystification of this family by the present Japanese government is a matter worthy of the careful attention of all people everywhere, but especially of people in other parts of Asia. ● ●

cultural imperialism in action



Thieu vs. The People: A Match He Cannot Win

by John Spragens, Jr.

"Thieu's really in trouble," said one western journalist. "I didn't believe it before, but I believe it now." That was on October 10th, when thousands of people surged past police lines to join a couple of hundred journalists demonstrating against Saigon's repressive press laws.

Ordinary life is not suspended to await the outcome of the growing popular pressure for Thieu's ouster, of course. People still go to market in the morning, just as they have all through the war. They get married and buried. And the bell-bottomed set with their tight tailored shirts and blouses still lounge in the air conditioned ice cream parlors and prance into downtown theaters to watch foreign films.

Since October 10th, though, it has been impossible to pretend that the downtown quarter is exclusively devoted to swinging. The police patrols there are doubled, tripled, even more. And coils of concertina wire leaning against lamp posts warn that these streets are no longer the pleasure preserve of the war profiteers and their young.

The journalists billed their demonstration as "Journalists' Begging Day," calling attention to those out of work because their publishers couldn't continue in the face of requirements for large deposits with the government, or repeated confiscations. The begging struck a sympathetic chord among the people, who have seen life grow increasingly harder in spite of glowing promises from on high.

While the Americanized war raged over Viet Nam, the Saigon economy disintegrated, and all the economic specialists sent in by the US Agency for International Development managed on a practical level was to plug some of the more egregious

holes with massive wads of dollars. The dollars bought Hondas and TV sets and all manner of goods to support a phantom consumer economy in the towns and cities. And such light industry as was set up during that period -- plastics fabricating is a good example -- is heavily dependent on imports of basic raw materials, and produces primarily for the local market.

What happened to rice farming illustrates many of the fundamental problems. The rich alluvial deltas of the Mekong in the south and the Red River in the north traditionally produced a surplus of rice, which was a major Vietnamese export. But to US war planners, rice fields and the farmers who tilled them were part of the enemy. They had to be "sanitized." Where US and Saigon troops could not garrison farming areas, bombs and shells, chemical defoliants, and sweep operations were used to force farmers from their land into the urban areas.

American aid brought in rice to make up the deficit, and "green revolution" methods were encouraged to raise production on remaining lands. The high yield strains required mechanical cultivators and chemical fertilizers and insecticides -- imported, because the Saigon economy had no such industrial base.

Meanwhile, the uprooted farmers were finding jobs in the towns and cities -- more often than not working for the US troops, providing American soldiers with everything from shined shoes and swept floors to barrack and bunker construction. And around the fringes of the bases, where those who had the enterprise and enough money set up bars and massage parlors, it was often the young wives and daughters from farm families who serviced GI passions.

Those who had money to invest were far more likely to put it into apartments

and bars and laundries, which could reap a fast, high return (some of it in solid green dollars) than they were to invest in the uncertain low-yield industries needed to support the agricultural base of the nation's economy.

Now the American presence is reduced to one or two percent of the peak levels, the dollars the GIs brought are missing from the foreign exchange accounts, and the service jobs that once abounded around U.S. bases have all but vanished. At the same time the US Congress is getting tired of providing stop-gap infusions of dollars. The American economy can no longer afford it.

If the Paris Agreement had been implemented, the shock would not have been so severe. Families herded into the cities during the war could have returned to their lands and resumed production. But to Saigon those farm lands are still enemy territory, and people have been allowed to return only if Saigon can establish military control.

The human result has been massive unemployment, in spite of the fact that well over a million people are in Saigon's armed forces, police and civil service. Inflation runs over 60 percent annually. The inflation is exaggerated by endemic corruption. Bribes exacted from rice truck drivers along the road, plus speculative hoarding by rice dealers often in collusion with government officials, hit the people's rice bowls directly.

Many families can no longer afford to eat rice, and consider themselves lucky to get a bowl of gruel twice a day. Those hit hardest have been city slum dwellers and those kept as virtual prisoners in refugee camps -- camps where no farm land is available, or where camp regulations allow too little time for field work. While there have been no reports of outright starvation, people have died from eating poisonous plants foraged to fill their stomachs. And parents who could not bear the suffering of their families, and could see no prospects for the future, have committed suicide, often taking their whole families with them in a final meal of poisoned gruel.

The US-Saigon response has been promises and pipe dreams ("We're going to

have oil. Everything will be great!"), coupled with requests for just enough more aid to shove Saigon's economy past an ever-receding take-off point.

There was, it is true, a massive plan for post-war reconstruction, which relied primarily on providing labor to foreign companies at rates even lower than Hong Kong and Korea. That plan was based on the assumption that Saigon would be the only government in post-war south Viet Nam, and that the revolutionary forces would be reduced to a few isolated bands.

For the past two years, Thieu has continued to insist that his is "the sole legal, constitutional government in the south." Both the Paris Agreement and the concrete situation disagree, and the revolutionary administration has remained strong and retained control over much of the country. That fact, along with the pervasive bureaucratic delays and corruption encountered by companies trying to invest in the Saigon economy, have discouraged all but a handful of firms.

The PRG has never yet had an opportunity to develop a full, well-rounded economy either. But the liberated zones have not developed the appetites for Hondas, cosmetics and other such luxuries which the US used in its attempt to buy support for Saigon. Instead, PRG stress has been on keeping the standard of living at a level which can be maintained on the basis of self-sufficiency. There are imports from the Saigon economy and from abroad -- radios and the batteries for them, canned milk and other light industrial products. But these goods could be eliminated with relatively little disruption.

Since the US troop pull-out, the liberated areas as a whole seem to be producing a surplus of agricultural goods. The PRG uses several high-yield rice strains, which have come both from the Saigon side and from PRG and DRV research farms' experimentation with the basic IRRI (International Rice Research Institute in the Philippines) seeds. To cope with these strains' greed for fertilizer, farmers in liberated zones have copied their northern brothers and sisters in making maximum use of natural fertilizers. Pit latrines are sealed when full to sterilize and digest their contents into useful fertilizer, and various forms of composted



October 20 - Children in vanguard - banners demand peace, implementation of the Paris Agreement

green fertilizer are used. By mixing manioc and sweet potatoes with the rice they eat, farmers in PRG areas save a surplus of rice which is sold in the Saigon zone along with poultry and produce, and industrial products are bought with the earnings.

If it became necessary, however, this trade could be sharply curtailed or even eliminated without seriously dislocating the style of life. Partly, this is because improved roads within the liberated zones make trade with the north more practical, and partly it is because local production of utensils (from war scrap) and cloth is sufficient to supply minimum needs. During my visit to one such area, people pointed out that the only petroleum they used, to take one example, was in their tiny lamps. Even that could be replaced by locally produced vegetable oil if necessary.

This should not be taken as an indication that the PRG idealizes primitive self-sufficiency. They are mechanizing agriculture where conditions permit, but their civilian economy and their appeal to the people are not based on a phantom prosperity dependent on massive

infusions of outside money. And by keeping as close as possible to self-sufficiency, they have given themselves a firmer base for future development -- gradual but balanced.

As discontent on the economic front has increased in Saigon areas, the PRG has increased its pressure. Recent reports indicate that in at least some parts of central Viet Nam, the PRG is withholding its produce from markets on the Saigon side, and at the same time increasing efforts to enable people in the refugee camps to return to their old homes.

This "return to village" program has a military component -- trying to knock out Saigon military blockades and provide sufficient security in the farming areas to which the people might return. (Refugees I talked with in Quang Ngai province earlier this year wanted very much to return to their old farms, which were often no more than ten kilometers from the camps where they were trapped. But they were afraid of raids by Saigon troops.) While this is one of the reasons for sharp strikes by PLAF units over the last several months, the basic cause lies deeper.

After a year and a half of maintaining a basically defensive posture, the PRG had seen between five and fifteen percent (estimates vary) of its territory eroded by constant Saigon attacks. Meanwhile, with Saigon insisting that the PRG was not a legitimate government, and thus could not legitimately claim territory or authority in the south, it was impossible for negotiations between the two southern administrations to make any progress. The PRG finally decided that Saigon needed a demonstration of what they can expect if they continue to opt for a military solution.

In mid summer PLAF troops launched a series of attacks in three areas of the country -- Quang Ngai and Quang Nam provinces in central Viet Nam, the central highlands, and several provinces northwest of Saigon. These moves routed Saigon troops in the areas, and tied down virtually all Saigon's available forces in attempts to hold on. If US intelligence reports can be believed, the revolutionary side still has over half its forces in reserve. Thus it would appear that US officials have been able to crow about success in the Vietnamization program only because, since the signing of the Paris Agreement, the PLAF has never put Saigon's ARVN to the test.

These PLAF attacks weakened Thieu's position, but not yet enough to embolden the people to express their discontent. As one former activist told me earlier this year, "The people need to feel that they have some chance of success before they will be willing to take the risks of demonstrating." Since the student movement of 1970-71 was squelched, Saigon's 120,000 police have been enough to keep the lid on.

But at the same time the PRG was counter-attacking on the battlefield, the US Congress was taking unexpectedly large hunks out of administration requests for aid to Viet Nam, and it was becoming more likely that Nixon would leave office. Opposition political forces knew that Nixon's departure, coupled with the aid cuts, would leave Thieu in a weakened position, and they began to prepare. When Nixon did resign, Ambassador Graham Martin (whose enthusiasm for Thieu prompted Senator Kennedy and others to ask just what government he was representing) was back in the US, and remained there for two months in all, stirring up still

more rumors which gave no comfort to Thieu. Within a month of Nixon's departure from the White House (and three weeks before Martin returned to Saigon), protests began.

The most active movement in the opening months of protest has been the "People's Movement Against Corruption to Save the Country and Create Peace." This group is almost entirely Catholic, initially led by 301 priests who were strong supporters of Ngo Dinh Diem when he was in power. Their first public statement came as early as June 18, but at the time was greeted with considerable scepticism because of the priests' background, because their statement was very vague, charging simply that a number of people in positions of authority were corrupt, and because the government had just made one of its periodic statements of determination to eradicate corruption. The suspicion was that the priests would only provide window dressing for another ineffective government charade.

The priests' motivations went deeper, however, and are widely believed to be related to a confidential report made by a conservative Italian priest, Fr. Peiro Gheddo, to an official of the Vatican State Secretariat after a late 1973 visit to Viet Nam. In closing his report, Fr. Gheddo noted, "...as it is inevitable that in the future Catholics will have to live with the Communists in a coalition government, the Church should move from now on in that direction, prepare the people, look for contacts with other forces, operate on a conscientious level in regard to social justice, etc. An alternative to the present regime must be contemplated and prepared."

On September 8, the anti-corruption movement fired its first heavy gun. At a meeting in Hue of some 5,000 Catholics, they brought out their "Indictment No. 1," aimed straight at Thieu and his family. It charged them with corruption in six areas ranging from buying and redecorating an inordinate number of lavish houses at public expense, to involvement in the speculation in rice and fertilizer which has directly affected the livelihood of all but the richest throughout the country. "The war which now continues to kill our troops and people is caused by the greed of Mr. Nguyen Van Thieu, who has considered his own position more important than the fate of the nation," the indictment charges.

The leading personality in the anti-corruption movement is Fr. Tran Huu Thanh, a solidly built, greying priest, quite handsome in a fatherly sort of way, who has an entertainer's sense of how to talk to a crowd. He mixes serious observations about how it has been over a year and a half since Thieu's representative signed the Paris Agreement, and yet peace has not come, with oblique sniping, asking why at a time when the country needs to economize, the police send four cars following him everywhere he goes around the country. He reminds people that corruption runs from top to bottom (and the money from corruption runs from bottom to top) through the whole governmental system, and then he jabs straight at Thieu: "He said he was going to clean up corruption in the armed forces in a month. Well, it's the 20th. He only has ten days left, and we haven't seen anything yet!"

The promise to get rid of corruption came in a televised speech on October 1. The anti-corruption movement had been joined in the struggle by other groups. A Buddhist sponsored National Reconciliation Force had its formal coming out on September 15. The People's Front Against Starvation was founded on the 22nd. On the 26th came the Committee to Protect the Rights of Workers. The Struggle Committee for Freedom of the Press and Publishing, founded on the 6th, had its first confrontation with the regime when three papers tried to publish the text of "Indictment No. 1," then publicly burned their editions rather than allow the police to confiscate them. And leaders of the People's Organization for the Implementation of the Paris Agreement, founded in December 1973, have given direct support to the developments. Thieu had to respond, and in the days before his speech there was speculation that he might announce a harsh, Korean-style step-up of repressive measures, or proclaim major reforms.

He didn't do either. Instead, he sat in front of the TV camera for nearly two hours and rambled. My informal survey indicated that no one but politicians' and journalists bothered to watch the whole performance. As many had presumed, Thieu spent a lot of time talking about The North Vietnamese General Offensive and The Communist Threat in general. But he appeared nervous and uncertain, angry

but afraid to act. And in the course of the speech, which appeared almost totally unprepared, he made a handful of statements which have come back to haunt him since.

The most often repeated has been his closing statement: "If, as the Communist propaganda says, the whole army and people have lost confidence in me, please let me know." People have been letting him know.

Police reaction to the protests has been uneven. At first the harshest measures were directed against the press, which Thieu charged with being a "megaphone" for communist propaganda. Since the bonfire protests against confiscation, the police have sent parties of a hundred uniformed and plainclothes men, more or less, to carry out confiscations, in order to prevent protests and insure that the confiscations are thorough. Some newspapers involved in the press freedom struggle have lost as many as four editions in a single week -- more than enough to wipe out a year's profits. And the regime has forced the regular printing shops of two papers to close. This move obliges the papers to rotate their printing among other plants, and take second place to the paper regularly printed at the printer of the day. Costs are higher that way, and the papers get to the streets later in the day. Several papers have been forced to suspend publication for various lengths of time, and some of them will almost surely be forced off the streets altogether before the struggle is over.


The other strong police response has been in trying to guard against expression of military discontent. Within the space of a week an army sergeant, Dao Vu Dat, and a young airman, Ho Vuong Tuan, made early morning appearances on the steps of Saigon's National Assembly building, and under the protection of opposition deputies, held impromptu news conferences saying they had no confidence in Thieu as president. After the first incident, 100 percent restriction to base was ordered for military personnel not on official leave, and unit commanders were made responsible for the actions of troops carrying passes they had issued. After the second protest, several jeep loads of M-16 toting military police were put on permanent duty in the area around the assembly building.

In dealing with demonstrations, the police at first seemed concerned to avoid bad press. The only strong repression came at times and places where there was no foreign news coverage, notably in Quang Ngai on October 17, when the first meeting of the province's National Reconciliation Force was dispersed with tear gas. In Saigon, the tactics called for relatively few uniformed police, mostly used to keep the people away from the demonstrators by diverting traffic and herding bystanders onto sidewalks at some distance from the action. Beatings and harrassment have been assigned to "people wearing ordinary clothes," as Thieu's party newspaper has called them.

These tactics proved inadequate. In the journalists' demonstration, thousands of bystanders broke through police lines and surged across the major downtown intersection of Le Loi and Nguyen Hue to help the journalists break through a three-deep cordon of uniformed police to continue their planned march. And the thousands stayed with the march all morning -- and hundreds of them were still in the streets long into the afternoon.

The police now have new orders. Just how far they will be told to go is not yet clear. They have quietly begun to arrest people who have been doing behind the scenes organizing work -- arresting them on the streets to avoid reaction from family and neighbors. This is in line with methods outlined in a document, circulated in the opposition underground in Saigon and alleged to be a top secret police plan -- the Comet Plan. Also, in line with directives in the Comet Plan, university openings have been delayed, though that maneuver has been played out about as long as it practically can already. The Ministry of the Interior has sent formal warnings to struggle organizations that they are "illegal," but no direct action has been taken so far.

Opposition politicians had suggested, hopefully, that Thieu was afraid to use his police too harshly for fear of further antagonizing the US Congress. But on October 31 it became obvious that the show of police restraint was over. To prevent demonstrations planned for that day, police carried out a brutal midnight raid against a group of journalists



Oct. 10 - Mrs. Ngo Ba Thanh faces down police officer (above); Fr. Tran Huu Thanh greets demonstrators (below)

spending the night in the press club, and severely injured one of the National Assembly deputies who intervened. The downtown area of Saigon was cordoned off all day, and all that could be seen in the streets was barbed wire blocking every intersection and hordes of police. Meanwhile, helmeted riot police and plainclothesmen attacked supporters of the anti-corruption movement who had held an all night vigil at the suburban Tan Sa Chau Church. The clash began about dawn, and the people fought back with sticks and stones until early afternoon, when they were allowed to disperse.

There were numerous casualties October 31. The most serious was Fr. Truong Ba Can, an advisor to the Young Catholic Workers, who was beaten by secret police outside the organization's office and suffered serious internal injuries. Of greater political consequence, the 31st marked the first direct attack on Fr. Thanh. During the Tan Sa Chau fighting a plainclothesman hit him in the face, breaking his glasses and bloodying his nose.

Since then Thieu has lashed out more strongly than ever at the nascent third force. In a November 12 speech he charged that the movement is a tool of the communists, then in almost the same breath claimed French plantation owners and business men are funding it. The Saigon press took special note of his warning that: "Senators and Deputies enjoy parliamentary immunity within the headquarters of the Upper and Lower Houses, but they are not entitled to bring politics to the streets and to disturb public security and order."

As if to demonstrate the seriousness of the threat, that very morning Deputy Nguyen Van Ham narrowly avoided death in a traffic "accident." Deputy Ham has been active in organizing for several of the opposition movements in his native province of Quang Ngai in central Viet Nam. He was riding on the back seat of one of the Hondas-for-hire that are a common substitute for taxis in Saigon when the construction-helmeted driver swerved in front of an oncoming Citroen touring car, jumped free, and fled. Although Ham will survive, he suffered a broken right leg and a crushed shoulder and left leg. He will be out of commission for months.

The directions the mass movements take, and how much strength they are able to mobilize in the face of such intimidation will be of great importance. So will officer corps, and the attitude of the US government.

There are already more opposition organizations and personalities than an outside observer can hope to keep up with, including the well-known lawyer, Mme. Ngo Ba Thanh and an order of mendicant Buddhist nuns who have been in the streets together off and on since early in the year, when no one else dared demonstrate, and two committees campaigning for the release of political prisoners. There will be more as events progress, doubtless including attempts by the Thieu regime to form counter-organizations. But the two major focal points will be Fr. Thanh's anti-corruption drive and the Buddhists' National Reconciliation Force. Although the two groups are offering each other guarded support, the contrast between their positions rather well sums up the two sorts of reasons why people are trying to get rid of Thieu.

The People's Movement Against Corruption etc. wants, basically, to reform the regime so that the anti-communist struggle can be carried out effectively. Whether this anti-communist struggle is to be military or peaceful is left ambiguous, though there seems to be a suggestion that if the "nationalist" side had a clean effective government, it could defeat the "communist" side without necessarily resorting to military force. A point made more explicitly is that the current Saigon regime will never defeat the other side, even militarily, because they're too corrupt to mobilize the support of their troops.

The National Reconciliation Force stresses that peace is the basic issue -- that the problems of hunger and corruption will not be solved until the war is ended, and that the best way to end the war is through implementing the Paris Agreement and working toward the national reconciliation outlined in that agreement. The National Reconciliation Force has devoted a great deal of time to preparing its organization, a process rendered more difficult by the divisions that have been sown within the Buddhist church over the last decade, with some of the major leaders in the struggle against Diem now considered dubious or even bought off.

One of the most watched events in the Buddhist calendar was their national student congress. The students, Catholic as well as Buddhist, are considered a crucial force, but they were seriously weakened when their 1970-71 struggle was put down. Many of the leaders from that period are still in prison. Others were forcibly returned to the PRG during the prisoner exchanges last year and earlier this year. The infiltration of campuses by police agents is also at a higher level than it was then. And for the men, the threat of conscription remains a constant shadow. But the youth and enthusiasm of the students will be important to the success of a popular struggle.

The mid-November convocation of representatives of Buddhist youth from all over the country set a determined theme. Among other things, they drummed out Hoang Van Giao, the layman who had been in charge of youth affairs for the Unified Buddhist Church. Giao had enraged the young people by trying to disrupt a presentation by Senator Vu Van Mau, leader

of the National Reconciliation Force. Giau was widely believed to be a key agent whom the regime hoped to use to defuse the youth movement.

The discontent within the military goes deeper than the two individuals who have protested on the National Assembly steps, and it reaches higher in the ranks. Only vague rumblings reach the press corps, but they include reports of officers as high as full colonel who believe the question is not whether Thieu will go, but how and when. An interesting aspect of the situation is that Fr. Thanh has taught ethics (anti-communism, in other words) to a large segment of the mid-level officer corps at Saigon's staff college.

In one spontaneous demonstration of sympathy, four paratroopers, including one officer, attacked the contingent of plainclothes police following Fr. Thanh on the night of November 15. They injured two ranking police officers, and chased one of the policemen into a church toilet where he was given asylum by the nuns at the church.

The US government attitude remains the biggest puzzle. The US embassy here apparently was slow to realize the importance of the mounting pressure against Thieu, and has no ready solution. They are trying to meet opposition figures to see where matters stand, and are putting pressure on Thieu to institute some dramatic reforms. Their first success in this area has been a cabinet purge that includes ousting Hoang Duc Nha, Thieu's cousin and Minister of Information -- the only person in the whole government he really trusts. As of this writing, though, the purge remains theoretical. No new appointments have been announced. And the difficulty of finding anyone who wants to take over the posts is read as an indication of the deterioration of Thieu's position.

At the same time, the US Deputy Secretary of Defense, William Clements, has said (October 8, after a whistle-stop tour of Asia that included 24 hours of conference with high level Saigon and embassy officials), "It is inconceivable to me that ... we will not help them." He suggested that the use of US air and naval forces might be considered, and it is known that earlier this year the

US reactivated its system of radar guidance beacons in Indochina.

But the US Congress has been determined to cut back in Indochina, the supplemental appropriation that Clements wants to get from Congress is not likely to come through, and the Congress will be on the look-out for attempts to shift money to Saigon through obscure back doors. Cuts already imposed have forced the withdrawal of some American aircraft and computer maintenance crews, and the curtailment of training for Vietnamese pilots. Departing American technicians say that within six months Saigon's air force will not be able to fly. And Vietnamese sources report that pilots are already being recommissioned as infantry officers.

It seems that, on a concrete level, all the US has is the vague hope that some acceptable new leader will emerge from the process now in motion. Meanwhile it seems they hope Thieu can be maintained in power until his current term ends in 1975. Thus any change could be made through elections under Saigon's current constitution, and need not shatter the US hope of expanding Saigon sovereignty over all of the south.

The PRG has, with barely disguised glee, supported the urban movements, and said that they have abandoned all hope of reaching a political solution with Saigon while Thieu remains in power. They have backed the urban movements' demands for a new administration which stands for peace, and said, "Only such a Saigon administration can really negotiate with the Provisional Revolutionary Government ... to insure the application of the provisions of the Paris Agreement."

The PRG will probably keep its military pressure at current levels -- just enough to keep Saigon's troops tied down -- and direct its political cadre in urban areas to help mobilize support for the protest movements. This makes far more sense than the general offensive that the US and Saigon charge they are planning, because the kinds of people leading the urban movements are in a better position to bridge the gaps between the revolutionaries and uninvolved urbanities than PRG cadre are. A gradual transition would be less painful for all concerned than a direct military takeover by the PRG.

(Continued on p. 95)

Letter from the Thai Movement

To my friends abroad,

The situation in Thailand has not changed since my previous report. The struggle of students remains at a low level, while that of the people grows high. The recent strikes by laborers of various factories, the farmers' demands for the clearance of unjust debts, as well as their claims that the land now in possession of the landowner-bourgeoisie be returned, serve as a good illustration. Meanwhile the cause of the assassination of Mr. Saeng Rangnirundormkul, an active student leader of Ramkambaeng University, is still as dark as a black cloud. The police cannot find the murderer and the case will end up as a failure, as with political assassinations in the past.

The birthday party of Deputy Foreign Minister Chartchai Chunhawan a few days ago, was a situation that brings to light the true nature of the fascist dictatorship of this civil government and fake Assembly. The guests, who consisted of more than one hundred phony members of the National Assembly, including Mr. Sunya Dgamasak, were exchanging their experiences in suppressing and exploiting the people. Moreover he and his group proposed that this administration should apply the most severe measures to suppress laborers', farmers' and students' movements. Indeed, it was a complete disclosure of their reactionary nature.

The government itself tries to establish strong measures to suppress the currents of struggle among the proletariat. The newly promulgated labor legislation allows an employer to close down the factory and prohibits laborers from different factories from striking in support of the laborers of that factory. Beside this, the labor law incorporates a strict penalty clause at the end. One of the dictatorial leaders, Vitoon Yasawas, CIA watchdog in Thailand, in an interview to the newspaper, said that if there is any resistance to such action, absolute measures will be introduced. Vitoon, who is well known as a CIA agent in Laos,

emphasized only the violation from the laborers' side, but not from the employers' side.

Concerning the problem of farmers, the government used various tactics in an attempt to denounce the farmers who came up to Bangkok to demand judicial measures from the government for the settlement of their problems. The government said that there must be somebody behind these farmers backing their protest, otherwise these farmers would not be able to do so. If the farmers really give back their I.D. cards (which means giving back their citizenship) and set up a liberated zone, that will be regarded as rebellion and must be punished. Apart from oppression by these various means, the dictators' side also publish fake news in the newspaper to subvert the power of the people. For instance, they said that the various strikes of hotels were well planned by the opposite side (e.g. communist) and hotels were the target following the textile factories. This is the strategy they use to distort the real principle in the struggle of laborers, which rise up because they are exploited by the bourgeoisie. Their intention in publishing this 'news' was to make the laborers disintegrate through mutual suspicion. And the people will not support the struggle of the laborers and farmers. It is not only the government but also the tyrant clique; one case is the subversion of students' power since the Plabphachai incident. It is an intentional, systematic and well-organized plan and their aim is to destroy the students' movement.

This tyrant clique uses various tactics aiming to confuse, and to destroy the struggle of the students-people movement in order to set up suitable conditions for a coup-d'etat. And they hope to bring back the military dictatorship to Thailand. At present, the current of the struggle of laborers is high, so they let out news like: the workers in the water-supply plant will cut off the water, in order to confuse people, making people tired of the situ-

ation. And they will withdraw their support to the laborers who are fighting for justice in their lives. Right now, I have a feeling that newspapers have fallen into the tyrant's trap. There is no reliability and authority in the news they present. There are many contradictions in the news itself. Eventually, this will lead to a situation in which people do not trust newspapers anymore. Too many rumors have been spread, and we can not distinguish facts from fake news. We have to remind ourselves that these reactionaries are good at exploiting people in many different ways, while the people are still weak in terms of experience.

On the other hand, the situation is changing. The reactionary groups

are dissolving themselves, while the people are getting stronger and gradually developing themselves and their ideas. In this sense, indeed the people have the better position, because the progressive power of history and justice is behind them. Although at the moment the reactionaries' power is still stronger, but it is getting weaker and weaker. But the power of the people will develop from weak to strong. We must understand the principle that the development of the people is from small to big, from simple to complex through the accumulation of experiences.

*From friends who work in
the countryside*

Thailand: The Golden Age of Students Comes to an End

Interview with Saeksan

Editor's note: It is a pattern that has been seen in other countries. The high moral purpose of Thai student movement has run up against the structural limits built into a class-based university system. A recent interview in the magazine Prachachart with student leader Saeksan Presertkul shows how Thai students are seeking to meet and overcome their new situation. Some excerpts from that interview follow.

Prachachart: Is the split in the student movement a natural development, or is it being carried out intentionally, and why is it so?

Saeksan: Personally, I anticipated the split even before the October incident. I think that the main causes are to be found in the contradictions of Thai society, primarily the contradiction between the politically and economically exploitative minority and the exploited majority. In general, the education system is the same as the economic and political system, in that the ones who win their way into the universities come from the minority group of wealthy people.

In the past, the students came out regularly to join the struggle because of their moral responsibility and their ardent youth. But, in the long run,

because the students are of the privileged class, they tend to side with the established economic, political and educational systems.

Prachachart: Why has the split become more serious since the October incident?

Saeksan: In the period before the October incident, the students of both the leftist minority and the rightist majority shared a common desire for "freedom," but it was an abstract one. There seemed to be no obvious contradictory interests. But since the October incident last year, the main contradiction of Thai society emerged in the form of the struggle between interest groups and classes. For example, in relation to the problems of workers and farmers, the students split when the progressive students realized that merely enforcing the constitution

was not sufficient to solve the problems of the people. For the interests of the poor, other changes in society would be needed. For that reason, the leftists joined the people's movement after the October incident.

Prachachart: Some say that the student movement has come to an end. What do you think?

Saeksan: Frankly, I agree, and, speaking idiomatically, I would say that the torch of the people's struggle has been passed from the students to the people. A certain leader will only fit a certain period of time in history. The student movement fills this role only when the people are still at a low level of political consciousness. Its task in that period is to organize the people to stand up for their civil rights. When the people rise up in struggle, the torch can then be passed to them. It is so because the people are the only main power behind long-range social change....

Prachachart: What hope do you have for the educated youth to change the society?

Saeksan: I used to have faith that the well-educated youth would have the soul to fight for the rights of the masses in this country. I have been hoping so for many years, but my faith has born no fruit. On the contrary, education gives people more choices and privileges. Now I don't believe students will be the principal force for change in this society. I rather have faith in the youth who have no choice in society, because they are the first group to feel the necessity of changing the society.

In fact, the students' struggle for the people is a struggle within the minority. Student power is a temporary thing. True power comes from the people. The students who are fighting have to understand this fact and not limit themselves to struggling within their institutions. They must treat the masses as equals and have confidence in them. They must not consider themselves "gods" whose duty is to wash away the sins of society; if they do not combat this tendency, there will be no escaping the elitist structure which raises the minority above the majority.

Prachachart: What form of society do you have in mind for the future?

Saeksan: First, we have to understand that society does not have a direction of its own, but is made up by men in order to fulfill their need for a better life. Presently, Thai society is structured so the minority can exploit the majority and keep them in poverty. The poor lack the basic means with which to develop their lives and search for happiness. As we have discovered in analyzing Thai society, the obstacle which prevents the achievement of human happiness is the structure of exploitation in the economic, political and educational systems, so we must start by changing these systems. Then, there must be a force that will conduct these changes. From our analysis of the present society, it is clear that there are exploiting and exploited classes. It is the exploited class that will conduct the changes, because they have no interest in keeping the old structure.

However, we must not forget that our ultimate goal is to build up the material conditions of human life, which, in turn will promote the highest level of human development, through the fulfillment of the people's needs. The class struggle is only a stage, for, in the end, human happiness must be evaluated on the basis of individuals and not social institutions, as the beauty of a tree must be judged by the color of each of its leaves.

I think this is crucial, because I have noticed many activists within the student movement, who behave like soulless, mechanical revolutionaries, without any understanding for the people. They wrongly interpret leftist ideas and socialism to mean that society is the aim in itself, and they place little importance on the individual. In fact, we work for socialism because we understand that the individual's alienation is caused by the social system. Thus, the transformation of society is of benefit to the individual. In another sense, equality is not valuable in itself, but it is a necessary condition for the development of the individual's character and for the discovery of the meaning of his life.

• •

FREE ISHIKAWA! 400-YEAR LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF OUTCASTE BURAKUMIN AT NEW HEIGHT

by Koyano Takeshi

On the afternoon of September 26, 1974, 110,000 people massed in Hibiya Park, Tokyo. This vast demonstration was the largest since the historic 1960 Ampo struggle. The issue this time was not peace, however, but discrimination and frameup. The angry chanting of the demonstrators spilled out of the park and enveloped the adjoining Tokyo District Courthouse, where Ishikawa Kazuo, the defendant in the celebrated Sayama rape-murder case, was making his final statement. Ishikawa declared his innocence and accused the police and the court of arresting him, subjecting him to an eleven-year trial, and sentencing him to death solely on the basis of his membership in the oppressed Buraku* caste.

In its size and diversity, this demonstration was something new in Japanese history. Never before has such a wide variety of groups unified in support of the Buraku struggle. Joining the Buraku Liberation League, which has been fighting for nine years for justice for Ishikawa, were Sohyo and other maincurrent unions, and groups representing the new left, the physically handicapped, women's liberation, and students. Prior to the rally these groups had carried out a national campaign, collecting 3,600,000 signatures and having resolutions demanding acquittal passed through 270 local assemblies throughout the country.

This massive popular voice was ignored. On October 31 in the Tokyo High Court Judge Terao upheld the guilty finding but commuted the death sentence to life imprisonment. When this news

**Buraku* refers to the ghetto-like shanty towns in which the outcastes are forced to live; *Burakumin* refers to the people themselves.


was conveyed to the 30,000 people gathered outside that day their first response was a momentous silence, then a violent uproar of bitter tears and rage. A 60-year old Buraku woman who was watching the scene on TV told this reporter, "I wept. Ishikawa-san is not somebody else. He is myself, too."

This woman's words contain, in addition to compassion, an important political insight. The Sayama case concerns more than one innocent young victim. It even concerns more than the fate of the three million people living in 6,000 Buraku communities throughout Japan. The trial and the sentence imposed represent an ailment that affects Japanese society as a whole. It demonstrates that the ancient system of divide and rule, for the purposes of which the outcaste status was first created some 360 years ago, still functions today. And while the Buraku people occupy the lowest position in this managerial system, all working people in Japan are entrapped in it in one way or another.

THE TOKUGAWA SYSTEM

Three years ago in Osaka, a 23 year old woman was accused by the mother of the man she was living with of being a Burakumin. She committed suicide, and left a note to her lover in which she admitted that the accusation was true. "If I could have hidden the fact," she wrote, "I would have hidden it all my life."

Her situation was the result of a history which dates back to the beginning of the 17th century, when the Tokugawa Shogunate consolidated its rule over the society by instituting a four-part caste system: warriors, farmers, craftsmen, and merchants. There is a saying, said to have been coined by the Tokugawa rulers and still heard



When arrested Ishikawa was 23 years old. He is now 34 -- 11 years in prison.

today, that expresses the essence of this hierarchical division: "Don't compare yourself with those above you; live with the knowledge that there are others below you." Thus each class was taught to take comfort from the fact that there was a class beneath it. But what about the lowest class? Here the Tokugawa founders displayed their genius with two devices. First, they made the farming class, the mainstay of the economy and the most bitterly exploited, the second highest class in official status, though in every other respect they were at the bottom. (A Tokugawa slogan with respect to farmers was, "Neither fill their stomachs nor let them starve.") Officially the lowest class was the merchants, who were in fact allowed to become quite prosperous. Thus there was no absolute bottom: each class had in some respect a class below it.

But the Tokugawa founders did not stop here; they also placed some people outside the class system altogether. And here again they displayed their craft, for they created not just one outcaste group, but two. The Eta ("the soiled") was the "higher" of the two, but membership in it was permanent and hereditary. The Hinin ("the unpersons") was at the very bottom but it was possible in some circumstances to escape it by being reclassified into one of the other classes. Thus everyone in the land was enabled to live

with the illusion that there were "others below."

The Eta and Hinin were officially cast out from human society and at the same time they served many vital social functions. They were forced to wear special clothes which distinguished them clearly from others, confined in villages on land too barren to support life, and forbidden contact with those of higher status. They were assigned work considered "defiling": butchering and disposal of animal carcasses, tanning, sandal-making, executing prisoners. Some also became wandering entertainers. Landless and excluded by law from almost all productive work, they lived in the bitterest poverty.

Later when the Tokugawa feudal system began to weaken and rising taxes were driving the farmers to desperation, the rulers again used the ingenious class structure to advantage. Eta and Hinin were used by the government to put down farmers' uprisings, thus transferring their rage to the hereditary scapegoats.

An episode that illustrates the atmosphere of the time concerns a young Eta man who was beaten to death for "polluting" a shrine by worshipping at it. The case was brought up before the city magistrate, who judged that as the life of an Eta was worth one-seventh that of an ordinary human, the charge of murder could not be made unless seven Eta were killed. The judgement is said to have been much praised at the time.

THE MEIJI RATIONALIZATION

In 1868, with the Meiji Imperial Restoration, the old feudal system was largely wiped out and Japan embarked on the path of capitalist development. The system of classifying the citizenry according to hereditary roles was abolished, and the Edict of Emancipation was promulgated in 1871, which read in part:

The classifications of Eta and Hinin are hereby abolished. Henceforth the status and occupations of such persons shall be equal to the common people.

This legal "emancipation" was as deceptive as that of the American Blacks, which had come only nine years before.

The Meiji founders knew that industrial capitalism needed a system of divide and rule as much as feudalism had, and they proceeded to build just such a system into the social structure. In the place of the old Tokugawa status system the Meiji government built a new one, streamlined to fit modern conditions. At the top they placed the Emperor and his family, to whom they gave superhuman status. Next they established an aristocracy for the ex-samurai, i.e. themselves. The rest of the population they designated as "commoners." The Burakumin (former Eta and Hinin) were called "new commoners," a name which ironically preserved their separate identity under the pretense of abolishing it.

The social and economic conditions of the Burakumin improved not at all, and in some respects grew worse. They remained as many as nine people living in a three-mat room, which is slightly larger than a ping-pong table. And under the new "freedom of employment," some of their hereditary crafts were taken over by the new and rising capitalists.

These conditions naturally lent support to social prejudice. Burakumin children were kept separate from the other children in the schools, excluded from jobs, forbidden to intermarry, etc.: the same dreary list of inhumanities that characterizes prejudice wherever it appears. It is said for example that when a Burakumin bought something in a store, the money was received on a stick and washed before being put away.

Some naturally attempted to conceal their background and "pass" into normal society. Those who were found out lost everything, including spouse and children if they had intermarried; those who succeeded lived in fear of discovery to the day of their death.

One of Japan's first modern novels, Shimazaki Toson's *Hakai*, dealt with this theme. It is the story of a young man who succeeds in concealing his Buraku origins and becomes an elementary school teacher. In the end overcome with guilt, he dramatically confesses his "deception" and, no longer believing it possible to remain in Japan, emigrates to California. The message of the novel was clear: The

shame of Buraku birth was ineradicable in Japanese society.

All of this was very convenient to capitalist development. The Burakumin made up a stable labor reserve which could be hired and fired as needed, giving great flexibility to the industrialists. The fact that they could be hired at the lowest wages at which human life could be sustained served as a weight to drag down the wages of the rest of the proletariat. At the same time the latter was blinded to its own exploitation by the comforting knowledge that there were "others below." And finally, prejudice prevented the exploited from unifying against the ruling class.

THE LEVELLERS

The situation was completely changed with the establishment of the National Levellers Association (Zenkoku Suiheisha) in 1922. The awakening of the Buraku population came as part of the worldwide revolutionary upsurge that followed the Russian revolution. World War I had brought an unprecedented economic boom to Japan, but while industrialists and speculators were making record profits, inflation was driving peasants and proletarians deeper into poverty. At the same time socialist ideology was being introduced by intellectuals. In 1918 the price of rice began to rise steeply due to hoarding by big wholesalers. The first reaction was in Toyama Prefecture. Women from the fishing villages attacked and seized rice merchants' warehouses, and distributed the hoarded rice. This uprising, known as the "rice riots," had no particular leaders or political parties behind it, but was the genuinely spontaneous action of the people at the bottom of the society. And of the 9,000 people arrested during the uprising, more than 10 per cent were Burakumin (at that time Burakumin made up some 1.8 per cent of the population).

The establishment of the Levellers Association came against this background. In their extraordinary and historic founding declaration, these Burakumin boldly proposed a giant leap up from shame to pride:

Tokushu Burakumin throughout the country, unite! Long-suffering brothers: In the past half century,

the undertakings on our behalf by so many people and in such varied ways have failed to yield any favorable results. This failure was a divine punishment we incurred for permitting others as well as ourselves to debase our own human dignity. Previous movements, though seemingly motivated by compassion, actually corrupted many of our brothers. In the light of this, it is necessary for us to organize a new group movement by which we shall emancipate ourselves through promoting respect for human dignity.

Brothers! Our ancestors sought after and practiced liberty and equality. But they became the victims of a base, contemptible system developed by the ruling class. They became the manly martyrs of industry. As a reward for skinning animals, they were flayed alive. As a recompense for tearing out the hearts of animals, their own warm, human hearts were ripped out. They were spat upon by the spittle of ridicule. Yet all through these cursed nightmares, their blood, still proud to be human, did not dry up... Now we have come to the age when man, pulsing with this blood, is trying to become divine. The time has come for the victims of discrimination to hurl back labels of derision. The time has come when the martyrs' crown of thorns will be blessed. The time has come when we can be proud of being Eta.

We must never again insult our ancestors and profane our humanity by slavish words and cowardly acts. Knowing well the coldness and contempt of ordinary human society, we seek and will be profoundly thankful for the warmth and light of true humanity.

From this the Levellers' Association is born. Let there now be warmth and light among men!

The authenticity of these dramatic words was quickly demonstrated. The movement spread with explosive speed, and in three and half years the Levellers' Association had more than 700 branches throughout the country. One old man who was active in the Association in the 1920s

recalls, "I realized that what I should try to leave to my children was not assets, but freedom."




Levellers' 5th Congress poster

In its early stages the main weapon used by the Levellers was called tettei kyudan, a concept invented by them which can be roughly translated "thorough denunciation." It was based on the belief that the root of the problem lay in the attitude of prejudice. The Levellers would single out blatantly prejudiced individuals and publicly denounce them until they realized the evil of discrimination. The kyudan method was effective: cases of open discrimination visibly decreased and the Levellers gained confidence in their own power. At the same time they began to realize that they were not getting at the real social and economic roots of the problem.

At the same time the political situation was changing rapidly. The year after the founding of the Levellers' Association the Communist Party of Japan was formed, with the goal of the overthrow of the emperor system. In 1922 the Japan Peasants' Union was formed, and in 1925 the Japan Council of Trade Unions was founded. These developments had a radicalizing influence on the Buraku liberation movement. In 1925 the Levellers' Youth League presented to the Levellers'



Levellers armed with bamboo spears to fight Kokusuikai rightwingers



Flag of the Crown of Thorns

national convention a proposal that the Buraku liberation struggle go beyond the stage of tettei kyudan and attack the roots of discrimination through participation in Marxist-Leninist proletarian politics.

Though this draft resolution was not adopted, it had tremendous influence on the further course of the Buraku liberation movement. In September of the same year, the National Proletarian Levellers' League was organized. This new League identified the roots of discrimination with the Emperor system, the landlord system, and capitalism, and sought to link the Buraku liberation struggle with the general class struggle.

The Levellers Association fought many important battles in those years. One of their ongoing struggles was with the army, which in classic fashion encouraged discrimination against Buraku-min soldiers in order to give vent to the frustrations generated in the troops by rigid discipline and hierarchy. When members of the Levellers' Association were conscripted, other members accompanied them to the barracks gate, flying the keikanki, their black flag, emblazoned with a crown of thorns and making anti-imperialist speeches there.

Another struggle was with an ultranationalist group called Kokusuikai, which had interfered in a kyudan case. This finally led to a gun battle, after which only the Leveller participants were prosecuted.

One of their biggest campaigns resulted in the reversal of a court decision. The case began in 1932 when a young Buraku man was arrested for

"abducting" his fiancée, with whom he was living. The court ruled that Buraku-min could not associate with "ordinary" people, and convicted the man of abduction and concealing his background. The Levellers organized a national information and petition campaign, and led a march from Fukuoka to the Ministry of Justice in Tokyo. Since the conviction was in clear violation of the Edict of 1871 it had to be reversed, the chief of the court was forced to resign. It was one of their few clear victories.

At their national convention of 1930, the Levellers Association had adopted a resolution, declaring their opposition to the capitalist government and their determination to "fight on as a component of the entire oppressed masses..." But by now the situation was beginning to turn against them. With the start of fullscale invasion by Japanese imperialism in 1931, the Emperor's government began to intensify its repression, crushing the CP, banning the left wing organizations one by one, and wiping out all popular resistance. The National Levellers' Association, which was the first of these organizations to be born, was the last to die: it did not disband until 1940.

POSTWAR "DEMOCRACY"

In a bitterly ironic way, World War II provided the most direct possible proof that the Buraku is not a "survival" of feudalism but an essential component of the capitalist system. Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya and other main cities were burned to the ground, physically abolishing the Buraku shanty towns. But when the cities were rebuilt the shanty towns not only reappeared but proliferated, inhabited

not only by Burakumin but also by Koreans, Okinawans, and, in Hiroshima, by atomic victims.

Nor did growing postwar prosperity lead to the extinction of the Buraku. On the contrary, rapid economic development absolutely depended upon, and therefore systematically produced, a huge underprivileged class of marginal workers (see "Sanya: Japan's Internal Colony" in *AMPO* Vol.6, nos.3-4). In a modified way, the society remained as hierarchical as ever.

The postwar examples of Buraku discrimination could be multiplied endlessly: bitter poverty, lack of education, discrimination in marriage, discrimination in employment, an elaborate array of disdainful stereotypes and techniques of insult (such as pointing four fingers at Burakumin to associate them with four-footed animals)...the entire system remains intact, and not as an anachronism. Today as ever the Burakumin serve their ancient function of bearing the brunt of the angers and frustrations which should properly be directed at the ruling class, and of assuring the rest of the proletariat and peasantry that there are "others below."

The Sayama case, described at the beginning of this article, illustrates perfectly how this system operates.

The 10th Congress of the Levellers' Assn. held under severe repression

THE SAYAMA CASE

In 1963, in the Tokyo suburb of Sayama, a highschool girl was kidnapped and murdered, and the criminal got away under the very nose of the police. The police came under heavy criticism, since they had let a kidnapper escape in a similar incident only two months before. The press reported the incident every day, and the question of police incompetence was brought up in the National Diet. The incident threatened to become a major scandal.

All this came at a crucial moment in Japanese postwar history. The economy was well on its way to recovery, and the government was in the process of building up the police and military to lay the basis for renewed expansion into the rest of Asia. Lack of confidence in the police was intolerable. When public criticism reached its peak the Chief of the National Police resigned, and the Provisional National Public Safety Commission was formed. A cordon was thrown up around the entire Sayama area, and a special crime squad dispatched there, but few clues were found.

Then two days after the discovery of the victim's body, one of the prime suspects in the case committed suicide.

Levellers' poster reads: "Prepare for Our Congress"



The Chief of the National Public Safety Commission was heard to grit his teeth and say, "A vicious criminal like that we have to catch alive, no matter what."

With that, the theory that had linked the crime to the suicide faded away, and suddenly from a hill that had been searched over and over there appeared "the shovel that had been used to bury the body." It was announced that the shovel came from a nearby pig farm where many Burakumin were known to work.

The announcement worked perfectly. All anger toward the police was transferred to a Burakumin witch hunt, in which the mass media participated vigorously. All the old stereotypes were dusted off and put into service: of course only a Burakumin could commit such an atrocity. Local residents who had been hostile to the police began cooperating enthusiastically, bringing meals to their headquarters, etc.

Under these circumstances, Burakumin Ishikawa Kazuo, 23, was arrested on completely unrelated charges. After one full month of intense police pressure, including torture, he was made to sign a "confession" of his guilt in the kidnapping case, though it was not the crime for which he was arrested. Six months later he was sentenced to death. Police, government agencies, and local residents exchanged congratulations, and the event was forgotten.

Ishikawa later repudiated his confession. Why then did he make it, and stand by it through his first trial and conviction? At the time of his arrest, this young man was unable to write his own name properly, and during his trial he did not -- by his own later account -- know what a lawyer was. The police were able to convince him that they were his allies and the lawyer his enemy, and that if he confessed he would get off with ten years. He says he didn't doubt this even when he heard the death sentence being passed on him. Only later did he realize that he had been duped, and, with the help of the Buraku Liberation League (Buraku Kaiho Domei or Kaido, the inheritor of the Levellers tradition) begin his long struggle to save his life, prove his innocence, and oppose the social discrimination

that made his use as a scapegoat possible. During his appeal Ishikawa has never once been granted bail, and so has been in prison for eleven years.



*110,000 people taking part in Sept. 26, 1974
"Free Ishikawa" Rally at Hibiya Park, Tokyo.*

THE LIBERATION LEAGUE

The postwar Buraku liberation movement began in 1946 with the foundation of the National Buraku Liberation Committee, which later grew into the Buraku Liberation League. The postwar pattern of struggle was set in 1951 in the so-called "All Romance" case. "All Romance," a cheap pulp magazine, published an inflammatory novel depicting a Kyoto Buraku as a "nest of evils." The novel, it turned out, was written by an official in the Kyoto Public Hygiene Office. A kyudan struggle was organized and as a consequence the official was fired.

If this had been before the war, the matter would have ended there. But the Buraku fighters went on to point out that conditions similar to those described in the novel actually did exist, not, however, as a consequence of the character of the residents but precisely because the Kyoto Municipality did nothing to rectify those conditions. Thus they opened a new struggle, and eventually forced the Kyoto Municipality to drastically increase its budget for the improvement of the Buraku areas (from ¥7.5 mil-

lion to ¥60 million in 1954), building schools and other public facilities as it does in other parts of the city.

On the basis of the accumulated experiences of many such postwar struggles, the Liberation League developed its present theory of Buraku Liberation.

In the first place, the League makes it clear that discrimination is neither a matter of individual thinking, nor a "remnant" of feudal society. Rather it is a "social consciousness" which has its roots in the present social structure. People absorb discriminatory consciousness just as they breathe the air. Since there are no automatic processes at work in the society tending to make discrimination disappear, it must be fought consciously on a social plane.

Secondly, the League argues that discriminatory consciousness does not exist in a vacuum, but has a material base: the actual physical poverty of the Buraku communities. Thus part of the struggle against discrimination must be the material improvement of Buraku life.

Thirdly, the League argues that the maintenance of Buraku discrimination has always been useful to the ruling class, for which purpose the ruling class has always done what it could to keep the Buraku communities impoverished. Thus for the administration to do nothing to help the Buraku must be understood as a positive policy to perpetuate discrimination.

On the basis of this three-point theory, the League carries out what it calls "administrative struggle," in which demands are made on both the central and local governments for job opportunities, improved housing, education, and living environment. After a long battle the League in 1965 forced the government to set up a special council advisory to the Cabinet and charged with forming government policy toward the Buraku. Through this council's recommendations, the government finally admitted officially for the first time that there really is a Buraku problem, that discrimination still exists, and that its solution is "the duty of the state and the task of the entire people." Armed with this statement of national policy, and the

Special Measures Law on Buraku which was later passed, the League has been able to make many material gains. In Osaka and elsewhere one can now see low rent "liberation apartments," hospitals, meeting places, nurseries, and other social facilities set up under the pressure of the movement.

Important as these material gains are, the Liberation League understands well that they do not in themselves constitute liberation. Thus they have recently launched a new and most interesting program: the formation of a united front of all groups discriminated against in Japanese society, including Okinawans, Korean residents, Ainu, and the physically handicapped. They argue that while the discrimination against each of these groups differs in form and history, yet the essence of discrimination itself is one and the same: it is a device created by the ruling class for the perpetuation of its rule. The League now maintains that "the Buraku can be completely liberated only through the liberation of all who suffer under discrimination and oppression."

The massive and historic demonstration of September 26 gave powerful evidence of the potential of this new policy of unification. Discrimination indeed remains an essential element in the method by which the small ruling class maintains its power over the masses. By attacking the essence of discrimination itself, the Buraku liberation movement is aiming at a fundamental change in Japanese society. ● ●



AS ARBITRARY IN EXIT AS IN ENTRANCE

JAPANESE CAPITAL'S BEHAVIOR IN THAILAND

by Tsurumi Yoshiyuki

One of the most brazen characteristics of Japan, Inc., its talent for drawing up and scrapping dozens of phony blueprints for "development" of South-east Asian countries, was revealed during the oil crisis and subsequent global economic crisis. Between autumn of 1971 and autumn of 1973 - when the myth of high growth still had a grip on businessmen, politicians and a large segment of the population - the total outstanding overseas investments of Japan, Inc. almost doubled to exceed \$10 billion. In this period, Japanese monopolists competed vigorously with each other in drawing up more than one dozen big projects for petro-chemical and oil-refining combines in Southeast and Northeast Asia. The number of projects announced was so large that one suspected that some of them were meant to be scrapped from the outset. Japanese monopolists had, in fact, approached several countries at once with similar blueprints, in order to see which government would offer the most favorable conditions on taxes, rent, etc.

Then came the oil "shock," which quadrupled the price of oil, accelerated sky-rocketing inflation, and drastically cut down the profits of the corporations. Allegedly to cope with the "crisis," some of the Japanese heavy industries and chemical companies started to withdraw from their overseas ventures, scrapping the contracts for large scale petro-chemical combines with a stroke of a pen. As we will see, the logic of withdrawal is just as one-sided as the logic of aggression.

SHELVING THE THAI PROJECT

A case in point is the unilateral decision made by the Mitsui and Mitsubishi groups in early September, 1974 to postpone implementation of the joint Japan-Thai project to build a petro-chem-

ical combine in Sriracha, on the coast of the Bay of Siam. According to the press report, the two Japanese zaibatsu groups jointly offered the Board of Investment (BOI) of Thailand the following reasons for a three-year postponement of the project:

(1) The Thai partners are unable to finance their initial investment share of 340 million bahts (5.1 mil. yen); and the tight-money policy in Japan has made it impossible for the Japanese to procure funds as scheduled. (As we shall point out later, the above sum of money is what is needed in the initial stage of the project. The total investment required on the part of the Thai partners amounted to as much as 82.2 billion yen as of May, 1973, when the contract was signed, and by now the figure no doubt exceeds 100 billion yen.)

(2) As was exemplified by the "Exhibition of Japan's Pollution Exports" held at National Tamasat University in September, 1974, the Thai students and intellectuals are becoming increasingly critical of the pollution problems to be caused by the petro-chemical combine.

(3) The worldwide oil crisis has cast doubt on the economic viability of the project.

(4) The petro-chemical combine to be built in Singapore by the companies of the Sumitomo group is more competitive than the Thai project.

The combination of plants, worth 200 billion yen, was to be the largest ever constructed in Thailand, and the decision to shelve the plan was met by strong responses from various sectors of Thai politics. The Bangkok World, an English language daily, ran a banner,

"Fulfill the Contract," and directed severe criticism against the Japanese companies. On the other hand, students active in the anti-pollution movement greeted the decision as a major victory for their movement.

On May 18, 1973, the formal contract for the project was signed by a 6-company Japanese consortium (Mitsui & Co., Ltd., Mitsubishi Corporation, Mitsui Petrochemical Industries, Ltd., Mitsui Toatsu Chemicals, Inc., Nihon Petrochemical Industries, Inc. and Mitsubishi Petrochemical Co., Ltd.) and the Thai group represented by the Thai Petrochemical Co. (TPC), itself a 50-50 joint venture of Thai Oil Refinery Co. (TORC) and Shell Oil.

The contract states that the Thai group will assume responsibility for the up-stream operation of the combine, refining from naphtha produced by TORC 150,000 tons of ethylene and 55,000 tons of propylene a year for use by the Japanese group in the down-stream operations, in the production of 70,000 tons of low pressure polyethylene, 30,000 tons of high pressure polyethylene, 40,000 tons of vinyl chloride monomer, 30,000 tons of polypropylene and 20,000 tons of alkyl benzene. It was estimated that the combine would create 300 new jobs in its up-stream sector and 800 in its down-stream sector.

What is noteworthy here is that the highly automatized petro-chemical plants, which require more than 200 billion yen in total investments from the Thai and Japanese groups combined, would create jobs for only 1,100 people. This composition runs counter to the teachings of development economics, which attaches great importance to labor-intensive industries as driving forces of "underdeveloped" economies. In fact, this apparent contradiction reflects the fact that the combine is not planned for the benefit of the Thai people, but for that of Japanese monopoly capital. In many cases, it is Japanese capitalists who rely on "development" and "industrialization" of the Third World countries more than the people living there do. (The same can be said about "development" of the internal colonies of Japan, such as Aomori and Kagoshima prefectures.) The question of whose interests the project serves becomes clearer when we look at the process through which it was devised.

CONSPIRACY OF JAPANESE COMPANIES

Though the formal contract was signed in May, 1973, the project was first approved by the BOI of Thailand as early as April, 1969, more than four years earlier. It was not until November, 1972 that the Japanese Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) gave the project its informal consent.

Why such long lapses of time? At least in the eyes of the Thai capitalists concerned, the four year wait implied conspiracy on the part of the Japanese companies.

In April, 1969, the president and owner of TORC, Chow Chaokwanyuen (also known as K.Y. Chow), established the Thai Petrochemical Company (TPC), the joint venture with Shell Oil, and had this new company certified by the BOI. At that point, several U.S. and European companies approached TORC with proposals to take part in the down-stream operations which the Mitusi-Mitsubishi group later managed to get hold of.

Up until then Japan had absorbed close to 90 per cent of Thailand's market for finished and semi-finished petrochemical products. In fear of losing the market to U.S. and European companies which would produce these products inside Thailand, the Mitsui and Mitsubishi groups staged a fierce counter-offensive. It is reported that in a period of less than two months following the establishment of TPC, they filed eight applications with the BOI seeking promotional rights for the production of almost all petrochemical products, including petrochemical derivatives. Unable to cope with the high offensive staged by the Japanese giants, and unable to finance the more than 50 billion yen investment needed for the down-stream sectors alone, the U.S. and European competitors withdrew their bids.

In autumn of 1969, Mitsui and Mitsubishi and their Thai partners signed a tentative agreement which was to be replaced by a formal contract upon approval by the Thai BOI and the Japanese MITI. Once the monopoly over the Thai petro-chemical market was secured, the Japanese companies started to sabotage the project. At least, this is what

the Thai business journals have been accusing the Japanese firms of doing.

According to the initial timetable, the construction of the combine was to be started in April, 1971, and completed by October, 1973. The Far Eastern Economic Review reported in its December 30, 1972 issue that, as of publication, Japanese companies had dispatched 28 investigation teams to Thailand. In the eyes of the Thai partners this was done to prolong the final signing of the contract, because "The Japanese have added demand after demand, usually strung out, to slow the process of agreement. For a start, they would not accept the Thai Government's assurance that it would see to the provision of the necessary infrastructure until the Government actually commenced work on it. (To date, the Thai side has spent about US\$15 million on various aspects of project preparation but the Japanese have made no positive move.)"

Moreover, during this long process, Mitsui and Mitsubishi were granted the monopoly right to import petro-chemical products from Japan for sale in Thailand until the plants began production. Though the BOI revoked this right, when the project was shelved, the companies of the Mitsui and Mitsubishi groups managed to dominate the petro-chemical market of Thailand and to rake in far greater profits than the compensation they are required to pay for their failure to fulfill the contract.

A MATTER OF SOCIAL OBLIGATION?


This is not the limit of the Japanese callousness. The Japanese group made a proposal to postpone the construction of the ethylene plant until 1981, which means postponement of the entire project. But as early as 1971, there were signs that the Japanese were aware that the prospects for the project were rather discouraging. The Japanese companies should have withdrawn from the project the moment they realized it was beyond their means. Instead, they justified their failure to act responsibly by saying, as a Mitsui spokesman did in September, 1974, "We were not very enthusiastic about the project, but as things came to a strange pass, we took part in it as a matter of social obligation" (Asahi Shimbun, September 4, 1974).

The key issue which caused the postponement of the project was the price at which the Japanese group would buy ethylene from the Thai partners. The Japanese did everything possible to postpone the implementation of the plan so as to beat down the price even by one yen. The Japanese companies tried to take advantage of the fact that they were building petro-chemical combines elsewhere as alternative sources of ethylene supply for use in Thailand. As a matter of fact, they maintained that it would be better not to produce ethylene in Thailand at high costs and that they would rather import it from Iran, where the Iranian Chemical Development Company -- a 50-50 joint venture between Iranian National Petrochemical Company (NPC) and four companies of Mitsui group (Mitsui & Co., Mitsui Petrochemical Industries, Ltd., Mitsui Toatsu Chemicals, Inc. and Toyo Soda Mfg. Co., Ltd.) -- is scheduled to go into operation in 1977. This proposal was a menacing threat to the Thais, for it meant that the project would be postponed till 1977, that the Japanese giants would keep enjoying monopoly import rights, and that Thai parties would not gain profits from the up-stream operations. (In a disgraceful report, the Oriental Economist, one of Japan's leading business weeklies, called this proposal a "Multi-national Idea to Link Iran and Thailand" in its November 8, 1972, issue and made the following comment: "Having already obtained the consent of the Thai government, the plan is awaiting the approval of the Iranian government. Upon its realization, it will set the pattern for multinational behavior, organically linking the overseas subsidiaries with each other.")

JOINT GOVERNMENT-BUSINESS STRATEGY FOR SABOTAGE

On November 28, 1972 MITI gave its informal consent to the combine project. Running a big headline, "A Move toward Improvement of Japan-Thai Economic Relations: MITI Promotes Autonomy and Division of Labor by Supporting Heavy and Chemical Industries in Thailand," Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 29, 1972) reported the decision in the following terms:

"Seriously concerned about the boycott movement against Japanese goods which has been rapidly spreading in Thailand recently, MITI has been studying



Girls picking jelly fish to be exported to Japan, on the coast of Sriracha, the area soon to be destroyed by Japanese "developers."

how to establish a system of international division of labor between Japan and Thailand in an effort to alter the imbalance of trade between the two. On November 28, it instituted a concrete plan with a long-term perspective.

"The major contents of the plan include: (1) the establishment of on-the-route oil refining bases and large scale steel plants in Thailand so as to have Thailand produce and export to Japan much-needed heavy and chemical products; and (2) the deliberate promotion of some economic cooperation in the future for the sake of consolidation of roads, ports, water systems, etc. which are prerequisites for these industrial activities in Thailand. MITI hopes that the implementation of these measures will help the Thai economy become independent in the long run, and aid the development of an equal Japan-Thai trade and commercial relationship."

As mentioned earlier, the signing of the formal agreement on the project depended upon MITI's official approval. If Mitsui and Mitsubishi had actually been trying to sabotage the smooth promotion of the project, the fact that

MITI did not give official sanction might have been used by the Japanese groups as a convenient excuse for delay. MITI was surely suspected of acting in complicity with the two zaibatsu groups.

But the conspiracy of Japan, Inc. was smashed by the boycott movement organized by the National Student Center of Thailand (NSCT) and staged for 10 days, beginning on November 20, 1973. In an effort to cope with the boycott movement, and to devise a "long-term countermeasure," MITI quickly moved to give official sanction to the project. Viewed in retrospect, however, the "long-term countermeasure" was quite short-lived: one of its major pillars, the Sriracha combine project, has been shelved; and the second major pillar, the Kra Canal (or Kra Pipelien) project, faces a virtual stalemate.

K.Y. CHOW AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SRIRACHA INDUSTRIAL ZONE

The one who seems to have gained most, at least in the short run, from MITI's quick decision is K.Y. Chow. In view of the fact that Chow had direct interests in the Kra Canal project, as well as in the petro-chemical project, one might even say that MITI's action in the wake of the boycott movement was in accord with what Chow wanted to accomplish.

K.Y. Chow is well known as a person who never fails to take part in a big project of any sort. But surprisingly little is known about his background. Born in Shanghai, he came to Thailand via Hong Kong more than a dozen years ago, and is now a naturalized citizen of Thailand. Many Thais suspect that he is still unable to speak Thai well. Some say that he is a distant relative of Chiang Kai-shek. But all these fragments of information are not well founded; they may be no more than rumors.

Basing himself on TORC, which is already in operation at Sriracha, Chow has been trying to diversify his activities both up and down stream. While promoting the joint venture with Mitsui and Mitsubishi in oil refining and naphtha-cracking (downstream) operations, he established in 1972 an oil shipping company together with Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn, who was

expelled in 1973, and former vice-premier Pote Sarasin.

But he is better known in South-East Asia as the most enthusiastic Thai promoter of the Kra Canal project (the details of which are analysed in "Kra Canal -- In Whose Interest?", AMPO, No. 18 and "Kra Canal or Kracodile," AMPO, No. 19). Centered on forging a canal through the Isthmus of Kra with the use of H-bombs, the project was promoted by an international consortium of Europe, the U.S., Japan and Thailand, with the Japanese group led by a trading firm, Nissho-Iwai. It is now frozen, partly because it caused a scandal in the Japanese Diet in February, 1974, when a Socialist Party Diet member criticized the government for violating the Partial Test-Ban Treaty and the Fundamental Law of Nuclear Energy, but mainly because the Thanom regime, which had enthusiastically supported the project, was ousted by the student movement in October, 1973.

When the Kra Canal project got bogged down, its alternative -- the Kra Pipeline project -- was now brought out on the table. In September, 1974, the National Energy Authority (NEA) of Thailand asked the Japanese Government to help promote the consolidation of a comprehensive oil base, consisting of a pipeline, a CTS (mammoth crude storage facility) and refineries. Construction of a pipeline through the Isthmus of Kra has been a "pet" project of another Japanese trading company, Marubeni Corporation. And, of course, Mr. Chow has had his hands in the alternative project, too.

Indeed, Chow is typical of the local power elite in Southeast Asia who benefit from "development" projects, undertaken with the "aid" and "cooperation" of Japan and other advanced capitalist countries, at the sacrifice of the majority of the people. And Sriracha is typical of industrial development sites in Southeast Asia where the interests of the local power elite meet those of the capitalists of the "advanced" countries. Japanese capitalists took interest in Sriracha as a potential site for development much earlier than MITI pronounced its "Long Term Plan" for giving aid to Thailand in November, 1972. In 1969 the government-run Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency dispatched its "Commission

for Investigation of Development of Industrial Zones in Thailand" headed by Iijima Sadakazu, Executive Director of the Japan Industrial Location Center, who was one of the promoters of the Kra Canal project. Included in the Commission was Mimura, auditor of Mitsui Port Development Co. The Commission chose a coastal district of Sriracha as the best site for construction of petrochemical plants and steel works.

In September, 1973, immediately before the political change, the Thanom regime decided to construct a comprehensive steel works in Sriracha, and the BOI invited private companies to apply for promotional rights. The following five groups filed applications: (1) Mitsui & Co. (cold strip mills); (2) Mitsubishi Corp. and other Mitsubishi firms (thick plate mills); (3) British Steel-Thai group (a comprehensive steel works, including everything from a blast furnace to cold strip mills); (4) Marubeni group (thick plate mills); and (5) Thailand's Union Bank (a comprehensive steel works).

Mitsui and Mitsubishi groups were in close collaboration with each other and were backed by the four largest steel companies in Japan: Nippon Steel Corporation, Nippon Kokan Kaisha, Sumitomo Metal Industries, and Kawasaki Steel Corporation. Teaming up with British Steel was Chow; this time becoming the business rival of his partners in the petro-chemical project. He is nothing other than a genuine multinational comprador capitalist, who teamed up with Nissho-Iwai on the Kra Canal project, with the British capital on the steel project, with Shell Oil on the oil refinery, and with Mitsui and Mitsubishi groups on the petro-chemical project.

Sriracha is also scheduled to be the site of a nuclear power plant; the Electricity Generating Agency of Thailand recently asked the U.S. Export-Import Bank for cooperation in construction of nuclear plants. It has so far invited KWU (W. Germany), ASEA (Sweden), GE (U.S.), Westinghouse (U.S.), Nuclear Power Group (England), Atomic Energy of Canada (Canada), Gulf Oil, General Atomic (U.S.) and Marubeni Corp. (Japan) to submit data (Nikkei Sangyo Shimbun, September 19, 1974), and Columbia Carbon, a leading carbon

producer in the world, has established a joint venture Thai Columbia Carbon with 75 per cent participation. This firm has recently obtained the BOI's approval for construction of a carbon plant in Sriracha.

DESTRUCTION OF NATURE

Sriracha is a fishing and farming village about two hours ride east of Bangkok. Though many companies are scheduled to make inroads into this area, Chow's refinery is the only plant which is now operating there. When I visited the village in the autumn of 1973, the villagers were still living leisurely, working in the rice paddies and repairing their fishing nets on the beach. In a small hut on the beach, some girls could be seen pickling jelly-fish with salt for export to Japan.

When I visited the same place in the spring of 1974, I noticed a brand new sign-board near the refinery which reads: "CONSTRUCTION SITE FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANT: OFF LIMITS TO UNAUTHORIZED PERSONNEL."

The land no longer belonged to the villagers. In anticipation of the development of the industrial zone, Alpha Holding Co. has bought up the land. The largest stockholder in Alpha is the omnipresent Mr. Chow. Other large stockholders are apparently dummies, with such names as Mr. Siam and Mr. Bangkok.

Those with money can make double and triple profits by speculating in land, contracting for construction of the plants, and selling commodities. In this process, nature is exploited and irreversibly destroyed. The poor are shoved even deeper into poverty. The example of the rape of Japan and its people is to be repeated here and everywhere else in Asia at a much faster pace.

ROUGH-AND-TUMBLE JAPANESE CAPITAL

In any case, Mitsui and Mitsubishi decided to withdraw from the petrochemical project in Thailand. It is still to be seen whether the withdrawal was part of a well-defined "long-term" plan of Japanese capital as a whole or

was simply necessitated by "family affairs". I am inclined to reason that the latter is the case, for Japan is a "hand-to-mouth" imperialist country and will continue to be so in the foreseeable future.

But the Thai people must think that the Japanese capitalists took recourse to the abrupt and one-sided withdrawal as a tricky machination or a threat, just as they did when they first won the promotional rights. As a matter of fact, the Japanese have been making remarks with a distinctly threatening tone for some time. The board chairman of Mitsui & Co., Hashimoto Eiichi, visited Bangkok in June, 1974, in an effort to gather opinions on the decision for withdrawal. At a press conference in Bangkok, he said bluntly: "If the anti-Japanese movement of students represents the opinion of the government and people of Thailand, we will have to consider cutting down our investment in Thailand. There is no sense investing in a place where we are not welcomed by the government and people. Great Mitsui is not like those small companies which are so small that, come what may, they need to earn profits in Thailand". (Tokyo Shimbun, June 21, 1974)

A remark like this verges on being a direct threat. Taking these words at face value, it sounds as if Mitsui is urging the Thai government to exercise much stricter control over the students.

Japanese capitalists, audacious and brazen when they are on the offensive, are no less so when on the defensive. ● ●



DISHONORABLE "WHITE" JAPANESE CAPITAL BUYS INTO APARTHEID

by Kitazawa Yoko

With the annual volume of trade between Japan and South Africa exceeding over one billion dollars in 1973, Japan's business involvements in South Africa have reached the alarming extent that Japan has become one of the major supporters for apartheid together with the other big powers.

In summer 1974, I spent a month in South Africa investigating Japanese corporate activities. As a Japanese person I was given the status of "honorary white" by the South African government. During my trip, I experienced the unique and disgraceful privileges given to Japanese people. These privileges are a direct result of Japan's economic commitments in South Africa, Namibia and Rhodesia.

The result of my research was later presented to the United Nations Fourth Committee of the 1974 General Assembly, Council for Namibia and Special Committee on Apartheid.

South Africa today is the last bastion of the white minority rule in the African Continent where 3.8 million Whites subjugate 16 million Black people, who are deprived even of citizenship.

The following is a brief account of what I have seen in South Africa and what I have learned from the Black people who suffer under the most inhuman system of apartheid. Here I begin with my talks with one of the leaders of the South African Students Organization (SASO).

SASO is a very closely watched, militant organization. It was established five years ago by Black students. It is the organization most radically confronting apartheid, 29 of its leaders having been banned so far and 2 others murdered,

one shot to death mysteriously in February 1974.

The methods of repression in this country are complex, the most common being Banning. This is a sort of house arrest, making it impossible to have a job; students have to leave school and cannot attend gathering of more than 3 persons. It is something like the case of Kim Dae Jung in South Korea, where a one-to-one interview is possible. There are many White liberals who are banned, but for Black people it is a daily occurrence.

When I said that the purpose of my visit to South Africa was "to investigate the effects of the economic activities of Japanese corporations on apartheid," he immediately responded, not even pausing to take a breath, "To Blacks, who are the true people of South Africa, a country that invests in or trades with South Africa, no matter whether it be British, American, German or Japanese, and no matter what pretext it gives, is linked with the enrichment of Whites, the extension of the life of White rule and the strengthening of the already existing oppression and exploitation of Black people. They are the enemies of Africans. There are no exceptions."

For him apartheid is a political set up, but from the economic view point it boils down to four problems: 1) wages, 2) housing, 3) migrant labor, 4) technical training, and today the most crucial issue among these four is the migrant labor problem. "Migrant labor," though, doesn't refer to laborers who migrate beyond the boundaries of the Republic of South Africa.

In South Africa Black people are prohibited from living outside areas

legally and administratively partitioned off as "home land (Bantustans)" comprising 12.8 per cent of the country that is little better than desert. In the remaining land designated as "White" area, Black people are migrant labor. Even if he or she was born there and has worked for decades there, if one's skin is Black, one is a "migrant laborer."

Black people can, on the one hand, do nothing but work there, and on the other, have to work there. This is what the infamous "pass law" is for. A pass is an identification card and must be endorsed by one's White employer. Almost once every two days the police conduct a "pass hunt" in the middle of the night. A Black person loitering on the street without a pass, a person, that is, without a place to stay related to work, is put in the paddy wagon and thrown in jail for several days after which he or she is sent back to the "homeland."

The question arises then, just what is this "homeland?" Having had their land taken away by the Boers, now called Afrikaners, who came from the Netherlands 300 years ago to colonize South Africa, the Africans' economic self-sufficiency was destroyed so that there was no means left to them to live other than working in the mines and factories of the Whites. The small, barren "homelands" that remain were originally ruled by hereditary chiefs of tribal units in the capacity of head of the community. But when the communal economy was destroyed with the seizure of their land by the Whites, the chiefs subsequently lost their ability to govern. Of course a chief or tribe who opposed the Whites' seizure of their land was wiped out militarily.

Today "homeland" leaders are appointed by the Vorster regime, and are mere puppets with no political power whatsoever. In their own "homeland" they are completely under the control of a White superintendent sent out by the government. A word here should be said about the traditional tribal system of South Africa. The chief is not an economic exploiter in the style of a feudal lord, but the political ruler of an entirely self-supporting community.

Besides the "homelands" there are areas on the suburbs of big cities and industrial zones called "Bantu townships" which are Black living areas. Taking

Johannesburg as an example, the center of the city and the suburbs (the Rand area) is the White residential and industrial area; Blacks may neither live nor spend the night there. Workers working at night must have identification cards from their employers, and only one household maid per home is allowed to live in. Janitors live in little shacks on the roofs of their buildings.

The total population of the Johannesburg area is something more than 1 million. About 250,000 are White, and approximately the same number are persons of mixed blood who qualify as Colored. There are also a small number of Indians and Chinese. The remaining 600,000 Black people live in a "Bantu residential area" called Soweto southwest of the city. It is said that if "illegal dwellers" were included, the figure for Soweto would exceed 1,200,000. The Colored, Indian and Chinese populations are, of course, divided into separate residential areas.

Johannesburg is quite different from a city like Tokyo. The spaces in South Africa are overwhelming. It takes 20 -30 minutes to go by car between the White and the other residential districts. They are kept separate from one another clearly for security reasons. Between Soweto and the White area fields stretch as far as the eye can see, so that even if, for example, there were a Black uprising here, they think it would be possible to easily put it down, containing it militarily in Soweto itself. Every morning and evening rush hour Black people go to work one to one-and-a-half hours from here to the center of the city or the industrial areas in the outskirts by bus or train. But within the city there is absolutely no transit service through which Black people could communicate with one another.

There are city buses, but they are exclusively for Whites. The Black peoples' buses, besides the fact that they are always full, don't go around the city but only from outside to within the city, like rays. Besides, most Whites have their own cars, and poor Whites who don't, live in town and commute by bus. This is why there is such an inordinate number of private cars, making the streets congested during the morning and evening rush hours and double parked during the day. As a car is an indispensable necessity for a White person, even an

office typist -- whose salary is high -- has one. For this reason you never hear a voice raised from the Whites no matter how dilapidated the public transit service might become.

THE CHARACTER OF "MIGRANT LABOR"

To continue the explanation about "migrant labor," in Soweto a Black person, even one born there, is classified as a "temporary sojourner" and a Black person is forbidden by law to own a dwelling in a white area. So the homes in Soweto are owned by the government Bantu Administration which is completely staffed by White officers. Furthermore, a "migrant laborer" is not intitled to live with his family. In the last 3 or 4 years there has been no house building in Soweto, the only dwelling increase has been hostels. The flophouses in Tokyo's Sanya would give some idea of what hostels are like, except that there are more men crowded in one room. Besides that, as the housing arrangements in Soweto never keep pace with the demand for labor in the city, there are many cases of young Black women brought from "homelands" to Johannesburg by the government's Labor Bureau

(equivalent to a public employment security office) and crowded into hostels with the men.

The predominant industry in South Africa is mining. However, the South African government started a new policy of industrialization in the mid 1960's. According to this policy, the minority regime in South Africa began to concentrate on heavy industry, particularly manufacturing, and to shift away from its former dependence on agriculture and mining. This led to a massive inflow of foreign investments into South Africa. By the middle of 1971, production figures in the manufacturing sector alone reached 23.6 per cent of the country's GNP and were equal to the total contribution from both mining and agriculture.

The biggest concern is the Anglo-American group owned by the famous Oppenheimer family. Anglo-American owns everything from the field of mining and manufacturing to the English-language media to the Carlton Hotel. In its connection between economic power and politics, it is like Rockefeller of the U.S. Anglo-American mines are not confined to South Africa; they extend to Rhodesia, Namibia, and Zambia and are said to employ a total of 110,000 workers.

The workers in the mines of South Africa are, naturally, Blacks. In contrast to the case of industries in the cities, 80 per cent of the workers are migrant labor in the true sense. They work under one or one-and-a-half-year contracts, coming to work from the neighboring Black African countries of Mozambique, Malawi, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana and Namibia.

This contract labor can, quite accurately, be called "forced labor" no different from slavery. Africans are recruited at two hundred branches of the South African Chamber of Mines; every year or year-and-a-half they must go back home, and they must renew their contract. This scheme, established by law, enables South African mining industry to perpetually avoid wage raises.

Up until just a year ago, moreover, the worker was paid R10 (about \$15.00) at the work place monthly and another R10 was sent in gold to the government of the worker's own country. Upon returning home



at the expiration of the contract, the government paid the individual in its local currency. This gold was sold on the international free market and was an important foreign exchange source for the governments of African countries, or, in the case of Mozambique, for Portugal. Of course many governmental scandals occurred during this time against the background of this undesirable link between South Africa and the nations of Black Africa.

MINING AS FORCED LABOR

Unions for Black workers, which are legal in writing in South Africa, are not actually allowed for mine workers. At a gold mine of the Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Corporation, located 50 miles southwest of Johannesburg, which I visited on the first Sunday of September, there are 15 separate hostels for the African workers, divided according to tribes. They are situated so as to keep the workers from communicating with one another.

Work in the mines is where the harshest labor is enforced, workers at the JCIC gold mine going straight down 1,000 meters in two shifts to dig gold with dynamite. Imagine what it must be like to work for such a long time in the heat at that depth. Mining capital, starting with Anglo-American, is enthusiastically advertising that rising prices of minerals on the international market, especially gold, is bringing a wage "revolution" to the African worker. But the only result of this "revolution" has been a meagre raise from the 70 - 72 cent wage per shift which has prevailed up to now to R1.20. For the workers this means only R31.20 (about \$46.80) per month. They come from foreign countries hundreds of miles away on one-year contract, and besides having to pay the round trip travel expenses, they have to take their savings from the mine back to their home country.

Labor disputes have occurred continuously at the mines over the last 2 years due to inflation and the economic crisis in Black Africa as well as the workers' own political awakening. Disputes usually start with demands for improvements in working conditions and raises in wages. But they take the form of wildcat strikes and, with the inter-

vention of police and army, result in bloodshed. Since September of last year strikes have continued at the rate of 2 per month, and more than fifty of the leaders have already been killed.

In Sept. 1973, for instance, a strike for a wage increase occurred at South Africa's biggest mine, Anglo-American-owned Western Deep Level. Thirteen workers were killed in this dispute. The police stated that they were attacked by the workers and were forced to open fire, but according to the report of a courageous Black journalist who dared to investigate this incident, the victims were all shot from behind. And then 10 people were killed during a dispute which occurred in February of last year at Anglo-American Welkom gold mine.

At any rate, these wildcat strikes themselves are the biggest factor in the "revolution" -- which hardly amounts to anything -- in mine workers' wages.

JAPAN, THE BIGGEST CUSTOMER

The biggest customer for mining products, South Africa's largest industry, is none other than Japan. Japan imports almost 100 per cent of South Africa's exported iron ore, 53 per cent of its chrome, 44 per cent of its manganese, and 33 per cent of its asbestos. And in March 1973 Japan liberalized its policy on imported gold. The team of Kanematsu-Sumitomo Metal has handled the gold import business. Auto industries like Toyota and Nissan have signed a purchase contract for their pollution-free engine with Impala which monopolized platinum mines here. It is thought that this will make Japan the largest importer of South African platinum.

Iron ore must be discussed in great detail. Besides the state-operated ISCOR, the largest iron and steel corporation in South Africa, there is also the privately owned Consolidated African Mines. Japan has recently concluded two big long-term contracts with South Africa. The one, with CAM, which seven big steel firms had been negotiating since 1971, is called the St. Croix Island project in offshore Port Elizabeth. It was finally decided on in March of last year, the main reason for the delay being that Japan was demand-

ing a written pledge from CAM that the St. Croix harbor facilities would be improved to guarantee iron ore export to Japan. But CAM, as a private enterprise, cannot make a commitment about railroads or harbors, which are state-run under the government of South Africa's SAR&H. Finally, at the end of August last year, the South African government at last decided to put R65 million into improving the harbor facilities. The newspapers wrote that this was the green light to the export of iron ore to Japan. But the South African government, whose finances are chronically in the red, has no funds for a new project without borrowing from abroad.

In any case, the March 1974 contract provides for the purchase by Japan of between 41.5 million and 43 million tons of iron ore over 15 years starting in 1977. Japan will also import from 1977, 10 million tons of manganese ore over an 11-year period.

And there is another project called the Sishen-Saldanha project. Large iron ore deposits were discovered in the Shisen area of South Africa bordering on Botswana and Namibia. There is now a big development plan to lay an 860-kilometer railroad to transport the iron ore to the west coast port of Saldanha where a large steel mill will be built to turn out semiprocessed steel for export. Naturally Japan is earmarked as the market for the semiprocessed products and R1,000 million capital will be required. In June and July 1973 Nippon Steel, representing the 7 major Japanese iron and steel companies, and South Africa's ISCOR exchanged missions and reached almost complete agreement.

South Africa wanted, on this occasion,

Transit camp where Coloureds await relocation from "white areas"



to conclude a solid relationship with Japan, with whom its volume of trade is increasing so explosively, while Japan was at a point where it was seeking to diversify its sources of imports, as its largest source of iron ore, Australia, has moved toward a stronger position of resource nationalism with the formation of a Labor Party government.

But Nippon Steel chairman Hirai Tomisaburo made a mistake in the middle of the negotiations. An article on his press conference was reprinted from the Asahi Shimbun in the English Asahi Evening News. According to that, "Mr. Hirai said Japanese participation (in the Saldanha project), if it materialized, would take the form of joint investment by several major steel firms. Import of pig iron and semi-finished steel products for final processing in Japan would also be considered." Hirai's "Japan's investment" statement created international repercussions and at the same time greatly embarrassed the Japanese government which had officially forbidden investment in South Africa in 1968.

This happened at the end of June 1973 and as a result Japan ostensibly bade farewell to participation in the Saldanha project. This was because the Japanese government, as one of the countries supporting the resolution against South Africa's apartheid, does not allow investment, since it is an economic activity strengthening apartheid. The ISCOR mission, however, upon its return home that July, reported to the South African government that "Japanese investment is not ruled out." (Rand Daily Mail 4 July, 1973). In January of this year South Africa's economic minister announced in the parliament, "ISCOR signed 3 long term sales contracts with Japan." It stipulates that Japan will import 12 million tons of iron ore annually from Saldanha harbor from 1976. Japan stipulated the condition, however, that of that amount, it wanted to purchase 7 million tons from the state-operated ISCOR and the remaining 5 million tons from the private CAM. Figuring from the present price of iron ore, R10.50 per ton, this amounts to a deal of R300 million. Furthermore Japan began negotiating to import 3 million tons annually, about \$9 million worth, of semiprocessed steel products from the Saldanha mill, which the Austrian Voest joined by Japan's Kobe Steel will build. Here too

imports begin in 1976.

Japan's plan to import iron ore from South Africa, whether it be the St. Croix project or the Saldanha project, is unmistakably of vital importance to the economy of South Africa today. The seriousness of Japan's economic commitment is further thrown into relief with the knowledge of the situation the Black African mine workers are placed in and of their struggle.

BIAs AND JAPANESE CORPORATIONS

The South African government is presently moving ahead with its South African style "remodelling plan." This is called the Border Industrial Area policy and will disperse groups of factories from the traditional industrial zones to the "borders" of the Africans' "homelands." The first reason is political - to "solve" the contradictions of apartheid. Take the Johannesburg industrial zone, for instance. It is getting so large that the Black labor force which is streaming in is overflowing the Soweto Black housing area -- which now may be a city of more than a million inhabitants. With these Africans going to work every day from Soweto to the White district of Johannesburg, the Vorster regime lives in a daily fear akin to someone handling explosives. The second reason is economic. The cost of living in Johannesburg is the highest in South Africa; if new factory groups are built along the "Borders" with the homelands, a cheaper labor force than that which now comes from Soweto could be transported to work without the security and transportation problems found in large cities. The government calls this BIA plan the policy of "industrial decentralization."

In order to attract the White managers and employees to this BIA project, the government is considering various incentives for the companies which move to the area. For instance, it will approve things like a low wage system for the Black workers and tax holidays for the factories and will pay out of special funds for transportation facilities, schools, and housing for the White employees.

However, all BIA's are not necessarily found on the "borders" of homelands. Areas neighboring the industrial zones of

places like East London, Durban, Pietermaritzburg and Pretoria are also being built. The Rosslyn BIA near Pretoria, for instance, is a scheme to build Garankuwa as a new Black township of the Tswana people, forcing the Black people who are now living in Pretoria to move there and employing this labor force in the Rosslyn industrial area. The BIA projects, therefore, are not what the government calls its homeland policy. Garankuwa has obviously no connection whatsoever with a traditional Tswana homeland.

Now we must look at the problem of Japan's economic invasion. The automobile and electric appliance industries are typical of the Japanese business invading South Africa, with Toyota Motor Co. being the largest. Cars such as Toyota and Mazda are being manufactured and assembled at the Toyota Motor Assembly plant in Prospecton near Durban. Toyota South Africa, along with Datsun-Nissan South Africa, is listed on the Johannesburg stock exchange. Nissan has assembly and engine manufacturing plants in Rosslyn, fifteen miles northwest of Pretoria, and is employing Black workers from the Garankuwa Black township mentioned above.

Matsushita Electric, in partnership with the Barlows group (second largest concern in South Africa after Anglo-American) is in operation assembling various electric appliances, starting with refrigerators and air conditioners at a plant by the name of National in the Kew area near Johannesburg. In July 1974 Sharp Electric established a plant in Johannesburg to assemble portable electrical calculators. This was built with the R67 million cleared in sales of calculators since they went on sale in February 1973. And in 1974 profits are expected to be 4 times those of 1973. Hitachi Electric has been exporting electrical products like transistor radios and hi-fi's to South Africa for 10 years, and in 1969 it started to export car radios in partnership with Nissan-Datsun. In less than a year they dominated the market, not only in South Africa but in Rhodesia as well, and from September 1970 Hitachi started producing 3-band car radios at Durban's Pinetown because, according to a company's press release, "The volume of car radio sales has grown to such a level that it is economically feasible to produce car radios locally at even lower prices than the imported models." The South African

government has assigned Colored laborers as the sector to be employed in electric appliances industry.

Almost all the factories of Japanese corporations invested in South Africa are in the BIAs, where, as a White industrial zone, the owners of corporations have a free hand with respect to wages and working conditions, being exempt from the regulations of both the Wage Board and Industrial Council (the agency for labor-management relations). It is exactly like the export free zones of south Korea, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. Workers are employed from Black townships by the Labor Bureau and a worker who has been dismissed is not allowed to remain in the BIA for more than 72 hours.

Suppose a labor dispute arises over, say, a Black worker being unfairly dismissed. Even if the worker who has been deported to his "homeland" appeals to the homeland leader to intervene, leaders have no authority whatsoever, for it is forbidden by law for BIA corporations to negotiate directly with homeland leaders over workers' employment problems. Not only that, but this would be "intervention" in the internal affairs of the Republic of South Africa.

The fact that the factories of Japanese subsidiaries are almost all built in the BIAs is due to fact that Japan's business entry is relatively new, compared with Britain and the U.S.; because of having, as Asians, to operate enterprises under a special "honorary White" status; and most importantly, because of the Japanese government's policy forbidding "direct investment in South Africa."

All Japanese assembly plants are financed by South Africans, so the Japanese have virtually no voice in the management, and, faithfully following the South African government's "reconstruct-

ion plan," they established their factories in BIAs. Thus it is not surprising that the wages and working conditions are worst at these Japanese subsidiaries. Let's take as a typical example, the automobile industry. As far as sales go, Toyota is way ahead, having passed Ford 2 or 3 years ago.

It is clear from a glance at the table that Nissan pays less than half the minimum wage paid by American companies Ford and GM. It is far below the Poverty Datum Line. Even in Durban where the labor movement is more active than anywhere else in South Africa, Toyota's wage is far below that of American companies. The reason American and Japanese enterprises are so different is because in January of this year the starting hourly wage for Black workers was set at 56 cents by the Industrial Council of the Automobile Industry at Port Elizabeth. However, this agreement has no effect in the BIAs. That is, the 56 cent agreement has nothing to do with either Toyota or Nissan.

Why then do Ford and GM pay a higher wage than the PDL? The reason is simple: because of political pressure of anti-apartheid groups, in which churches play a prominent role, within the United States. American companies started paying wages above the PDL as of only one year ago. It was certainly not something the companies themselves wanted to do. A year ago when the National Council of Churches' Corporate Information Center investigated, ITT was the only American company paying over the PDL.

I would like to say something here about the process by which Japanese companies invest in South Africa. As was already mentioned above, because of the Japanese government's stated policy on apartheid in the United Nations, it does not permit direct investment by the corporation in South Africa. But it does permit trade, so companies go in under the name of "trade."

The most popular method is, in the case of automobiles, etc., to begin by going all out to export finished products from Japan through a South African sale agent. Then having obtained a certain share of the market even with the method of dumping, with the profits accumulated from sales in South Africa, augmented by local capital, a subsidiary is

1974 JANUARY MINIMUM WAGE LIST FOR BLACK WORKERS
IN THE AUTO INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA

Name of Company	Site of Plant	Minimum hourly wage	Monthly wage	P.D.L.*	M.E.L.*
Ford, GM	Port Elizabeth	56 c	R 110.80	78.58	117.87
Citroen, V.W.	Port Elizabeth	47			
Toyota	Durban	38	76.95	78.13	117.19
Chrysler	Pretoria	35			
Peugot		32			
Datsun-Nissan	Pretoria	25	49.45	75.44	113.16

* Johannesburg Chamber of Commerce figures for 1973 for Black family of six.

set up and a "knock-down," in other words, assembly plant is built. The Japanese side has only to sell the franchise to make about the same profit it did exporting and sell the unassembled kits. But since the product is assembled in South Africa, customs duty is much lower than for imported finished goods, so it can be sold at a cheaper price, and hence more sales.

The South African government does not formally allow 100 per cent knock-down. Automobiles must have 60 per cent domestic contents. The Japanese companies have found a good loophole for this. Instead of interpreting this 60 per cent domestic contents limit in terms of price, they use weight. They honor this regulation by earmarking parts like the auto seats, which though heavy don't cost much, for domestic contents manufactured in South Africa. Toyota, in terms of value, is said to be 85 per cent knock-down.

Even in the first stage of selling finished goods, it used the traditional dumping method. I learned that in the case of tires, since 1969 big makers like Bridgestone Tyre and Yokohama Rubber have had tremendous sales with a retail price 30 per cent cheaper than that of South African Dunlop or Goodyear. Sales increased rapidly from R370,000 in 1969 to R4,300,000 in 1970. Then in 1972 they built local manufacturing plants in partnership with a South African distributor.

Toyota Motor South Africa has been the most successful company in South Africa. Looking at the statistics for January to June of last year, Toyota sales of family cars in South Africa was 7,476 and of commercial vehicles and trucks, 11,814, accounting for a 22 per cent share -- the largest -- of the market.

American and German makes followed, but compared to the same period the previous year they experienced an overall drop in sales. Only Toyota and other Japanese automobiles like Nissan recorded an increase. The Toyota South Africa Co.'s profit totals for 1973 were R5,170,000, a 42 per cent increase over 1972. Re-exports from South Africa were R96,000 in 1972, but shot up to R660,000 in 1973. It is thought that some portion of this volume was possibly reexported to Rhodesia.

Toyota started knock-down in South Africa in 1962, and in 1972 began construction of its present Prospecton plant near Durban with funds of R15 million. Employing a total of 3,700 employees, daily output is 230 units and expected to go up to 600; for Toyota Motor Co. this is the biggest plant outside of Japan. And South Africa is the 3rd largest market for finished automobiles from Japan after America-Canada and Europe.

Then on August 30th of last year Toyota announced it had built a truck factory in its motor assembly plant complex in Prospecton with funds of R1.8 million. Production started on September 1st of the 7-ton DA 110 with the Hino Diesel engine. Total output from September to December of last year is estimated at 100 units and will go up by 50 units daily in 1975.

TOYOTA ENCOUNTERS THE LABOR MOVEMENT

Since Toyota's assembly plant is found in Prospecton some 50 miles from Durban it inevitably met with the wave of the Black workers labor movement since Durban has been the center. At the beginning of February 1974, Black workers went to the Toyota management to demand a raise in wages. At the time its plant was built in November of 1972, Toyota was pay-



ing the incredibly low minimum hourly wage of 22 cents. This came to R43.5. (about \$65.26) per month. It was finally raised in January of last year to 38 cents. And the average wage per hour was only 44 cents. The workers wanted an average hourly wage of R1, but the management's reply was an hourly raise of 2 cents.

The workers were dissatisfied with this and in the middle of negotiations 400 black workers in the body shop stopped their machines and went on a wildcat strike. 1,600 more joined the strike the next day, so that out of 3,200 people 2,000 were on strike. With this, the 235 vehicle-a-day production line at the plant, including Mazda, was completely halted.

In Durban there is a Black workers union called the United Automobile and Rubber Workers Union. At an interview at the motor assembly plant, swamped by journalists, industrial relations manager Bob Devlin declared, "A local of the Automobile Rubber Workers Union for Blacks has been in existence at our plant for 8 or 9 months. But it has only 400 members out of 3,200 workers. If this number exceeds 50 per cent we are ready to sit down and enter into negotiations with them." The Black workers are presently busy in organizing the 2,000 workers who participated in the strike into its membership. Thanks to the strike, the minimum hourly wage, which up to then had been 38 cents, went up to 41 cents.

Now the focus of attention is on whether or not subsidiaries of the foreign corporations in South Africa are going to ignore Vorster's labor laws and recognize the right of unionized Black workers to negotiate. At the beginning of 1974 the South African multinational Oppenheimer Anglo-American corporation showed signs of recognizing Black workers' unions but the move was stopped by Vorster's Minister of Labor.

Then in March, Black workers at Leyland assembly plant, a South African subsidiary of a United Kingdom Automobile Co., demanded the union right. In response to this the company fired 104 of the activists. In spite of the fact that the African workers asserted that 100 per cent of the workers were organized in the Black Metal Allied Workers Union, the company said that it would negotiate only through a company's liaison committee,

established by the management.

But there was a problem here. A select committee of the British House of Commons discussed the charges made by the Guardian and passed a decree, "Subsidiaries of British companies must recognize workers' right to negotiate." After a week-long dispute the South African subsidiary issued its answer, "We recognize the labor union to which the workers the Leyland plant belong." But suddenly the following week the firing of 65 more people was announced. This British subsidiary, under pressure from the South African government had refused the recognition of the Black workers' union. This made people realize all too painfully that no matter what resolutions the British parliament comes out with, the South African government is much stronger.

Now everyone's attention is focused on what Toyota's manager Devlin said last May about recognizing the union if it succeeded in organizing more than 50 per cent of the workers.

Questions like "What kind of labor statutes is the Japanese government making its subsidiaries abroad?" and "What kind of support are Japanese labor unions, especially auto unions ready to give black workers in South Africa?" are frequently asked. Correct answers to these questions put forward by the South Africa's valiant Black workers are the only way ahead for all Japanese workers to reinstitute ourselves as true members of the third world. ● ●



MASS ARRESTS IN MALAYSIA

In mid-December of 1974, the Malay government instituted campaign of repression against the independent university student movement and political activists, which is described in the accompanying appeal letter. Several significant events provide the background for this incident.

On August 24, Malaysian Premier Tun Abdul Razak's Barisan Nasional was returned to power in a carefully staged and well controlled election, which was, of course, hailed as an expression of national unity. The government's main campaign plank was a plan to give the impoverished Malay people preferential treatment in educational and job opportunities, the supposed intention of bringing the Malays up to the level of the Chinese and Indians; the Razak government thus is extremely sensitive to any manifestations of Malay opposition. But the desperately poor Malays have mounted two nationwide movements since last August, aimed at forcing the government to make good their campaign promises. Both movements have been met with violent retaliation, as the government tries to smother the cries of opposition to its grand "National unity."

The first movement began when 134 landless urban Malay families set up wooden shacks on undeveloped land on the southern tip of the Malay peninsula, shortly before the election. Two weeks after the election, riot squads and demolition teams entered the settlement and destroyed all the homes. The peasants, left homeless, decided to encamp in front of the local State Secretariat building to publicize their plight. Students from the University of Malaya and activists from the Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya (PSRM: Malayan Peoples' Socialist Party) assisted the peasants in building tents for protection from the rain in front of the Secretariat. News of the movement spread quickly, and soon money, food and clothing began flowing in to the peasants from all over Malaya. Large demonstrations were organized at many Malayan universities but were dispersed by riot police and right-

wing paramilitary groups. On September 19 and 22, riot police invaded the peasants' encampment with pistols, machine guns and tear gas, arresting 42 squatters and 11 supporters, and effectively dispersing the demonstration. The struggle is far from over, though; the students are spreading the lessons to other areas, and building for the scheduled January trials of those arrested. The demonstrations themselves were somewhat successful, as the government was forced to provide housing to the original squatters and to make efforts to improve the general housing situation.

The second movement is the object of this appeal. It began as a protest against the low price of rubber that was causing intense suffering to the peasants of Baling. The demonstrators are almost exclusively Malay, and they have attacked all the pro-government parties and threatened to use the guns that were issued to them to fight Communists against the government itself. News of the peasants' struggle quickly reached the universities, where strong demonstrations were organized in support. These demonstrations were met with unprecedented levels of repression, including mass arrests, causing an emergency situation for Malaysian activists. AMPO urges all readers to actively protest this wave of repression by following the suggestions of Kamal's letter.

(NOTE: The Internal Security Act is Malaysia's equivalent of the south Korean Anti-Communist Law, except that there is no provision whatsoever for court trials or other hearings. The ISA charges are very different from "unlawful assembly" or "riot" charges as these are heard before a court. The future is, therefore, very bleak for those arrested under the ISA.)

letter from malaysia

Selamat Ahmad Kamal,
President, University Sains of Malaysia
Students' Union
Batu Uban, Penang
December 11, 1974

Dear Friends,

I am the President of the Students' Union of the University Sains, Malaysia and at present am in hiding. I am writing this letter to you from my hide-out to seek your support to end the reign of terror launched by the Malaysian Government against our students. More than 14 student leaders, 2 university professors, one university lecturer and one youth leader have been detained under the obnoxious Internal Security Act which enables a Minister to detain a citizen indefinitely without trial. This law is used by the Government to detain anyone who poses a real and immediate threat to the monopoly of power by a small group of rich people. Several hundred people are still under detention under this anti-democratic law, some of them for more than 10 years.

Under the current reign of terror many student leaders have now been forced to go into hiding to escape the Government dragnet. Although we are in hiding, our struggle for justice and democracy, and against exploitation, corruption and abuse of power by the authorities continues with the same, if not increased, intensity and dedication. I shall, in this letter, attempt to describe briefly the events preceding the current reign of terror.

Malaysia is among the richest countries in South East Asia, having a per capita income of more than M\$1,200/-per annum (US\$480/-). Yet many of our people are extremely poor. Even the Government admits that 40 per cent of our people live below the poverty line. This situation worsened with the recent drop in the price of rubber and the steep increase in the price of food. The income of many families in places like Baling, Selama and Kulim fell sharply, below M\$25/- (US\$10/-) per month per household. They could not afford rice and had to be content with eating tapioca. Some lived on tubers found in the jungle. Several children died as a result of eating wild poisonous tubers. According to the State Assemblyman from Baling, when he visited the home of one of the victim's families, he did not find a single grain of rice there.

The peasants from these districts appealed to the authorities, including the 'peoples' representatives for help but they received only empty promises. Therefore they decided to dramatise their plight by means of demonstrations to force the authorities to take some remedial measures. They marched by thousands to the various district towns, some walking as far as 22 miles. They surrounded the district offices and demanded to speak to the Chief Minister of the State. In one place, they lowered the State flag and in its place raised a bunch of tapioca and the portrait of the Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, together with a slogan. The slogan read "Razak, we do not want to eat tapioca." They demanded that the price of rubber be raised, the price of food lowered, and the allowances and salaries of Ministers and 'peoples' representatives be cut. (There is a bill before Parliament to increase the salaries and allowances of Ministers and 'peoples' representatives by 50 per cent).

On December 2, 1974 the students from all the universities and colleges staged peaceful mass demonstrations throughout the country in support of the just demands of the peasants. Some 10,000 students demonstrated in Kuala Lumpur, 2,000 in Penang, and 1,000 in Ipoh. The students did not carry any weapons, not even a stick. They did not cause any inconvenience to the public. In Kuala

Lumpur the students wanted to hold a rally in the Selangor Padang to explain to the public the plight of the poor people and their demands. Instead of commending the students for their selflessness and deep concern for the people, the Government sent truck-loads of riot police to disperse them. The police fired tear gas and beat them up. The students ran and took sanctuary in the National Mosque thinking that the police would not attack them there. Before entering the mosque, they took off their shoes.

The riot police came charging into the mosque with their filthy boots on. They beat up the students who, in self defence, picked up whatever they could find in the mosque compound, including bricks, and fought back. The police also fired tear gas into the mosque. Using the mass media, including radio, television, and all the newspapers, the Government is trying to misrepresent this incident to the public by accusing the students of desecrating the mosque. By this dirty trick, they hope to bring the public into confrontation with the students. We are hopeful and confident that the Government's vile attempt to divide the people from the students will fail.

More than 1,200 students and members of the public have been charged in Court in connection with these demonstrations. Not content with this repression, the Government followed this up by arresting and detaining some 3 university lecturers and one youth leader under the Internal Security Act. This wave of repression reached its climax in the early hours of the 8th and 9th days of December 1974 when the Military (euphemistically called "the Field Force") invaded University of Malaya, University Kebangsaan and the University Sains Malaysia and occupied them. In Gestapo-like fashion they then made room to room searches and using informers, they arrested some 14 student leaders and detained them under the Internal Security Act.

At present these universities are still being occupied by the Military. The public are not allowed access to the university grounds. Students are searched before entering the universities by armed soldiers. The Government has threatened to cancel the scholarships of all those students who took part in the demonstration. This will be a hard blow to the students, most of whom come from very poor peasant or worker families. The police harass the students if they distribute pamphlets or go to the villages to explain issues. Some student leaders even fear that the Government may use thugs to beat them up. The Government repression has not deterred the students from pursuing their struggle. Demonstrations are being held daily and the students are going to the police to explain the real issues, since the radio, T.V. and the newspapers have become the mouthpiece of the Government for spreading lies and slanders against the students, and sowing dissension in the ranks of the people.

As usual, the Government has accused "the Communists" (without identifying those "communists") of being responsible for the demonstrations. According to the Prime Minister, the communists instigated the students who, in turn, instigated the people in the villages. Anyone with some commonsense will realise that Tun Razak is telling a blatant LIE. Many men and children walked more than 22 miles, braving the rain, to demonstrate their plight. Will anyone walk this distance merely because of instigation from the communists or the students? Certainly NO. Only the pangs of hunger and the cry of the babies for food can compel a person to walk this distance, and not instigations from outside. Tun Razak knows this but he is blaming the Communists to divert the attention of the people from the real issues of hunger and poverty in the rural areas.


I expect further repression from the Government in the near future. Those who are being detained under the Internal Security Act may be detained without any legal redress for many years. Only the support and agitation of our people and our friends overseas can bring pressure on the Government to abandon its criminal acts. Therefore, on behalf of my fellow students and the poor people of Malaysia, I appeal to you to give your support to our struggle in the following ways.

1. Send letters and telegrams to the Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, protesting against the Government repression, calling for unconditional release of all those detained or charged in Court, and urging the Government to meet the just demands of the peasants and students.
2. Organize demonstrations and protest meetings for the abovestated purposes.
3. Help to distribute and publicize this letter.

I firmly believe that the struggle of the common people for justice and democracy will finally triumph despite the power and might of the rulers.

Thank you

Yours fraternally,



PERSONS DETAINED UNDER THE INTERNAL SECURITY ACT

- | | |
|------------------------------|--|
| 1. Dr. Syed Hussein Ali | Associate Professor
University of Malaya |
| 2. Tungku Shamshul Bahrain | Associate Professor
University of Malaya |
| 3. Gurdial Singh Wijar | Lecturer, University of Malaya |
| 4. Annuar Ibrahim | President, Angkatan
Belia Islam Malaysia
(Malaysia Islamic Youth Movement) |
| 5. Mohd. Idris Jusi | President of the National
Union of Malaysian Students |
| 6. Abdul Rahman Rukaini | President, University
Kebangsaan Students' Union |
| 7. Hassanuddin Yeop | Deputy President University
Kebangsaan Students' Union |
| 8. Ahmad Shah Bin Mohd. Noor | Secretary-General
National Union of Islamic
Student of Malaysia |
| 9. Adi Kastria | Assistant Secretary-General
of University Malaya Students Union |
| 10. Basroh Hassan | Secretary-General University
Lobangsaan Students' Union |
| 11. Mohamed Hussain | Secretary-General of MARA
Institute of Technology
Students' Union |
| 12. Ibrahim Ali | President of the MARA
Institute of Technology Students' Union |
| 13. Ishak Jaafar | Deputy President of MARA
Institute of Technology Students' Union |
| 14. Zainuddin Abdul Rashid | President Kedah Students
Union University Malaya |
| 15. Shukri Hj. Abdullah | President of Islamic Society
of University Sains Malaysia |
| 16. Hoo Kee Ping | President of Social Science
Society University Sains Malaysia |
| 17. Lai Sung Kit | President of Chinese Language
Society of University Sains Malaysia |
| 18. Teoh Thian San | Student Leader |

Student and Labor Leaders Framed in Singapore

Two Singapore workers and a student leader are facing trial on trumped-up charges of "rioting" and are appealing for international support. Ng Wah Ling and Yap Kim Khong, workers, and Tan Wah Piow, an architectural student and President of the University of Singapore Student Union, were arrested on November 1 in connection with a workers' dispute at American Marine.

On October 18 American Marine -- a company which makes luxury yachts -- suddenly fired 1200 workers on two minutes' notice. The company-controlled union refused to act on their behalf, and on October 30 some 200 workers gathered at the union office demanding to see the chairman. The union officials locked them out, and the workers then heard the

sound of furniture and glass being broken up inside the offices. Wondering if a frame-up was being planned, the workers waited until 4:00 p.m. and then dispersed.

The Straits Times (Singapore's English language daily) reported the incident but mentioned no rioting.

The following day the three were arrested for illegal assembly and rioting. Tan is a well-known activist who has been working to build solidarity between the student and workers' movements, and his arrest had been predicted for some time.

Supporters of the three are making an urgent international appeal, the text of which is printed below.

The problem of retrenchment is a growing one in Singapore. Since June, 1974, about 14,000 workers have been laid-off. Although the retrenchment has been claimed to be due to the recession in the 'advanced, industrialized countries,' the corporations involved have been quick to manipulate the situation by shifting operations out of Singapore (tax-holiday periods for many companies have expired, and the minimum wage level in Singapore has also risen in recent years). Workers are given extremely short notice of their retrenchment. They are not paid any compensation in some cases and wages have been in the form of coupons exchangeable only at supermarkets of the government-run union PIEU (Pioneer Industries Employees' Union).

Not surprisingly, therefore, the PIEU has collaborated rather actively with management against the workers. For example, the retrenched workers from American Marine who had sought help at the office of their Secretary-General Phey Yew Kok, had to wait eight and a half hours before the latter consented to arrive under the protection of a police escort. He hurled abuse at 'his' union members, and was generally not only unsympathetic, but even intimidating. At a similarly futile gathering the following week, union officials acting on orders, smashed furniture and windows of the PIEU union house to simulate a riot by workers. The following night, Tan Wah Piow, president of the University of Singapore Students Union (USSU) was arrested along with 2 workers. Tan Wah Piow was also head of the USSU Retrenchment Research Center, which had just been established in direct response to the plight of workers jointly oppressed by their union, the state and foreign corporations. Wah Piow had previously publicly accused Phey Yew Kok (also a member of the ruling People's Action Party and an MP) and the PIEU of incompetency and gross neglect of workers' welfare. Their trials were set for December 11, 1974, before the notorious judge of the 1st District Court of Singapore.

This frame-up has aroused deep concern and protest by student bodies in Singapore, Malaysia, Australia and New Zealand.

This blatant violation of basic human rights should come as no surprise

to anyone even vaguely familiar with Singapore's history of systematic repression and exploitation: the Internal Security Act, 1963 (the replacement of the draconic British Preservation of Public Security Ordinance which Lee Kwan Yew himself had so eloquently condemned before he came to power); the Suitability Certificate, a subclause of the ISA, which is required for entry into all institutions of higher learning in the island; the arbitrary withdrawal of citizenship; the prohibition of public assembly and procession except by license; the practice of only issuing annual publicaiton licenses; the newly implemented Press Act (which gives the government-selected 1 per cent management shareholders 75 per cent of the voting rights); the Employment Act, 1968 (1 of its more infamous clauses outlaws strikes); the right of the government to arbitrarily label and evict 'undesirable' dwellers from their Housing Development Board flats, etc.

With the effective neutralization of all other opposition, student organizations like USSU, the Singapore Polytechnic Students Union, the Ngee Ann Technical College Students Union and the Nanyang University Students Union have become the only voice of the silenced majority. Recent events have shown that the Lee Kuan Yew government is now on the move to eliminate this last channel of popular grievance. It is hoped that international pressure may prevent such continuing acts of repression. We appeal to our friends to

- 1) send petitions to the Singapore Embassy in your country demanding that justice be observed in the current trial of Tan Wah Piow, Ng Wah Ling and Yap Kim Khong; and
- 2) donate urgently needed funds for their defence to: Yeow and Raman, 27-B North Canal Road, Singapore 1, Republic of Singapore. Checks should be specified for 'TAN, NG & YAP COURT DEFENCE FUND.' ● ●

THE SOH BROTHERS' CASE : Tortured In Pak's Prisons

Soh Joon Shik is again in danger for his life. Arrested in south Korea in 1972, he has for two years been subjected to the torture, maltreatment, and neglect characteristic of Dictator Pak Chung Hee's prison system. Though he seemed to be recovering last spring, it is reported that he has recently again fallen ill, and has been running a fever since August. There is no reason to expect that he will receive medical attention unless there is an international demand for it.

Soh Joon Shik and his brother Soh Sung, are Koreans who were born in Japan and who returned to their homeland for study. Both were arrested in 1972 for "participating in the student movement," "communicating with the DPRK," etc., etc., Soh Sung is under a sentence of death; Soh Joon Shik is serving seven years.

Both are known to have been tortured to the edge of death.

On May 3, 1974 Rev. Nishimura Kan'ichi a member of the Japanese Diet, became the first Japanese to talk with Soh Joon Shik in prison. The following is the transcript of that interview, which was made before Soh's health again began to decline.

INTERVIEW WITH MR. SOH JOON SHIK BY MR. KAN'ICHI NISHIMURA, A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT

May 3, 1974

Kwangju Prison

This meeting took place in the warden's office with five other prison personnel, including a member of KCIA, Chunla Nando office, also attending. The

interview was conducted in Japanese.

Mr. Nishimura: How is Soh Joon Shik's health?

Warden: There is nothing wrong with his health and his mental condition is also good. When his mother came yesterday, I permitted her to see him.

Mr. Nishimura: How are his living conditions?

Warden: He has no special problems here. He will be here shortly.

(Mr. Soh Joon Shik, wearing the blue uniform of the prisoner with no handcuffs, entered the office.)

Mr. Nishimura: I am very glad to see you. *(putting out his hand)*

Soh Joon Shik: I have been waiting to see you.

Mr. Nishimura: Please speak honestly, without concealment.

Soh: It's not only for me that I ask for your help, but also for the other prisoners who are in the same position as I am. Your visit here is a rare opportunity.

Mr. Nishimura: How is your health?

Soh: After that trouble I had before, I've gradually been recovering my health. *(Soh had previously attempted suicide. His complexion was not so bad in spite of his nervous features.)*
I manage to keep body and soul together regardless of the insecurity and possibility of torture at any time.

Mr. Nishimura: I didn't come to meet you for the purpose of converting you.

Soh: I have already been tortured, but even if they are ready to kill me, I will not sign a declaration of conversion. I believe in Communism and have a vision for the future.

Mr. Nishimura: When did you become a Communist?

Soh: It was two years ago after I came to Korea. When I went back to Japan for vacations, I studied social science and became to believe in Communism.

Mr. Nishimura: No one has the right to deny you the right to your belief. Everyone is guaranteed the freedom of an ideology and faith in the World Declaration of the Rights of Man. But I think, through my own experience, that we must observe the problems of the hearts and souls of human beings as well as the social problems. Have you ever read the Bible?

Soh: Yes, I sometimes read it while in Daejeon Prison. But I don't have a chance for reading here because of the many restrictions. Yesterday, for the first time, I was allowed to read for one hour before my mother came. Until then, I didn't have any freedom at all.

Mr. Nishimura: Did you receive the presents sent to you in this prison?

Soh: No, I received nothing. No reading material, no letters, and no interviewers.

Warden: *(to Mr. Nishimura in Korean)* He can correspond with his family, but we forbid him to be in contact with anyone else. We give special treatment to the political prisoners. Soh Joon Shik, since he is young and his ideas are immature, also gets special treatment. We have never beaten him. He is treated better than the other prisoners. For example, I have met with him four times privately even though I was very busy. During the hot days of summer when other prisoners are assigned four to a room, he has his own private room. In winter when the others were given only one quilt for several people, he had one all to himself. On snowy days we allowed him to see the snow, and he was even permitted to go shopping in town and see a movie when he wanted to.

Soh: You lie! He's not telling the truth! There are severe tortures and terrorism in this prison.

Mr. Nishimura: Please tell me in what ways were you tortured.

Soh: One freezing cold winter day I was stripped naked, tied up outside, and had water thrown on my body.

Warden: *(In Korean)* Stop! Stop! Oh, Stop!

Mr. Nishimura: Go on and tell me what really happened.

Soh: They only gave me one blanket and this uniform, nothing more. After that they forced me to drink four kettles of water and then trod on my body to make me vomit. The torture and terrorism was so bad that I decided to kill myself. I just couldn't take it anymore. Through December, 1973 and January, 1974, the other political prisoners here were also tortured. Some of them were tortured for so long and so cruelly that they finally recanted under the terrible pressure. But I didn't because this isn't only the problem of my elder brother and myself, but of all political prisoners. Those who have inflicted all the torture and terrorism have been the prisoner ruffians, not the wardens. It wasn't only me, but all the political prisoners who refused to submit were tortured.

Warden: (*Apparently very confused and turning pale, in Korean*) No more! Stop!

Soh: I'm very serious now and am telling you the truth. (*He repeated this same utterance three times during the interview.*)

Warden: Everything he is telling you is false. I want to say this in front of him. We permit him to write letters and

(Continued from p. 61)

read. He has access to a lawyer whenever he wants one. But he never does, even when we encourage him to. He has always ignored our kindness, demanding to know why we don't treat the other political prisoners as well as we treat him. We have tried to soften their opposition by gathering all the non-convert political prisoners into one room. But instead, they united. They've been plotting to bring the prison cleaners on to their side. So, we changed from trying to influence the groups back to trying to influence the individuals again. (*At this point the warden was becoming angry*) He has told you some very extreme things, but we don't intend to treat him differently because of it. You don't have to worry about him. We'll take sufficient care of him.

Soh: Please make an appeal to the International Red Cross and to people all over the world.

(*Soh Joon Shik firmly shook hands with Mr. Nishimura. He then left with a smile.*)

(*The interview lasted about forty minutes.*) ● ●

Thieu vs. the people

Although few people still believe that Thieu will be able to hang on, there are no obvious candidates to replace him. But if the final shove does come from a military coup -- and that would have to come from the mid-levels, because higher ranking officers are simply too corrupt to be acceptable -- then Fr. Thanh will be in an excellent position to guide the formation of such a government, or at least to help avoid the sort of merry-go-round governments that followed the coup against Diem.

Third force figures would be prepared to play a role in a new government, too. General Duong Van ("Big") Minh, for example, has said that he is willing to play any role the people want him to in a government that really represents the people. But third force participation on the Saigon side is not absolutely necessary. If a rightist administration seriously interested in implementing the Paris Agreement comes to power, the third force will still have its role in the

National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord prescribed by the Agreement.

It is obvious that people in Saigon controlled areas need some solution to their basic problems of survival. American aid will no longer fill the gaps. And non-communist opponents of Thieu feel this is their last chance to set a progressive but not communist course for South Viet Nam. In a curious convergence of views with US intelligence observers, they think that if no solution is reached by the first months of 1975, PRG patience will be exhausted and the Paris Agreement will be abandoned.

At this point the happiest solution for all concerned would probably be for Thieu to fly off to Paris for medical treatment. But so long as he tries to hold on, things are likely to grow increasingly nasty. The next few months will almost certainly be punctuated by further bloodshed. ● ●



NOBEL PRIZE TO..... SATO!?

"This is a bad joke -- the worst kind of black humor."

"It's a joke that would win a prize in the Liars' Club Contest."

"It makes a mockery of the Nobel Prize."

These reactions by Japanese Diet members are typical. It was as though an April fool had come in October. On October 9 news arrived that ex-premier Sato Eisaku had won the Nobel Peace Prize for the "non-nuclear policy" and "contributions to the peace of the world" followed during his term of office.

The timing was perfect. Three days before the award was announced, retired U.S. Rear Admiral Gene R. Larocque testified in Washington that U.S. warships do not off-load their nuclear weapons before visiting Japan, thus collapsing a myth carefully nurtured by the government here. Then on October 8, the New York Times quoted a U.S. Department of Defense source as saying that the Japanese government had been informed that U.S. ships carry nuclear weapons to Japan.

Thus the Nobel Prize came just at the moment when Sato's "non-nuclear policy" was finally being exposed as a fraud. The Mainichi Shimbun (Oct. 8, 1974) declared that if the Larocque statement is true, the Japanese government had been making fools of the people. Far from genuinely representing the Japanese people's anti-nuclear sentiment, the Sato government and its successors have consistently sought to undermine and betray that sentiment as far as they were politically able.

A look at the rest of Sato's "peaceful" record:

*The first nuclear submarine visited Japan immediately after his inauguration.

*In June 1965 his government rammed through the Japan-ROK Treaty, instrumental in building up the present Park dictatorship.

*When the bombing of North Vietnam began, Sato pledged to support the U.S.

*During his term of office Japan's Self-Defense Forces became the strongest military force in "free Asia."

*While his government signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it refused to put it to the Diet for ratification, and it has still not been ratified.

*When Okinawa was returned to Japanese sovereignty, Sato claimed that all nuclear weapons had been removed from the islands, but the evidence mounts that this is not true.

How then did he get the prize? The press reports that there was a year-long Nobel-Prize-for-Sato drive led by his aides and financial backers, and supported by Premier Tanaka and Henry Kissinger.

But if it was a tactic to help lull the Japanese people away from their stubborn opposition to nuclear weapons, the Larocque statement has ruined that possibility. Anti-nuclear sentiment is rising, and for the first time mayors and governors of port areas are threatening to refuse entry to suspicious U.S. ships. Japan's "nuclear allergy" is alive and well, raising its fist again at Yokosuka and Sasebo. ● ●

TANAKA RETIRES WITH A HOPE

By HARA TAIRA

